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ABSTRACT

DELIBERATION IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS AND THE
HIPPOCRATIC CORPUS
Anna M. Cremaldi
Supervisor: Susan Sauvé Meyer

Many scholars view Aristotle as the source of the particularist position in modern ethics –
the view that action-guiding principles cannot capture the complexity of moral cases.
John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and other particularists have developed this aspect of
Aristotle’s ethics. Rather than aiming to provide an account of action-guiding principles
– the view goes – moral philosophers should provide a theory that focuses on situational
sensitivity, judgment and moral perception. In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle was
not a particularist. While he does highlight the importance of moral perception and the
complexity of moral cases, Aristotle’s claims are consistent with the endorsement of an
important role for action-guiding principles in deliberation.
The dissertation shows as much by taking a new methodological approach to the
study of Aristotle’s ethics. Scholars tend to focus on Aristotle’s texts alone to resolve
interpretive questions. I approach Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as if it were part of a
genre of treatises on practical sciences. This methodological approach requires that we
read Aristotle’s ethics in a new way, since it encourages us to see trends that stand out
only in relief against the backdrop of Aristotle’s intellectual context. Specifically, I argue

v
that studying the Hippocratic Corpus will help to resolve the interpretive debate about
Aristotle’s particularism. More generally, it will also help to resolve other outstanding
interpretive problems concerning, for example, the technê analogy, perception of
particulars and the status of universals in ethics.
Thus, in my dissertation I highlight the significant thematic overlap between
Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the Hippocratic Corpus’s presentation of medical
deliberation. While Hippocratic treatises express many of the same concerns and
concepts that are found in textual evidence invoked by the particularists, they do not
support a particularist interpretation of medical practice. Rather, in the Hippocratic
Corpus, general theories and principles play an action-guiding role in medical
deliberation, and they help us to see how an analogous case may be true of ethical
deliberation on Aristotle’s account.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What the Phronimos Knows

1 What the Phronimos Knows
At the beginning of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that one
must have a mark or goal (skopos) in light of which he makes decisions. In order to hit
the mean (meson)(EN 1138b18-9), the virtuous person must have a standard (horos) or
mark (skopos) with reference to which he aims (b22-3). “There is a mark to which the
man who possesses reason looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly” (b224). Just as the doctor makes decisions about patients by consulting a standard – a
conception of health - the virtuous person also makes decisions by consulting a standard.
Having established that one must have such a standard to make good decisions,
Aristotle owns that it is unhelpful only to know as much. For if one knew only that he
should have a standard, he would be “no clearer” about the manner in which he should
act.
But such a statement, though true, is by no means illuminating…. If a man had only
this knowledge he would be none the wiser - e.g. we should not know what sort of
medicines to apply to our body is some one were to say ‘all those which the medical
art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art’
(1138b26-29).1
1

All translations are from the Barnes edition of Aristotle’s works, unless otherwise noted.
In Greek, the passage reads: e1sti de\ to_ me\n ei0pei=n ou3twj a)lhqe\j me/n, ou)qe\n de\
safe/j…. tou~to de\ mo&non e1xwn a1n tij ou)de\n a2n ei0dei/h ple/on, oi[on poi=a dei=
prosfe/resqai pro_j to_ sw~ma, ei1 tij ei1peien o3ti o3sa h( i0atrikh_ keleu&ei kai\ w(j o(
tau&thn e1xwn.

2
If a doctor in training asked: ‘what medicine should I administer to this patient?’ it would
be perverse for the expert doctor to reply: ‘whatever the best medical judgment would
prescribe.’ Similarly, if a person trying to become virtuous were to ask: ‘how should I
act in this situation?’ it would be entirely unhelpful for the moral expert to answer:
‘whatever reason prescribes’ or ‘whatever a virtuous person (like me) would do.’ Thus
Aristotle owns that, in claming that the choiceworthy action is determined by reason
(orthos logos)(1138b20; b25; b29), he has not said much by way of telling us how to act.
Since Aristotle acknowledges the unhelpfulness of these descriptions of good action
at the beginning of Book VI, we have very good reason to suspect that he will provide an
action-guiding account in later parts of Book VI. Indeed, earlier chapters of the Ethics
provide even more reason to suspect that such an account will ultimately be offered. For
Aristotle claims that the Nicomachean Ethics has been written in order to help us
‘become good.’2 The ethical inquiry “does not aim at theoretical knowledge…for we are
inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good, since
toherwise our inquiry would have been of no use” (1103b27-9).
Does Book VI fulfill our expectations of an action-guiding account? Yes, in some
ways, for it explains the mechanism of decision-making and several important features of
phronêsis. From Book VI, we learn that: the domain of practical knowledge consists of
matters related to the good for man (1140b5); such matters are variable and can ‘be
otherwise’ (1139a8, a14; 1140b2-3); because they can ‘be otherwise,’ the truths of

2

The claim that the purpose of the Nicomachean Ethics is to make us ‘become good’: EN
II.2, 1103b27-29; Cf. II.4, 1105b9-12, X.9, 1179a33–b4.

practical knowledge hold only ‘usually’ or ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu);

3

3

nevertheless, practical knowledge admits of being true or false; practical truth is attained
when there is agreement between reason (orthos logos) and desire (orexis)(1139a24-6);
and the scope of practical knowledge is constrained by the fact that practical knowledge
is in the service of action (praxis). Thus, the need for depth of explanation of the claims
of practical knowledge is mitigated, at least in comparison with theoretical knowledge
(EN 1102a17-3).
Book VI also helpfully characterizes the nature of practical knowledge in
contradistinction to other forms of knowledge. Practical knowledge is not scientific
(epistêmê) (VI.3) Scientific knowledge concerns matters that hold ‘by necessity’
(1140b1), and practical matters can ‘be otherwise.’ Nor is it craft-like (technê)(VI.4).
Knowledge of the standard by which we deliberate, according to Aristotle, is “not the
object of any art (technê)” (1140a29-30).
But none of this provides the action-guiding standard we expect to find in Book VI.
Moreover, when we look elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics for an action-guiding
standard, Aristotle’s discussion of the matter is less than clear. The phronimos
deliberates with reference to a conception of ‘living well’ (to eu zên)(1140a28).4
3

Hôs epi to polu sometimes means ‘in general,’ as in ‘x is, in general, the case: EN
1110a32, 1129a24; 1161a27; 1164b31; EE 1220b13; 1228b4; 1231a27; 1247b28. This
use of hôs epi to polu seems to have synonyms like epi polu: EN 1121b16; 1126b8.
However, Aristotle also uses hôs epi to polu as a term of art. Hôs epi to polu is
contrasted with ‘always’ (aei) and chance (tuche): 1247a32, a35. It is also used to
describe the characteristic form of knowledge in politics: EN 1094b21. Deliberation
(bouleusis) is directed at what happens hôs epi to polu: 1112b9.
4
It seems that the phronimos is the person who is capable of deliberating well with
regard to (pros) living well as a whole: dokei= dh_ froni/mou ei]nai to_ (du&nasqai kalw~j
bouleu&sasqai…a)lla_ poi=a pro_j to_ eu} zh~n o3lwj. For a discussion of the relationship

4
However, all people – the hoi polloi and the ‘gentlemen’ alike – identify happiness
(eudaimonia) with ‘living well’ (eu zên) and ‘faring well’ (eu prattein) (1095a19-20).5
Thus, to claim that one makes decisions according to a conception of living well tells us
nothing about how we ought to live. I.e. it does not provide an action-guiding standard.
Aristotle’s account of the kalon is far more promising in this respect. The phronimos
chooses for the sake of the ‘admirable’ or the ‘noble’ (kalon, EE 1230a27-35).6 The
phronimos is thus different from other agents in that he deliberates with reference to the
kalon. We learn much about the kalon throughout the Nicomachean Ethics. For
between eudamonia and eu prattein, see McDowell 1988. I agree with McDowell that it
would be a mistake to think of eu prattein as promoting or serving as the means to
eudaimonia. To act well (eu prattein) just is to realize eudaimonia. This point can be
helpfully illustrated by a chess example. On the one hand, there is winning a chess game,
which is the player’s aim. On the other hand, one moves the pieces in order to promote
his aim – namely winning. Of course, there is a considerable difference between winning
the game (aim) and moving a piece (promoting the aim). McDowell correctly denies that
Aristotle regards eu prattein as a way of promoting eudaimonia. Rather, each particular
action is an instance of eudaimonia - hence, his emphasis on the equivalence between
eudaimonia and eu prattein (90-1). This point is significant, as we shall see later,
because McDowell rejects Irwin interpretation of the claim that x is pros y. For Irwin
reads Aristotle’s pros as ‘promotes’ – as in ‘good action promotes happiness,’ according
to McDowell: “Irwin says that he is using “promotes” “simply to indicate the relation or
relations Aristotle has in mind in saying that x is pros y, or that we do x heneka y”
(McDowell 1988, 90).
5
th_n ga_r eu)daimoni/an kai\ oi9 polloi\ kai\ oi9 xari/entej le/gousin, to_ d' eu} zh~n kai\ to_
eu} pra&ttein tau)to_n u(polamba&nousi tw|~ eu)daimonei=n. This passage suggests that
Aristotle identifies eu prattein as the goal of the virtuous and the non-virtuous alike.
However, in NE VI, he associates eu prattein with the phronimos specifically. For
Aristotle claims that the telos of phronesis is eupraxia (1140b6-7).
6
That for the sake of which (hou heneka) we choose (hairêsis) is the kalon: 1230a27 -35.
tou~to de\ pw~j le/gomen, ei1rhtai pro&teron, o3ti e3neka& tinoj pa&nta ai9rei=sqai poiei=,
kai\ tou~to& e0sti to_ ou{ e3neka, to_ kalo&n), dh~lon o3ti kai\ h( a)ndrei/a a)reth&
tij ou}sa e3neka& tinoj poih&sei ta_ fobera_ u(pome/nein, w3st' ou1te di' a1gnoian (o)rqw~j
ga_r ma~llon poiei= kri/nein) ou1te di' h(donh&n, a)ll' o3ti kalo&n, e0pei/, a1n ge mh_ kalo_n h|}
a)lla_ maniko&n, ou)x u(pome/nei: ai0sxro_n ga&r. Thanks for the card! You are sending
it early, and I won't open it until the actual day arrives. I should have left
Auntoann's card in the envelope too. See Michael Pakaluk – p.157. We perform
brave (andreia) actions for the sake of (hou heneka) the kalon (1115b23-4);

5
example, in his account of the character virtues, Aristotle explains that the generous
person will give gifts for the sake of the kalon (1120a23-6), that the magnanimous man
will undertake large expenditures on behalf of the city for the sake of the kalon (1122b67), and that the courageous person aims for the kalon attained in battle rather than staying
alive for its own sake (1117b14).7 Thus, we see that virtuous action is motivated by a
desire for the kalon and that to evaluate an action as ‘admirable’ is to judge it as worth
undertaking.
But given that an account of the kalon provides us only with the most general
description of admirable action in various domains of virtue, it seems that Aristotle never
provides an action guiding standard that is specific enough to guide us directly in the
making of good decisions. What one wants, it seems, is something like precise rules
about conduct - for example, ‘to be magnanimous, one must finance at least one trireme
or major public event every three years.’ Or: ‘to be generous, one ought to give gifts of
substantial value to good friends once a year.’ To give action-guiding principles is to give
us principles like these – namely, principles that give us specific guidance about action in
specific situations.
Because Aristotle does not appear to provide these kinds of principles, commentators
have speculated about the extent to which Aristotle ever meant to suggest that moral
7

The kalon is both a notion with which everyone would have been familiar, for it
corresponds to the idea of the admirable, and it constitutes a reason for acting that is
distinct from, say, the pleasurable or the advantageous. (For Aristotle, the objects of
choice and flight are the noble (kalon), advantageous (sumpheron), and the pleasant
(hêdu)(the phronimos chooses the noble, presumably)(1104b30-1; 1105a1). But the
kalon is also up for dispute. For example, in the Gorgias, Callicles argues that unjust
actions are only ‘shameful’ (aischron) by convention. In fact, Callicles claims, unjust
actions are ‘admirable’ (kalon) if performed by powerful people (483bd). For a
discussion of these themes, see Michael Pakaluk 2005, ch. 5.

6
deliberation looks like rule-governed decision procedures – on the model, say, of the
practical syllogism. For example, they have supposed that, because Aristotle never gave
any such standards, he meant to suggest that we do not deliberate according to any
standards.8 Others have suggested that Aristotle does offer some definitive actionguiding standards (e.g. do not commit adultery), and therefore that we may reasonably
assume that he would be amenable to the idea of providing action-guiding standards
about other matters in virtue as well. We can guess at these standards or recover them
from Aristotle’s discussion of the individual virtues in Books II through V of the
Nicomachean Ethics.9 Still others have claimed that the action-guiding standards are
ensconced in the laws or nomoi. Since the notion of nomos encompasses both the notion
of city laws as well as customs, it is wide enough to include norms about things like
generosity.10 These positions raise questions about the form that phronêsis takes. Does
the phronimos grasp a set of principles by which he deliberates? Does he deliberate in
light of a theory of the good life? Or does his conception of the good come in a form
altogether unlike explicit knowledge or grasp of principles?
We can distinguish two basic kinds of positions about such issues. Some argue that
the standard by which we deliberate takes the form of a set of action-guiding
generalizations or principles that the agent uses in making choices. I refer to this account
as ‘generalism.’ Others argue that the content of the standard should not be thought of as
a codifiable set of principles or a theory at all. Rather, it should be represented as a

8

Broadie 1991.
Irwin 2000.
10
Striker 2006.
9

7
evaluative outlook through which an agent chooses actions in particular cases. I will
refer to this account as ‘particularism.’
The goal of this dissertation is to resist the particularist interpretation of Aristotle,
according to which ethics does not provide us with action-guiding principles by which we
deliberate. In this introduction, I will sketch the two positions just described in greater
detail. Then I explain the methodological grounds on which I present a case against the
particularist position. For I will make heavy use of the Hippocratic Corpus in responding
to the particularist reading of Aristotle’s ethics, and I must explain how the Corpus can be
used to motivate a claim about Aristotle’s ethics. Next, I will present a sketch of the
argument in the following chapters. Finally, I present an account of the Hippocratic
Corpus and the various reasons for thinking that Aristotle might have been familiar with
it.
2

The Standard Views about Phronêsis

While it is clear that knowledge of the standard plays a role in deliberation, it is
not clear how to characterize the nature of practical knowledge and its role in the
deliberation of the phronimos. The proper interpretation of these matters is disputed
among contemporary interpreters.
For the sake of argument, we can distinguish two extreme positions in the debate.
On the one hand, there is the particularist view according to which there are no true moral
principles.11 For our purposes, this is the claim that there are no true action-guiding
11

McKeever and Ridge refer to the position as “principle eliminativism” – the view that
there are no true moral principles (McKeever and Ridge 2006, 15). The main proponent
of the view is John McDowell (McDowell 1998b, 148-9). For example, McDowell
writes: “is there any alternative to thinking of [ethical knowledge] as capable of being

principles.

12

8
That is, there are no principles whose explicit purpose is to guide our

actions in specific situations. The particularist is often associated with sensibility theory,
according to which ethical knowledge consists in the deliverances of a sensibility or a
disposition to ‘see’ the good. For the sensibility theorist claims that the agent possesses
an evaluative outlook through which he or she decides on actions in particular cases. For
example, the particularist or sensibility theorist will claim that one does not decide how
to show fear on the basis of a principle about danger, but on the basis of an evaluative
outlook – one which probably cannot be captured or translated into a set of
generalizations or action-guiding principles about danger.13 On this view, ethical
knowledge consists in responses to particulars, rather than judgments about particulars in
light of concepts or universals.

captured, at least in theory, by a set of principles for superimposing values on to a valuefree reality? The upshot is that the search for an evaluative outlook one can endorse as
rational becomes, virtually irresistibly, a search for such a set of principles: a search for a
theory of beauty of goodness…. I have a hunch that such efforts are misguided….”
While McDowell espouses principle eliminativism on some occasions, he also claims that
principles have a heuristic function (McDowell 1996). Martha Nussbaum makes a
similar claim, adding that principles can serve as heuristics. On her account in
“Discernment of Perception,” they are true to the extent that they offer a “summary of
wise decisions” (Nussbaum 1990, 69). Compare Nussbaum 1986, 298 ff. Following
Nussbaum, Irwin characterizes particularism along these lines. Rules only “summarize
the particular perceptual judgments of virtuous agents” (Irwin 2000, 103). The view that
rules are summaries of wise decisions is not the same as McDowell’s principle
eliminativism, for it allows that there are principles and that they are true, albeit in weak
sense – only to the extent that they are associated with virtuous decisions in the past. For
discussion, see McKeever and Ridge on “moral truth-makers” (McKeever and Ridge
2004, 12-3).
12
McKeever and Ridge define “action-guiding principles” as principles that both provide
explanatory truth conditions and are suitable for guiding action (McKeever and Ridge
2006, 6-7, 8-11).
13
McDowell, 1998b, 149.

9
But, one might ask, Aristotle claims that phronêsis involves cognition of
universals, as well as particulars. How does the sensibility theorist address this point? In
order to account for the universal’s role in phronêsis, the sensibility theorist glosses the
universal as follows. First, the only relevant universal is the kalon. According to the
sensibility theorist, the kalon is the only universal in ethics. Second, the universal does
not take the form of a content-filled concept, as we tend to think of universals (e.g.
‘human being’). For there is no independent and general and content-filled conception of
the kalon, according to the sensibility theorist. It cannot be understood as a rule or a goal
whose content can be grasped either by the intellect or independently from the various
motivational states which instantiate the grasp. 14 Rather, the kalon is a contentless
principle that becomes contentful only in particular situations. To say that someone has
the grasp of the kalon is just to say that he or she sees the world in the way that a virtuous
person would see the world.
The other extreme is the generalist view that ethical knowledge takes the form of
universals. We can distinguish three versions of the generalist view, each distinguishable
by its position on the form and role of universals in deliberation. According to the first
view, universals take the form of rules. Deliberation is modeled in the practical

14

There is a particularly clear expression of this point in McDowell 1996, 23. Sarah
Broadie does not hold this view, although in other respects, she should be understood as
subscribing to the sensibility theorist’s reading of Aristotle. For Broadie, one deliberates
not in light of any general conception of the good. Rather, one deliberates in light of
particular aims, where we are to understand that there is no overriding notion of the way
that these particular aims should be understood altogether – no theory, in other words
(Broadie 1991, 234 ff.). For the response to Broadie’s argument against the Grand-End
view, see Kraut 1993.

15

10

syllogism, and these rules serve as the major premise of the practical syllogism.

According to the second view, universals take the form of theories of the kalon, where
the theory is like a ‘blueprint’ that expresses a general, but determinate conception of the
good life, replete with a mapping of the relative value or weight of an agent’s various
commitments.16 Some commentators have claimed that there needs to be an explanation
of the manner in which the practical reasoner moves from this very general conception of
the good life to the selection of a specific rule to use in deliberation. Hence, one version
of the ‘blueprint’ account intersperses a linking principle between the general conception
of the good life and the selection of the specific rule.17 On this account, deliberation is
modeled on the practical syllogism, where the major premise takes the form of principle
derived from the ‘blueprint’ conception of the good.
A third view assimilates the ethical universal to a scientific theory. Thus,
according to C.D.C. Reeve, the universal in question is composed, in the first place, of
matterless first principles – for example, ‘we all aim at eudaimonia’ and ‘every nous
chooses what is best for itself.’18 These matterless principles explain the sense in which

15

See Allan 1995. For a critical discussion of Allan’s view, see Cooper 1975, 47 ff.
Initially,‘blueprint’ was the negative term used by McDowell to characterize theoryviews about deliberation (McDowell 1996, 1998). However, the term continued to be
used in the secondary literature to denote the view because it aptly illustrates the nature
of the position. I follow that practice in using ‘blueprint.’
17
See Irwin 1998.
16

18

Reeve 1995. Reeve argues that unconditional scientific knowledge (episteme haplos)
of ethics is possible if one considers the fact that only matter makes unconditional
scientific knowledge impossible. But there are immaterial principles in ethics – namely,
nous. We have nous of ethical first principles – for example, eudaimonia, is the activity
of nous, claims Reeve (22-9).

11
ethics can be a demonstrative science (epistêmê haplos). As matterless principles, they
hold ‘by necessity’ and scientific knowledge is about what holds ‘by necessity’ (e.g. An .
Pr. 1.13, 32b4-10). While practical knowledge is about matters that hold by necessity, it
also concerns things that are ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu)(e.g. An Pr I.13, 32b410). Facts about such matters take the form of contingent, non-universal truths. For
example, ‘wealth promotes happiness’ is true, by Aristotle’s lights, ‘for the most part.’
For it is true in most cases, but not all cases. According to Reeve, such claims are true in
the same sense that the facts of physics are true. For example, it is true, by nature, that
‘humans have five fingers’ and that ‘honey cures fever’ (Met. E. 2, 1027a22-6). Thus,
knowledge of ethical universals is like knowledge of the necessities that constitute natural
laws in the physical and biological works. If the comparison between the natural
sciences and politics holds, knowledge of ethical universals will be like knowledge of
scientific universals – albeit those of a natural science.19
3 The Methodology of the Dissertation
Interpretive debates about the merits of the particularist reading of Aristotle’s
ethics have come to a standstill because the possible lines of interpretation have been
developed.20 Why revisit the issue?
I believe there are texts which are relevant to the interpretation, but which have
been neglected – namely, texts from the Hippocratic Corpus. For they develop the very
themes that we find associated with particularism in Aristotle’s ethics: the complexity of
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cases and the need to deliberate about cases in the face of incomplete and imprecise
information. I believe that studying the Hippocratic Corpus’ treatment of these issues can
shed light on the interpretive question about Aristotle.
In turning to the Corpus to settle a question about Aristotle, the dissertation
develops a distinct kind of methodological approach to the study of Aristotle’s ethics. It
treats Aristotle’s text as if it were an instance of a genre of a fifth and fourth-century
Greek scientific writing - specifically, writing on the practical sciences such as medicine,
rhetoric or politics. I mean ‘genre’ loosely here as anything that includes the motifs or
topoi that tend to be associated with the practical sciences. Included in this genre are
works like: Isocrates’ Against the Sophists, the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine,
and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. All make mention of certain topoi which I take to
be associated with the practical sciences. These include discussions of: method; the
nature of inquiry and discovery; the difficulty of acquiring a technê, the inxactness of
practical knowledge; the high levels of variety in the phenomena with which practical
sciences are concerned (diaphora); notions of progress and the writer’s conception of his
place in the progress of the scientific program; the distinction between abstract and
practical or useful knowledge; the distinction between deliberative and non-deliberative
arts; errors in the application of the science; application of the doctrine of the mean with
respect to particular cases, and phenomena that take place ‘for the most part.’ Some of
these features are shared in common with all scientific texts, and not just texts on
practical science – for example, a discussion of method. However, many of them are
peculiar to discussions of practical science.
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Rather than surveying all works on practical science of the period, the
dissertation deals with medical texts primarily. I have focused on medical texts for three
reasons. First, medicine is a practical science in much the way that politics is a practical
science for Aristotle. Both are inexact sciences. By ‘inexact science,’ I mean a science
that deals with (a) knowledge that consist of truths that hold ‘for the most part,’ (hôs epi
to polu) and with (b) perception of particulars qua particulars (i.e. rather than as
instantiations of universals). Second, Aristotle himself often compares political science
to medicine, and this gives us good reason to think that medical treatises of the period
might have something revealing to tell us about Aristotle’s ethics.21 Third, as I have
already suggested, there are striking thematic similarities among Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics and a group of texts in the Hippocratic Corpus -particularly those on regimen. In
the dissertation, I focus on some of these features, including: the notion of exactness
(akribeia) in science, the status of sciences in which claims hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs
epi to polu) or ‘mostly’ (polu), and consequent modes of expressing principles in that
science.
My methdology is to assess the merits of the particularist interpretation of
deliberation in the light of the aforementioned parallels between Aristotle ethical treatises
and treatises in the Hippocratic Corpus. I provide a comparative analysis of the
Nicomachean Ethics and the Hippocratic Corpus, showing that there is significant
thematic similarity overlap between Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the
Hippocratic Corpus’s presentation of medical deliberation. I also show that, while
21

Numerous scholars have provided a comparison between Aristotle’s ethics and the
Hippocratic Corpus with this point in mind. The best, I think, is Jaeger 1957.

14
treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus express many of the same concerns and concepts
that are found in textual evidence invoked by the particularists, they do not support a
particularist interpretation of medical practice. Rather, in the Hippocratic Corpus,
general theories and principles play an action-guiding role in medical deliberation, and
they help us to see how analogous case may be true of ethical deliberation on Aristotle’s
account.
I supply two arguments against particularist readings of Aristotle’s account of
deliberation. The first presents a counterexample to the particularist’s inference from (1)
inexactness in a science to (2) the no-principle view. That is, Aristotle claims that (1)
politics is not an exact science. On the basis of this and related claims, particularists have
inferred that Aristotle (2) denies a role to action-guiding principles in deliberation. The
Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine provides the counterexample. For, its author
claims that (1) medicine is not exact. Nevertheless, the author endorses a role for actionguiding principles through which the doctor can deliberate about patient’s cases.
The second argument also presents a counterexample to the particularist’s
inference from (1) inexactness in a science to (2) the no-principle view. On a
particularist reading of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, the standard (horos) in light of
which an agent selects the mean is not constituted by principles. Rather, it is constituted
by a contentless conception of the good that becomes determinate only in specific
situations. Once again, On Ancient Medicine tells against such a reading. For it offers an
account of the mean very much like Aristotle’s – namely, Aristotle’s mean “relative to
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us” (pros hêmas). Nevertheless, On Ancient Medicine also endorses a role for
principles in the selection of the mean.
4 The Outline of the Chapters
Chapters 1 and 2 present an overview of Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the main
interpretations of the account.
Chapter 1 shows that Aristotle does not give a full characterization of the standard by
which the phronimos is said to deliberate. It discusses the two main interpretive accounts
of deliberation (bouleusis) - namely, the particularist and generalist interpretations. It
establishes that we can negotiate between these interpretations by exploring parallels
between Aristotle’s ethics and medical treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus. The chapter
also provides an introduction to the texts of the Hippocratic Corpus and explains why one
might be warranted in thinking that Aristotle was familiar with the concerns expressed in
the Hippocratic Corpus.
Chapter 2 reprises much of the content of chapter 1, but in greater detail. It gives an
overview of Aristotle’s account of deliberation and a more detailed explanation of the
generalist and particularist interpretations of deliberation. It also provides an account of
the textual evidence for the particularist interpretation, including Aristotle’s remarks
about: ‘exactness’ (akribeia), the ‘particular’ (kath hekasta), perception, claims that hold
‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu), the ‘outline’ (tupos), and ‘variation’ (diaphora).
Chapters 3 and 4 take the textual evidence for the particularist interpretation of
deliberation and re-position that evidence in the context of fifth and fourth century
scientific thought.
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Chapter 3 places the textual evidence for the particularist reading in the context of
Aristotle’s scientific thought about the features of exact and inexact sciences. It begins
by offering a brief history of the term akribeia and a discussion of Plato’s likely influence
on Aristotle’s understanding of akribeia. It offers an analysis of three criteria Aristotle
uses to define the exact science in the Posterior Analytics. It also shows that politics was
not an exact science for Aristotle, and it presents an analysis of the sense in which
politics failed to be an exact science. The chapter concludes with a summary of the
terminology Aristotle used to express the idea that a science was not exact – for example,
the term ‘outline’ (tupos).
Chapter 4 draws important parallels between the Hippocratic Corpus and Aristotle’s
ethics. As indicated above, the existence of such parallels grounds the methodological
approach I bring to the question about the merit of particularist readings of Aristotelian
deliberation. The chapter presents the following parallels. (1) Just as Aristotelian politics
is not exact (akribeia), medicine also lacks exactness (akribeia/ atrekês). Similarly, (2)
just as claims in politics hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu), claims in medicine also
hold ‘mostly’ (hôs epi to pleiston, polu, de polu). Moreover, medical writers claim – as
Aristotle claims about politics - that only schematic accounts of medicine can be given, a
point they express by writing that medical claims hold ‘in summary’ (en kephalaioi). (3)
Finally, medical writers also appeal to ‘variation’ (diaphora) to explain inexactness in
medicine, just as Aristotle appeals to diaphora to explain inexactness in politics.
Chapter 5 presents a counterexample to the particularist’s interpretive claim that (1) an
attribution of inexactness to a science can be equated with (2) a no-principle view. The
chapter begins by focusing on a range of skeptical objections made to the medical art in
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the fifth and fourth century Greece, one of which was the lack of exactness (akribeia)
in medicine. The chapter recalls the particularist claim that the inexact science is a
science that does not endorse true action-guiding principles for deliberation. The chapter
then examines the discussion of inexactness in the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient
Medicine. The chapter shows that, while the author claims that medicine is inexact, he
nevertheless endorses action-guiding principles for medical deliberation. I suggest that an
analogous point might be made about Aristotle’s account of deliberation. That is,
Aristotle’s claim that politics is inexact is consistent with the endorsement of actionguiding principles for the deliberating agent.
Chapter 6 also presents a counterexample to the particularist’s equation between (1) an
attribution of inexactness to a science and (2) a no-principle view. This chapter deals
with that interpretive claim in the context of the doctrine of the mean. The chapter begins
with a discussion of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean and presents the particularist’s
reading of the doctrine of the mean. For the particularist, the standard in light of which
an agent selects the mean is not constituted by principles. The chapter argues against
such a reading by showing that On Ancient Medicine presents a very similar account of
the mean. Nevertheless, as the chapter shows, the standard according to which one
selects the mean in On Ancient Medicine is constituted by action-guiding principles.
5 Texts
It is quite natural to ask about an exegetical approach that seeks to use one text to
prove something about another text. One what grounds might such an approach be
merited? As I hope to show in chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation, there is significant
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overlap between Aristotle’s account of practical knowledge and the Hippocratic
Corpus’s account of medical deliberation. As a preliminary step in establishing as much,
it is important to explain what the Hippocratic Corpus is and why Aristotle might have
been familiar with it. Hence, the rest of the currect chapter presents a description of the
Hippocratic Corpus, a summary of its contents, and an account of the various reasons for
thinking that Aristotle might have been familiar with the Corpus and its concerns.
The rise of rational medicine in Greece can be divided into two periods, the first
lasting from c. 420-370. The period can be distinguished by its departure from magicoreligious science. Whereas previous forms of medicine resembled magic, the new
medicine adopted the techniques and methodologies of exact sciences such as
mathematics and geometry, which were devloping at the same time.22 Establishing
authorship of treatises during this period has proven difficult. Nevertheless, it is known
that Hippocrates and his pupils at Cos were active during the period, and many of the
core treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus were probably composed by members of the
school.23
Whereas there is considerable difficulty tracing works in the Hippocratic Corpus
to any particular author, identifying particular authors is possible during the second
period of medical history, which comprises the remainder of the fourth century. During
this period, it has been possible to follow the views of individual physicians, scientists
and philosophers such as Diocles of Carystus, Mneistheus, and Praxagoras of Cos. These
writers were regarded as working strictly within the field of medicine. Others writers of
22
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the period, however, also work within the field of medicine, but their works have
tended to be regarded not exclusively as medical in theme. Among these we might
include: Plato (Timaeus, esp. 72d), Aristotle (History of Animals, VII, 602b12-605b21),
and Theophrastus (On Vertigo and Dizziness).
We have three sources for the history of medicine in the first period: (1) the
Hippocratic Corpus, (2) the Anonymus Londinesis and (3) doxography. The Hippocratic
Corpus is a body of medical treatises in which various genres are represented. Some
treatises are adressed to broad readership composed of both specialists and lay people;
some are aimed at specialists; and some are notes meant to be used by the physician. Still
others are manuals or handbooks meant for the use of other physicians. Most of the
Hipppocratic Corpus is thought to have been composed in the time of Hippocrates (460370); however, some are believed to have been composed after Aristotle’s time.
The Hippocratic Corpus can be divided into three main groups of treatises. The
first consists of (1) a core group of writings thought to have been composed by
Hippocrates and his circle of disciples. These are often referred to as the Coan treatises,
since they were composed by Hippocrates or members of his school, which was on the
island of Cos, one of the traditional homes of the Asclepiad family (along with the island
of Cnidus). The second is the (2) work of the Cnidian writers, a group of physicians and
scientists thought to be affiliated with a school of medicine on Cnidus, the second
traditional home of the Ascelpiad family. Finally, there are (3) the treatises that were
written outside the Coan and Cnidian schools. This group can be divided into two sub-
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groups. The first includes a number of treatises that were written outside the Coan and
Cnidian circles, but under the influence of the Asclepiad teachings.24
The (1) core group of the Hippocratic Corpus, the Coan works, includes: The
Hippocratic Oath, Fleshes, Regimen, On Wounds in the Head, On Fratures, On Joints, In
the Sugery, Mochlicon, Epidemics, Airs Waters and Places, The Sacred Disease,
Aphorisms, Regimen in Acute Diseases, and Prognostic. Some of these works are
surgical treatises which may have been used as manuals for treatment of battle wounds.
One group of these treatises – including works such as On Wounds in the Head and On
Fractures – tends to be thorough and pay scrupulous attention to detail. A second group
of surgical treatises – including Mochlicon, for example – is less precise and reads more
like lecture notes or summaries of more detailed works.
Second, there is a group of works that were probably written by itinerant
physicians. These include the famous Epidemics, which is a summary of individual case
studies conducted in and around Thessaly. Airs, Waters and Places also reports the
experience of a doctor traveling from city to city, recording the predominant medical
conditions there, the seasons at which diseases in those regions occur, characteristics of
the place, and other comparable features.
Finally, there are a number of treatises which are not classifiable. These include:
The Sacred Disease, which gives a scientific treatment of epilepsy; Prognostic, which
presents the famous Hippocratic facies, i.e. the facial expression indicating that death is at
hand; Regimen in Acute Diseases, a treatise on regimen; the Hippocratic Oath, which
records the oath taken by Hippocrates’ students at Cos; Aphorisms, a collection of
24
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unsystematic remarks about medicine – the treatise probably most read and
commented upon by Medieval and Early Modern scholars of medicine; and last Precepts,
a collection of remarks about prognosis, or the art of predicting the course of illness.
The second group of Hippocratic treatises are the Cnidian works.25 These
include: Cnidian Sentences, the preamble to Regimen in Acute Diseases, Diseases, and
Internal Affections. The Cnidian treatises are different from Coan treatises in several
respects. First, they place a greater emphasis on the importance of classification.
Second, they place less emphasis on the recording of actual practice – the sort of
observations that one sees in the Coan treatise Epidemics, for instance. On the other
hand, the Cnidian treatises describe symptoms in great detail, so it cannot be said that, in
terms of observation, the Cnidian treatises are inferior to those of the Coan school. Third,
the Cnidian treatises favor treatment through purgatives and emetics over treatment
through change in diet (regimen), perhaps prompting the observation in the Coan treatise
Regimen in Acute Diseases that the Cnidian school does not place enough trust in
treatment through change in diet. Finally, one does not see the remarks on method in the
Cnidian treatises that one sees in some Coan treatises (e.g. Regimen in Acute Diseases).
The third group of Hippocratic treatises are the works that are neither Cnidian nor
Coan. It is convenient to divide this group in terms of periods of composition. The first
of these groups of treatises are probably composed on the intellectual periphery of the
Coan and Cnidian schools. For they were composed in the period coinciding with the
composition of the Coan and Cnidian groups of Hippocratic Corpus. In some cases, they
are reacting to ideas promoted by the Coan or Cnidian schools. Take On Ancient
25

For discussion of the Cnidian school, see Lonie 1965 and Lonie 1978.

22
Medicine, for example. It was probably not composed in either the Coan or Cnidian
schools, but the treatise is clearly written during the same time period (420-370).
Moreover, it is written in response to ideas promoted by some treatises among the Coan
works.
Among the third group of treatises, some are philosophical. By ‘philosophical,’ I
mean that they inherit the Presocratic tradition of inquiry into the fundamental
constituents of nature and their arrangement. In this group are: Fleshes, Regimen, and
Sevens. Regimen, for example, presents a general Heraclitean view of the body and of
nature. It is composed of the interaction between fire and water, extinguishing one
another “in measures” (5).
However, other treatises among this group are anti-philosophical. They suggest
that medicine is not a branch of philosophy and need not delve into the inquiry regarding
nature. Instead, knowledge of the human body and of the effects of various substances
on the body is sufficient for medical practice. One may say that this group of treatises is
the intellectual parent to the Methodism that developed in third century ancient Greek
medicine. Among this group of treatises, we may include: On Ancient Medicine and The
Nature of Man. On Ancient Medicine will be discussed at length below. Nature of Man,
thought to be written by Polybus, criticizes the view that the human body is composed of
the elements fire, earth, air and water.
In the second sub-group of treatises in the Hippocratic Corpus, we find those that
were composed outside of the fifth and fourth century, some of which are even thought to
have been composed during the Middle Ages. These include: The Heart, Precepts,
Decorum, Physician, Affections, Anatomy, Crises, Dentition, Excision of the Foetus,
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Eight Month’s Child, Generation, Critical Days, Diseases IV, Diseases of the Girls,
Nature of Women, Prenotions of Cos, Superfoetation, Sight, Decree of the Athenians,
Letters. Sources: Anonymous Londinensis26
Now that we have seen a description of the Hippocratic Corpus and its contents,
we can ask what evidence there is to show that Aristotle was familiar with the
Hippocratic Corpus.27 Aristotle was born to a medical family. Both Aristotle’s parents
were descendants of Ascelpius. As a male descendant of Asclepius, Aristotle’s father,
Nicomachus of Stagira, was a member of the Asclepiad guild. Nicomachus served the
Macedonian court as a physician and acted as both friend and doctor to King Amyntas of
Macedon in the late fifth century.28 There is some speculation that Nicomachus would
have known about the Epidemics, a collection of individual patient case studies. For the
first and third books of the Epidemics consist of studies from Thasos and Abdera, which
are close to Nicomachus’ home, Stagira (Aristotle’s birthplace). The dates of
composition for Epidemics I and III match Nicomachus’ dates. Therefore, it is not
unreasonable to think that Nicomachus might have been influenced by the author of these
treatises.29 Although Nicomachus died when Aristotle was young, Aristotle’s interest in
biology may have been kindled by his father’s studies.
The Aristotelian Corpus does not contain any treatises written about
medicine, specifically. However, a number of sources suggest that Aristotle wrote
treatises on medicine. For example, Diogenes claims that Aristotle wrote the following
26
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medical works: On Health and Disease (Peri hugeias kai nosou); Dissections
(Anatomai); Medical Issues (Iatrika); On the Failure to Generate Offspring (Huper tou
mâ Gennan); and On Remedies (Peri Boâthâmatôn). 30. Similarly, Galen suggests that
Aristotle wrote a treatise called A Summary of Medicine.31 Finally, there are references to
works on medicine in Aristotle’s own treatises, for example: On Length and Shortness of
Life 1, 464b32; 480b22-30 and Parts of Animals II.7, 653a8. The line at 480b22-30 is
thought to be a reference to a lost treatise, De Sanitate et Morbo.32
The Lyceum’s doxographical project in medicine also suggests that Aristotle
had an interest in medicine. The project was directed at the theoretical sciences,
mathematics, physics and theology. Eudemus worked on the histories of mathematics
and theology, while Theophrastus and Meno composed the work on the physics. Meno’s
share in the task was a medical doxography. The work is now lost, but a part of it –that
which covers the views of Hippon, Philolaus and Plato – is preserved in the second part
of the Anonymous Londiniensis papyrus.33. Medicine is included in the doxography of
physics, despite the fact that it has a practical component. Some scholars surmise that the
theoretical and practical parts of medicine could be distinguished, and only the theoretical
part of medicine is included in the doxography of physics.34 As Leonid Zhmud points
out, Meno’s medical doxography neglects entirely to discuss the application of
30
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generalizations about medicine. It therefore appears to treat medicine as a theoretical
science, or to neglect that aspect of medicine which would have constituted an applied
science. Similarly, Meno’s work on medical doxography was confined to the study of the
causes of diseases. Again, this seems to indicate that Meno treated medicine as a
theoretical science, insofar as a theoretical science would have been one that engages in
the study of causes. Meno would perhaps have been holding to the Academy’s definition
of a science as that which studies first causes.
Finally, Aristotle’s interest in medicine is suggested by the significant
thematic overlap between his work and the Hippocratic Corpus. Aristotle thought the
investigation of biology was central to the theoretical study of nature. Indeed, his study
of zoology alone constitutes roughly a fourth of the entire Aristotelian Corpus. The study
of human anatomy forms an important part of the main zoological treatise History of
Animals (HA I.7-17). Studies of human anatomy also form an important part of other
treatises in the Corpus – for example, Aristotle’s writings on the causes of longevity and
death (On Youth and Old Age, 3; PA III.5); cooking and mixture (Meteorology IV);
digestion (On Sleep, 3; On Youth and Old Age); respiration (On Youth and Old Age, 7-27;
On Breath); the role of heat in the body (On Youth and Old Age; Generation of Animals
II.3 ff); blood (PA II.2-6); the brain (PA II.7) the flesh (PA II.8); vessels (PA II.9; III.5)
and the lungs (PA III.6)
Consider, too, Aristotle’s treatment of specific topics in human health.35 For
example, there are several detailed discussions of women’s bodies - topics in sex,
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menstruation, pregnancy and birth (History of Animals VII and X; Generation of
Animals I and II). Generation of Animals deals with the various features of children that
can be enhanced in gestation (e.g. intelligence), as does the Hippocratic treatise Regimen
(Book I). On Divination in Sleep and On Dreams respond to the tradition of using
dreams to determine the best course of treatment for a patient, as does Hippocratic
treatise Regimen (Book IV). Like several Hippocratic treatises, Aristotle associates
longevity with moistness and fluidness, on the one hand, and dryness and fixedness with
old age and death (On the Length and Shortness of Life).
Now that we have considered the sense in which Aristotle’s interests were
consistent with those of the Hippocratic Corpus, it is time to establish the most important
grounds for comparing Aristotle’s ethics with Hippocratic Corpus – namely, the
extensive use of the medical analogy in the ethics.36
The medical analogy has a long history in Greek literature.37 One dimension of
the analogy is the idea that the moral expert is like a healthy person. Aristotle draws on
this aspect of the analogy when he compares the healthy person’s perception of sensory
qualities and the ideal moral agent’s perception of the morally salient features of a
situation. The healthy person will perceive certain things as sweet , bitter, or hot, etc. A
less healthy person will not perceive these things in the same way. For example, given a
cold, he may be insensitive to the subtler flavors of his food. Similarly, the ideal moral
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agent will take stock of a situation in a certain sort of way, seeing certain things as bad
or good to a certain degree and in particular ways.
A second important dimension of the medical analogy is the idea that moral
excellence is like physical excellence. Aristotle draws this point out with the well-worn
theme that practice makes perfect. Just as one keeps his strength or health by exercising
and eating well, one keeps his moral virtue by performing appropriate actions repeatedly
(1104a27b3; cf. 1106a29 ff.).38 Moral excellence and physical excellence are also similar
in that we have control over neither contracting sickness and becoming healthy nor over
becoming bad or virtuous (1114b30, 1115a1-2). Finally, moral excellence and physical
excellence are alike in their use of the doctrine of the mean. Just as the doctor applies the
doctrine of the mean to determine what sort of diet a patient should have, an agent applies
the doctrine of the mean to determine how she should act (or rather, the statesman applies
the doctrine of the mean to determine how to cultivate good citizens).39
The primary influence on Aristotle’s use of the analogy is Plato’s development of
the analogy. Aristotle follows Plato’s model in some central ways. Like Plato, he
envisions statesmanship as an activity of caring for one’s constituents (1258a27,
11097a11, 1287a25).40 Aristotle also treats phronêsis - at least in its guise as
statesmanship – as a form of universal knowledge (NE X.9, 1180b21) For entitlement to
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act in the caring capacity is only earned through possession of a right account of the
good.
But there are some important ways in which Aristotle departs from the Platonic
model. For he regards knowledge of the good as relativized to a domain (NE I.6,
1096a17-29).41 Just as the doctor does better to consider each patient separately, the
phronimos does better to consider each situation in its particularity. That is, the
phronimos must know not only what the general rules of ethics are; he must in addition
know about all the particular features of any given situation (NE VI.7, 1141b15-20).
Aristotelian phronêsis also involves assessment of particular situations, in virtue of which
he regards phronêsis as involving lack of exactness (akribeia). Note that Plato had
claimed that phronêsis was the least inexact of the sciences. The knowledge required of
the phronimos, on Aristotle’s reading, is said to be both universal and particular.
Aristotle’s point, rather, is that phronêsis also consists in knowledge of particulars, and as
a result, phronêsis is not an exact science like mathematics.
Finally, Aristotle sees phronêsis as a decidedly practical activity, whereas Plato
had only grudgingly allowed that the wise person would take part in politics.42. The
analogy between medicine and ethics shows that ethics is a practical, rather than
theoretical, kind of knowledge. Plato had used the analogy to make a point about the care
41
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to_ xrh&simon, kai\ e0n xro&nw| kairo&j, kai\ e0n to&pw| di/aita kai\ e3tera toiau~ta), dh~lon
w(j ou)k a2n ei1h koino&n ti kaqo&lou kai\ e3n: ou) ga_r a2n e0le/get' e0n pa&saij tai=j
kathgori/aij, a)ll' e0n mia|~ mo&nh|.
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of the soul and the sense in which the soul – like the body – needs to be maintained in
health.43 Aristotle, on the other hand, uses the analogy to make clear the practical nature
of ethical knowledge. Just as the doctor must know about particular patients and be
practically efficacious in actual situations, the politikos must know about particular
situations and how to be practically efficacious in them. For example, as Aristotle points
out in NE I.4, the politikos does not need to know about the good in general. Rather he
needs to know about the good in specific contexts. Aristotle construes the good as a kind
of opportunity (kairos) or measure (metron). Each science of opportunity deals with a
different sort of opportunity. In medicine, for example, one deals with opportunity with
respect to food. Aristotle envisions medicine as one of several sciences of opportunity
(kairon) or moderation (metrion) (EE I.8 1217b37; NE 1096a32), and in particular, as the
one that studies food (1217b39) Thus, the politikos needs to know about the opportune
(kairos) and expedient (sumpheron) in particular situations that relate to the human good,
just as the doctor, for example, needs to know about the opportune moment with regard
to health and particular patients (EE I.8, 1217b35-41; cf. NE I.6, 1096a32, 1096b33).
Conclusion
In this chapter of the dissertation, I introduced my project and its methodological
assumptions. I attempted to show that that Aristotle does not give a full characterization
of the standard by which the phronimos is said to deliberate, and I discussed the two main
interpretive accounts of deliberation (bouleusis) - the particularist and generalist
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See, for example: Gorgias. 501ab; Phaedrus 270cd; Laws 857cd. In Phaedrus, Plato
develops the famous image of the philosopher dividing up the soul at its joints, just as the
medical doctor divides the body up at its joints. The comparison between the health of
the body and soul is a commonplace. See, for example, Isocrates, Antidosis, 183.
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interpretations. I suggested that we can assess the merit of the particularist reading by
exploring parallels between Aristotle’s ethics and treatises from the Hippocratic Corpus.
I provided some reasons for thinking that Aristotle was familiar with the concerns
expressed in the Hippocratic Corpus.
The next chapter deals with many of the same topics, but in a more detailed
fashion. It explains Aristotle’s account of deliberation and the generalist and particularist
interpretations of deliberation. It provides an account of the textual evidence for the
particularist interpretation, including Aristotle’s remarks about ‘exactness’ (akribeia), the
‘particular’ (kath hekasta), perception, claims that hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to
polu), the ‘outline’ (tupos) and ‘variation’ (diaphora). This familiarity with Aristotle’s
position on deliberation and the particularist reading of deliberation will help us in later
chapters to see why the medical corpus tells against the particularist reading of
Aristotelian deliberation.
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Chapter 2
Particularist Readings and their Alternatives

The first step towards recognizing that Aristotle is not a particularist is to examine
his account of deliberation. A conception of the kalon or living well (eu prattein) guides
the virtuous person’s deliberation. Scholars have interpreted the content of this
conception in multiple ways. The most important difference in these interpretations is
that between (a) generalists, according to whom the content of the conception is a body of
action guiding principles, and (b) particularists, according to whom the conception is
contentless. With this account of the particularist reading of Aristotelian deliberaiton in
hand, we will be well placed to see in the next chapters that the textual evidence for the
particularist reading has been misinterpreted.
The chapter begins with an introduction to Aristotle’s account of deliberation, or
bouleusis. I explain that deliberation is informed by a conception of good action (eu
prattein) or the noble (kalon). In the second part of the chapter, I consider in greater
detail some of the accounts of practical knowledge sketched in chapter 1. These include
(1) the generalist views that the universals guiding deliberation are (a) rules or (b)
blueprints from which rules are derived. I also discuss (2) the particularist position that
the conception of the good is a contentless principle that takes definite shape in only
particular decision-making contexts. I finish the second section of the chapter with a
discussion of the textual grounds for ascribing the particularist position to Aristotle.
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1 Aristotle’s Account of Deliberation
Deliberation is the characteristic form of practical wisdom (NE VI. 1140a31).44 It
is a form of teleological reasoning, or reasoning in light of a goal (telos). In particular, it
is reasoning about the best way to achieve a goal. For example, one might reason in light
of his desire to have a vacation to Europe in the summer as follows: ‘if I save up money
by avoiding extravagant purchases, and if I work like a demon in the month of May, I can
afford to take the summer vacation to Europe.’ While this is a decent plan, it is not the
best one. An even better plan is the following: ‘if I save up money by avoiding
extravagant purchases, and if work at a steady, hard pace for a few months in the spring, I
can afford to take the summer trip.’ Excellent deliberation requires not merely that one
figure out how to execute his plans. Rather, it requires that one determine how best to
execute his plans.
There are many kinds of goals in light of which one might make plans, and thus
there are a wide range of cases in which one engages in teleological reasoning. Aristotle
sometimes clarifies the teleological aspect of deliberation by comparing it with technical
reasoning. When one is wearing his doctor’s cap, he reasons in light of health. That is,
he thinks about the best ways to make his patients healthy. Similarly, when one is
wearing his rhetor’s cap, he reasons in light of persuasion, for he thinks about the best
ways to persuade an audience. Deliberation works in the same way. When one is
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wearing the phronimos’s cap, he reasons in light of a conception of the good life or
good action.45
Neither deliberation nor technical reasoning concern what is ‘about the goal’ (peri
tôn telôn). Rather, the end having been established (1112b15), one reasons about things
that are towards the goal (1112b12). For example, the doctor does not consider ‘if he
will heal his patients’(b13). If the doctor were considering whether he should cure a
patient or cold-bloodedly kill the patient, he would no longer be thinking in his capacity
as a doctor. Rather, he would be thinking in his capacity as a villain. The doctor reasons
only about the ‘how” and the methods or the ‘through what’ of healing. Again, the case
is the same with deliberation. For one does not deliberate about whether he will pursue
the kalon. Rather, he deliberates about how and through what methods he will pursue it.
While there is this similarity between technical reasoning and deliberation, there
are also key differences between the two. First, deliberation does not concern any
particular subject matter, but matters in general (holôs)(1141a28).46 Aristotle claims that
the person of practical wisdom calculates “with a view to some good end which is one of
those that are not the object of any art” (VI.5, 1140a29-30).47 By contrast, the technical
goal is specific; it concerns a part of life (kata meros)(1140a27). There are two ways we
can take the disanalogy on offer. (I do not promise to settle the matter here.) On the
other hand, the disanalogy may imply that health and happiness are aims of different
scope, but that they are not different in kind. From the perspective of the doctor qua
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doctor, health is a final end; and similarly, from the perspective of the doctor qua
phronimos, the kalon is a final end. We might think that, from each perspective, there is
no difference in kind here, but merely of content and scope. However, Aristotle suggests
that the perspective from phronêsis is the important one (NE VI.13). If the phronimos’s
perspective is the important one, then we see that there is a difference in kind between
health and the kalon as aims. For one pursues kalon with no further aim in mind, but one
pursues health with a further aim – namely, the kalon (or eu prattein). If this is so, then
health and happiness may be different sorts of aims; one is absolutely final in the way
that the other is not.48
Second, deliberation is distinct from all other forms of teleological reasoning in
that its goal is the kalon. It is important to clarify the sense in which one can reason in
light of such a goal. In order for a process of reasoning to qualify as deliberation, it must
link up with a conception of goodness at some point. That is, a general conception of the
good must enter in one’s deliberation at some point such that the conception guides the
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For a discussion of these and related points, see Broadie 1991, 190-8. Broadie argues
that Aristotle’s discussion of the craft analogy is unclear. She raises three problems for
the craft analogy. First, the end of craft is determined, whereas the end of practical
wisdom is not, by definition; but what should we make of this disanalogy? Second, what
is the difference between ends sought in good practical deliberation and ends sought in
bad practical deliberation? Third, there seems to be a difference between the craftman’s
deliberation about his end, and the craftsman’s end. What is it? Broadie claims that the
ambiguous discussion of the craft analogy leaves us with two possible views of practical
wisdom. On the one hand, practical wisdom resembles medicine in acting and
deliberating on the basis of a specific picture of the end. This ethical picture figures in
the premises of all the wise man’s deliberations about particular problems. On the other
hand, it may be the case that the technical picture is dispensable, since it is only a means
to health. “On this model, practical wisdom is like the ability to balance,” according to
Broadie (198). As Aristotle says, in practical matters, we don’t need full specification of
the grounds on which we act. Only minimal clarity is required.
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decision one makes. If this is true, an objection might go, there seem to be very few
cases in which we deliberate. For it seems that one seldom engages in a process of
reasoning that brings one back to thoughts of one’s overall conception of the good. This
is an interesting point, for it raises a question about the range of cases in which we make
decisions in light of our conception of the good life. Perhaps we reason in light of an
idea of a conception of the good seldomly – e.g. only when facing momentous decisions.
However, it is possible to push back on this thought by considering the following.
There is an implicit conception of the good at the back of much of reasoning, and this
implicit conception of happiness might be invoked if the agent were pressed about her
reasons for making certain choices. For example, suppose that Sally decided to attend a
friend’s wedding, despite the fact that the cost of attending would be very expensive.
‘Why did you decide to attend the wedding, Sally?’ one might ask. Sally answers:
‘because I care about my friend.’ This is likely as far as she has pushed her own thought
process, being satisfied that her care for her friend is a good enough reason to attend the
wedding. But she might be pushed for further reasons. Why do you care about your
friend? She answers: because we have a strong friendship. But why do you care about
friendship? She answers: because friendship is part of a good life. There, according to
Aristotle, the train of questions should end, for it does not make sense to ask anyone why
she should care about good life. After all, we all desire to be happy (NE I.4, 1094a20).
Lest happiness appear to be an abstruse goal, it is important to see that, for
Aristotle, we are not after just any old kind of happiness. That is, we are not pursuing the
happiness of antelopes, squirrels or bees. Rather, the happiness in question is human
happiness. Just as there is some distinct notion of health for each kind of animal - for the
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bumble bee, a solitary life, and for the honey bee, a communal life (HA 623b6-12) –
so, too, is there some distinct form of happiness for human beings. Indeed, there is a
distinct good for all kinds of animals (NE 1141a26—34). Deliberation will concern only
that distinctly human happiness. We are able to get purchase on the conception of the
good life in question by considering the function of the animal (NE I.7). In the case of
human beings, for example, our function is wrapped up in our identity as rational and
political animals. The result is that the good life for humans will involve the cultivation
of the intellect and promoting of good political communities – and, of course, the
realization of the kalon or eupraxia. This sort of aim is not appropriate for living things
that do not share the same set of of capacities.
We have seen that the agent deliberates in light of a conception of the kalon or eu
prattein. This deliberation issues in choice (prohairesis) of an action in specific
circumstances. For Aristotle, it is not enough that one perform the correct action.
Rather, one must perform that action with the right intention, for actions are only called
just and temperate if they are performed as (hôs) the just or temperate person would
perform them (NE II. 5, 1105b6-8; cf. 1105a30-1). Prohairesis is a reasoned intention in
the sense that it is a decision informed by the process of deliberation – hence, the
reasoning. The prohairesis is a voluntarily-made choice, and Aristotle claims that it is
the best indicator of one’s character (NE III.3, 1111b5-6).
Prohairesis has a complicated structure. First, it consists of an evaluation of
particulars (1142a21-3, 1143a28-31). Things are evaluated by the extent to which and
the manner in which they realize the kalon. The evaluation takes the form, roughly, of
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the sentence that ‘x is the good thing to do, all things considered’ (where the ‘all things
considered’ stands for the process of deliberation). We can think of the evaluation as a
way that a particular scene looks to an agent phenomenologically or as a characterization
of situations, as judged by agents. I mean to imply nothing here as to whether the
evaluation takes the form of a perceptual judgment or a propositional judgment. For our
purposes, it matters only that the judgment concerns particulars.
Thus Aristotle claims that deliberation concerns both universals and particulars
(1141b15-6; 1180b20 ff; ). For example, deliberation concerns both the fact that white
meat is better for the health (the universal) and also the fact that this particular morsel of
food is white meat (the particular)(1141b16-21). This is what Aristotle has in mind when
he claims that the best practitioners are those that have experience, which is knowledge
of particulars, and knowledge (i.e. of universals). Just as the medical doctor should have
both knowledge of particular patients and of universals about human nature (NE X.9; I.5),
so too must the person of practical wisdom have knowledge of both his own case and of
universals.
Consider a more developed example of judging particulars. In George Eliot’s
Middlemarch, the main character is a young, idealistic woman, Dorothea Brooke, who
has made a bad marriage to a much older man, the Reverend Causabon. Casaubon is
working on a tome about the relationship between religion and mythology (The Key to All
Mythologies), and this book is his life’s work. Dorothea has been acting as a secretary to
him in this work, but has increasingly little regard for the project and for her husband. As
her interest in both declines, Causabon discovers that he is dying, and he asks her to give
a solemn promise to continue the project once he has passed away. Dorothea must decide

38
whether to make the promise. Ultimately, after a period of difficult deliberation, she
decides that she will promise to complete the book.49
Dorothea’s decision is based, in part, on her evaluation of particulars. For example,
much of Dorothea’s deliberations in this period are marked by painful specific memories.
She recalls with bitterness, for example, that after Causabon was informed by the doctor
of his terminal illness, he coldly informed her of as much as they walked in the garden
and would not take her arm. The specific gesture of not taking her arm seems to
Dorothea to encapsulate what has been wrong all along with the marriage: Causabon has
never treated her as being a part of his life.50 I mention this because of the important role
that specific pictures and images play in deliberation. In order to understand someone’s
reaction to a situation and the sense in which the reaction makes sense, we may have to
call to mind the specific images that provoke a person or make him or her regard a
situation as being of a certain kind.
There are other evaluations of particulars that have bearing on Dorothea’s choice.
For instance, Dorothea initially thinks of her future, which she imagines unhappily as a
life toiling in her library on a project in which she finds little worth. But other
evaluations of particulars push her in the opposite direction. Dorothea pictures
Causabon’s past – the years worth of solitary and determined labor on his project.51 Her
vivid imagining of Causabon both laboring with futility on a project bound to failure and
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“…Dorothea’s pity turned from her own future to her husband’s past – nay, to his
present hard struggle with a lot which had grown out of that past: the lonely labour, the
ambition breathing hardly under the pressure of self-distrust; the goal receding, and the
heavier limbs; and now at last the sword visibly trembling above him!” (Eliot 1981, 465).
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his realizing as much in the period of his impending death inspires her with a sense of
pity. She feels she cannot step on a “bruised heart.” Ultimately, Dorothea decides to
take on the project because she feels herself to be a compassionate person - the sort of
person who acts as a vehicle for the happiness and fulfilment of others.52 These are the
sorts of evaluations of particular features of one’s situation that have bearing on the
deliberative process and which explain the choice that an agent ultimately makes.53
Note that the way the scene appears to Dorothea is closely related to her character.
She is an compassionate, willful and idealistic person, and as a result, she evaluates
particulars in a certain way. A different person, for example, might have thought that
promises were easily broken, and thus would not have been as wracked by worry as
Dorothea in deciding whether to give her promise. Hence, Aristotle claims that one’s
character has bearing on the way he or she reads situations (NE 1113a30-3; cf. EE
1229a21-6; 1230a31).54
Note, too, that the evaluation prompts the decision. In part, deliberation is the
difficult process of arriving at an assessment of various elements of a decision-making
context. One must decide, for example: how important is compassion? How important is
the pain I will endure? How important is the pain the others will endure? There is a kind
of balancing act between a proto-decision and one’s evaluation of one’s situation. For
example, at the beginning of the deliberative process, the prospect of years spent laboring
52
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53
According to the particularist, the evaluation of particulars fully explains the decision.
According to the generalist, by contrast, an agent’s independent conception of the good
must also be invoked to explain the agent’s decision.
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For discussion, see Fortenbaugh 1964. Fortenbaugh argues that, for Aristotle, moral
virtue helps the agent judge (krinein) the morally salient particulars.
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on the failed book project appears entirely unappealing to Dorothea. However, upon
reflection, this prospect comes to seem less important than other commitments. We
might read Dorothea as having re-evaluated the particulars of the situation so as to bring
her evaluations more closely in line with one’s projected choices: e.g. ‘the work on the
book project will not be so bad.’ Through reiterations of this process, one might bring
evaluation fully in line with the choice.55
In its directedness towards particulars, prohairesis is not merely evaluative. It is
motivational as well. To see this, it is helpful to constrast Aristotle’s position with a
Humean account of motivation. According to a basic Humean view of moral motivation,
it is possible to make the evaluation that ‘x is the appropriate thing to do’ or that ‘x is
good’ without thereby being motivated to do x. For example, one can recognize that
there is a reason for doing something - one ought to keep promises to the people to whom
one has made promises - without having the corresponding desire (I want to keep the
promise). The lack of appropriate desires is to be explained by a failure of habituation or
moral cultivation.
On Aristotle’s account of prohairesis, there can be no breakdown between the
evaluation that ‘x is the good thing to do, all things considered,’ and the desire to do x.
Thus, we cannot ask of a person who has made a prohairesis to do x –yes, but will he try
to do x? He will most certainly carry out his plan, provided that the agent is not akratic
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In some cases, we can imagine that people are not really free to choose, such that they
are forced to bring their evaluations into line with the ‘choice,’ since no other option is
fully available to them. This is arguably what we do when we rationalize.
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and provided that nothing happens to intefere with her plans. We can see an example
of such a case in Dorothea’s situation. She fully intends to make the promise to complete
Causabon’s book. But in an implausible instance of good timing for Dorothea, Causabon
passes away just before she is about to utter her promise.
Prohairesis has the interesting property of being both an evaluative state – i.e.
knowledge – and an impulse. It is an evaluative state in the sense we have just seen. But
it is an impulse or motivational state in distinct sense. There are other kinds of impulse:
epithumia and thumos among them. Prohairesis differs from epithumia and thumos (NE
III.2, 1111b16-8) in that it requires rational capacities. Thus, the animals also have
epithumia and thumos, but they do not have prohairesis (1111b12-3).
This point brings us to the second aspect of proharesis – namely, the fact that
prohairesis is carried out in a context of considerations or facts that one might take into
account as one deliberates. They might be thought of as constituting the realm of
relevant facts in light of which one deliberates. The context of considerations includes
human affairs (1112a28; 1141b8-9). As before, we rule out matters such as: bee affairs,
and elephant affairs and other such matters, for these do not concern us as human beings.
While deliberation concerns human affairs, it does not concern all human affairs. For we
deliberate about only those human affairs which are directly relevant to to our own cases.
For example, the Spartan does not deliberate about the Scythian constitution (1112a28-9).
He may entertain some speculation about the Scythian constitution, but this speculation is
not the same as deliberation. On the other hand, the Spartan might deliberate about his
own constitution, provided that he is in the position to have some effect on its
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amendments. If he were to speculate about how it could be improved without being in
the position to change it (e.g. through voting), he would not be deliberating about the
constitution. A Spartan helot, then, does not deliberate about Spartan affairs, though he is
a Spartan. For he is not a citizen and thus not in the position to endorse rules of selfgovernment.
Part of the reason for the restriction of deliberation to relevant matters is that
deliberation is practical. Recall that deliberation concerns what is up to us and doable
(eph’ hemin) (1112a31; cf. 1141b10-11). One cannot deliberate about something that he
has no power to effect or which is unrelated to him. The deeper point may be that, when
we think about matters the outcome of which bear on us directly – not just in any way,
but insofar as our goodness as people is concerned - we bring to bear on our thoughts a
certain kind of urgency and need to interfuse our values with our actions. This quality is
probably lost from the distant and casual theoretical reflection that, as a Spartan, one
might have about the various pros and cons of the Scythian constitution. After all,
something is really at stake in deliberation – one’s own good or advantage.
The idea that deliberation concerns knowledge that is relevant to us brings up a
second point. For knowledge of our own particular cases might be thought to be the
most relevant to us. Aristotle claims that phronimos is someone who is good at
determining what good and expedient with regard to human affairs, but more particularly
with regard to himself (ta heautô agatha kai sumpheronta) (1141b30; cf. 1140a26-7).56
We might reasonably conclude from this claim that deliberation concerns thoughts about
56
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one’s own welfare, specifically.
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But even if this were an apt interpretation, it is a far

cry from the idea that the phronimos pursues his own self-interest and can be
characterized as someone who is very good at determining how best to serve naked selfinterest. As we saw in chapter 1, the phronimos’ deliberation is guided by a notion of the
‘admirable’ (kalon). The phronimos is motivated by a desire to realize the kalon. Thus,
we can think of the kalon as regulating the one’s deliberation about his own affairs.
While it may be true that the phronimos takes into consideration his own affairs, in
particular, it is also the case that his thoughts about promoting his ends are governed by a
a desire to realize the kalon.
Because deliberation is directed at matters that are relevant to particulars – such
as the features of our specific lives - it is deemed as taking place ‘usually’ or ‘for the
most part’ (hos epi to polu)(1112b8-9).58 The idea is that whatever patterns human life
might exhibit, they are subject to exception and a great deal of ‘variation’ (diaphora).
For example, it is ‘usually’ (hos epi to polu) the case that wealth contributes to
eudaimonia (NE I.4, 1094b18-9). However, it is sometimes the case that wealth does not
promote eudaimonia. Imagine, for example, the case in which wealth made a person
unusually jealous of his money so that, instead of making him better off, it makes him
only more miserly than he would have been otherwise.

57

For the distinction about phronesis as it applies to the city and as it applies to one’s
own private life, see Isocrates To Nicocles. For a comparable distinction, see NE VI.8, in
which Aristotle claims that there is political wisdom about the state, or statesmanship,
and practical wisdom about one’s own affairs and that these are the same hexis, but
different in ‘being.’
58
to_ bouleu&esqai de\ e0n toi=j w(j e0pi\ to polu&, a)dh&loij de\ pw~j a)pobh&setai, kai\ e0n
oi[j a)dio&riston

44
Hos epi to polu might refer to one of two things. On the one hand, it might
refer to statistical frequency, i.e. the frequency with which certain events take place.59
For example, ‘the nine o’clock train to New York is on time, for the most part.’ In such
cases, we mean that, nine times out of ten, the nine o’clock train happens to be on time.
(Suppose that the railroad engineer prided himself on getting the train to the station
promptly at 9:00 am.)
Hos epi to polu might also be a reference to the frequency with which natural
phenomena take place in accordance with nature (kata phusin).60 For it is not always the
case that natural phenomena happen as they ought. That is, it is usually the case that
natural norms hold, but not always. By ‘natural norms,’ I have in mind the idea that
nature exhibits certain patterns. For example, humans typically have five fingers; mares
reproduce; and bats echolocate. It is almost always the case that nature successfully
delivers five-fingered humans, reproducing mares and echolocating bats. However,
sometimes nature delivers “monstrosities” (terata).61 For example, human children are
sometimes born with six fingers on each hand, rather than five; mares might be barren;
59
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Aristotle has very interesting things to say about the various types of cases in which the
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(ateles) that has yet to mature – e.g. the child is an ‘incomplete’ human being in this
sense. On the other hand, the ‘limited’ animals (peiromata) will never mature. They
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and the bat’s sensory machinery might on occasion be impaired. These must be
congenital problems to count as indications that natural phenomena hold ‘hos epi to
polu,’ since the bat’s failure to echolocate because of an injury or the mare’s forced
sterilization does not show a failure of nature, per se. Rather, it shows that some other
factor has compromised the animal’s functioning.
On this view of hos epi to polu, it may in fact be the case that, statistically
speaking, claims that hold hos epi to polu are stastistical norms. However, for Aristotle,
something stronger is meant by hos epi to polu, as the association between hos epi to polu
and kata phusin shows. For claims that hold ‘for the most part’ are claims that are almost
always true just because nature makes it so. In this regard, the phenomena that are
caused by nature should be contrasted with those that happen by luck (tuche), or by skill
(technê), or because of the failure of matter (hule), as is the case with Aristotle’s
monstrosities (terata).
It is important to see that biological norms are teleological, for Aristotle – i.e. they
tend to promote certain ends. For example, self-preservation is one of the goals of the
human being, and the design of human fingers comes in very handy in this regard. For
the various configurations that the fingers can adopt make the human being adept at tool
use and weaponry, which in turn promotes self-preservation (687b2-22). Similarly, the
perpetuation of one’s species is the aim of all animals, according to Aristotle (Physics
VIII). Reproductive abilities promote the perpetuation of the species. Thus, we say,
these norms are norms because they tend to promote the goals of the species.
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But why does any of this make ethical norms like biological norms? The
teleological dimension of biological norms helps us to see why ethical norms are
anything like biological norms. Ethical norms are norms in virtue of the fact that they
tend to promote human goals. Thus, Aristotle claims wealth is usually condusive to
happiness (NE 1094b18-9). For most of the time, being wealthy helps with happiness;
yet, sometimes it compromises happiness. 62 Similarly, as Aristotle points out in the
Eudemian Ethics, the external goods that men strive for are naturally good (agatha
phusei, 1248b28). However, they are not good for everyone, since they are of limited or
incorrect use for the intemperate and unjust. They are good or bad according to one’s
character (dia tas hexeis)(1248b27-30).63 The point is that, just as five fingers promote
self-preservation for humans, wealth and other external goods tend to promote happiness.
The final part of the structure of prohairesis is the end or standard (telos, skopos,
horos) in light of which we deliberate. The telos is a goal in light of which one
deliberates.64 There is a particularly clear statement of this point in the Eudemian Ethics:
But since the doctor has a standard (horos) by reference to which he distinguishes
(krinein) what is healthy for the body from what is not, and with reference to
(pros on) which each thing (hekaston) up to a certain point (mechri) ought to be
done and is healthy, while if less or more is done health is the result no longer, so
in regard to actions (praxeis) and choices (haireseôs) of what is naturally good
(phusei) but not praiseworthy, the good man (agathôn) should have a standard
62

Indeed, modern psychological has established as much! Studies show that, if wealth is
pursued with the right sorts of aims – namely, utilitarian goals such as helping one’s
family, enhancing one’s ability to pursue other aims – wealth does, indeed, make people
happy. By contrast, pursuing wealth as an end in itself – studies show – tends to produce
unhappiness.
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ta_ ga_r perima&xhta kai\ me/gista ei]nai dokou~nta a)gaqa&, timh_ kai\ plou~toj kai\
sw&matoj a)retai\ kai\ eu)tuxi/ai kai\ duna&meij, a)gaqa_ me\n fu&sei e0sti/n, e0nde/xetai d'
ei]nai blabera& tisi dia_ ta_j e3ceij
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For discussion, see Broadie 1991, ch. 4, passim.
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(horon) both of disposition (hexeôs) and of choice and avoidance with regard to
excess or deficiency of wealth and good fortune, the standard being…as reason
(logos) directs; this corresponds to saying in regard to diet (trophê) that the
standard should be as medical science and its reason direct (1249a21-b5)65
The doctor has a notion of health according to which he administers to a patient either a
stronger or a weaker diet (e.g. of wine, say). He prescribes less or more, any deviation
from the appropriate mean results in a loss of health. In the same way, the good man
(agathôn) deliberates with reference to a standard “of disposition and of choice both
concerning both avoidance and use of wealth, poverty and good fortune.’66 This standard
is ‘as reason [directs]’ (to hôs logos). In the case of human being’s deliberation, the telos
is eu prattein, or more specifically, the kalon in the case of the virtuous person. That is,
one deliberates in light of a goal of living or acting well and a notion of the sorts of
dispositions and choices that promote such a goal.
As we saw earlier, there are a number of determinants of the conception of kalon
or eu prattein. First, a human being deliberates in light of the specifically human good,
and not the good of any other being – e.g. the bumblebee. As such, the telos must
express the fact that man is a rational and political. Consequently, a person ought not to
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I have provided my own translation here, since the Barnes translation obscures the
point I wish to emphasize in the passage – namely, the content of the horos according to
which the good person deliberates.
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adopt as an end a solitary life outside of the city (Pol. 1253a2-4) or a life spent
mindlessly in the pursuit of the next pleasure (NE 1095a8; 1095b19-22). Similarly, the
person deliberates in light of the the good in his or her own case – i.e. her own personal
good. For example, Dorothea Brooke deliberates in light of the human good, but in light
of her own personal goals as well – namely, commitments to compassion and to the
project of helping others achieve their aims. In this way, Aristotle helps us understand
how the conception of one’s ends might take shape.
2 Interpretations of Deliberation
It is quite natural to ask for more detail about the end or standard in light of which
we deliberate. How, precisely, it is structured? Does it take the form of a theory of the
good life or of good action? Might it take the form of a set of lexically ordered
principles? Might it have far less content than that? In this section of the chapter, I will
consider several interpretations of the content of the telos that guides the deliberative
process. First, I present (1) the generalist views that the universals guiding deliberation
are either (a) rules and (b) blueprints from which rules are derived. Then I present (2) the
particularist position that the conception of the good (the kalon) is a contentless principle
that takes definite shape in only particular decision-making contexts.
1a. Rules
According to the rule-case interpretation of deliberation made prominent by D.J.
Allan and followed by Gauthier and Jolif, practical reason posits or ‘determines’
67
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(horidzesthai) rules as expressions of good action (eu prattein). For example, a
woman might determine that fulfillment of one’s duties as a wife is an expression of eu
prattein. Once the relevant rule has been determined, it is applied to a particular situation
and results in a choice (prohairesis) to perform an action in particular circumstances.
Then practical reason issues an ‘order’ (keleuei, epitattei) to the appetitve faculty. If
desire obeys, it is desire that converts the judgment about the good action into a wish
(boulêsis) to perform a specific action.68
Two scenarios might prevent this process from taking place. First, the rule
determined by practical reason may be general. If this is the case, practical reason
subsumes particular cases under rules.69 The result is a decision about what to do now,
and again, reason issues an order to desire in order that a wish for the action be formed.
Second, the rule determined by practical reason may be sufficiently precise, but it may
not be clear how to execute the rule. For example, it may be clear that Hamlet should
accuse his stepfather Claudius of murder, but it may be unclear how, when, and in what
manner he should make this accusation. In this case, practical reason engages in
instrumental reasoning and determines the manner in which best to perform an action.
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See Allan, 74-5.
In designating this form of reasoning ‘rule-case’ reasoning, I am following McDowell
1998. While the rule-case account of deliberation is associated with D.J. Allan (Allan
1953) a version of the rule-case interpretation of deliberation was also popularized by
Gauthier and Jolif, but in terms of the efficient and formal causes (Gauthier and Jolif
1970). They characterize the roles of the practical intellect in terms of the formal and
efficient causes of deliberation. As a formal cause, deliberation involves the specification
of ends. It posits general rules. Practical wisdom also determines the conformity of
particular goals to those rules. As an efficient cause, deliberation involves the
specification of means by which to achieve the end.
69
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Again, the result of this process of reasoning is a judgment that one should perform x
action now.
Two notions of ‘determination’ (horidzesthai) might be in use here. One the one
hand, consider the sense in which the Secretary of the Treasury determines the interest
rate. The Secretary is, in effect, creating what was not already there. This is to be
contrasted with the sense in which the astronomer determines the distance between the
moon and the Earth. In this case, there is a fact about the distance, and the astronomer is
ascertaining the fact.70
As D.J. Allan claims, rule-case deliberation involves determination in the former
sense – namely, in the sense that the Secretary of the Treasury determines the interest
rate. Moral rules, on this conception of practical reasoning, are produced by the practical
intellect rather than ascertained by the practical intellect as if they were objectively
existing objects of thought. Moreover, they are construed independently of desire,
according to Allan. On his account, deliberation is not a process of discovering that one
has deep-seated desires for certain ends.71 For example, deliberation is not the process of
discovering that one does really, in fact, care about being a vehicle through which others
can fulfill their projects, rather than pursuing one’s own projects. Instead, deliberation
operates independently of desire in its rule-setting stage, determining rules to which one
should be committed, desired or not.
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Allan 1953, 75.
As Allan remarks, “it can hardly have been [Aristotle’s] view that reason merely lights
up the scene in order to reveal an end which has already been effectively, thought blindly
and instinctively, chosen by desire” (Allan 1953, 76).
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Once one has determined the general rule that ought to be followed, there is the
project of determining whether specific and relevant action types fall under that rule.72
For the deliberative process must be made relevant to an agent’s own case. So, for
example, Dorothea might ask whether the keeping of promises to a husband (a specific
action type) falls under the more general rule that one fulfill one’s duties as a wife. If it is
determined that the rule does subsume the action type, then one has a rule to follow that
is directly relevant to her own case – namely, that one ought to keep promises to a
husband, Following this specific rule is an expression or instance of good action, rather
than a means to fulfilling one’s telos, according to Allan.73
Once the appropriate relevant rule has been determined, the reasoner must
determine how to realize the rule – i.e. through means-ends reasoning. So, it may be the
case that, though Dorothea knows that she should keep the promise, she has yet to
determine how precisely she should express as much. When will she do it? Where?
How? These sorts of questions are addressed during the stage in which the agent engages
in means-ends reasoning about the realization of the rule.
To illustrate these points in the moral case, consider Dorothea from Middlemarch
again. In the process of deliberation, her faculty of practical reason performs the three
functions sketched above. First, it posits the following as an expression of eu prattein:
‘fulfill one’s duties as a wife.’ At this stage, Dorothea has only acknowledged that this is
72
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a good action or an expression the good. She believes that fulfilling one’s duties as a
wife is the right thing to do, whether she personally desires to do this or not. Indeed, in
reflecting about the matter, she naturally refrains from confusing thoughts about what she
wants and what is right.
After determining that fulfilling one’s duties as a wife is the right thing to do,
Dorothea reflects that this is an extremely general judgment and not very helpful, as far
as action-guiding considerations go. For example, while she recognizes that it is good to
fulfill one’s duties as a wife, she is not sure if sacrificing one’s own projects for a
husband’s project counts as an instance of fulfilling one’s duties as a wife. But the
question about her own projects weighed against her promises to a husband is the very
dilemma that Dorothea faces. Thus her faculty of practical reason must undertake a
second task – namely, figuring out whether particular instances of actions fulfill the rule
in question. Does promising to finish the book count as an instance of the rule that fulfill
one’s duties as a wife? Ultimately, Dorothea concludes that the act of promising to
complete her husband’s project does, in fact, fall under the rule that wives fulfill duties to
husbands. Her deliberation thus issues in the conclusion that she make the promise.
Finally, there is a question about the manner in which Dorothea should make this
promise. After all, Causabon is ill and only, at times, able to entertain sustained
conversation. So, Dorothea has to think about the means by which she might make this
promise. Through her faculty of practical reason, Dorothea determines that she should
approach Causabon during his afternoon walk in the garden on the forthcoming day.
Reason orders the appetitive faculty to form the wish to take up this action in pursuit of
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the goal of fulfilling her duties to her husband. If Dorothea is not akratic, she will
form the desire.
The most important result of the widespread adoption of the rule-case
interpretation has been to introduce the debate that has proved to be a central one about
practical reason in the latter half of the twentieth century – as Allan himself put it: “what,
in [Aristotle’s] system, is the part played respectively by reason and desire in the
formulation of the end or good for man?”74 While commentators have subsequently
demurred from accepting the view that practical reason “determines” the end – in the
strong sense that Allan conceived of “determination” – they have nevertheless taken
seriously the idea that reason plays a prominent role in the determination of ends. This is
certainly a reversal from the main view promulgated in first decades of the 1900’s,
according to which practical reason played no role in setting the ends for man (since
virtue did this).75 Most commentators now accept the view that reason plays a role in
setting ends. 76
The interpretation of deliberation as relevant to the agent’s case has not been
universally accepted. For example, John Cooper objects to the idea that rule-case
reasoning terminates in a decision about an action in a particular situation. Rather,
Cooper suggests, the purpose of deliberation is to arrive at the rule which can be used,
subsequently, as the major premise of the practical syllogism. Thus, deliberation issues
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That is, deliberation issues

in the subscription to the specific rule ‘one ought to keep promises to husbands’ rather
than in the choice that ‘I, Dorothea Brooke, ought to keep my promise to my husband
Causabon, and I ought to do this by discussing the matter with him in the garden
tomorrow during his daily stroll.’
Cooper’s objection targets the assumption that deliberation is incomplete until the
agent can hit upon an action he can immediately perform.78 According to Cooper, a close
reading of Aristotle’s discussion of practical perception in NE VI.9 shows that practical
perception is not perception of particulars. Instead, according to Cooper, these passages
from NE VI. 9 show only that deliberation involves consideration of action types – i.e. as
opposed to particulars. Commentators develop a false contrast between universal and
particular in these passages (1141b14-23, 1142a11-23). They assume that the term often
translated as ‘particular’ (to kath’hekaston) and the term for ‘this’ in those passages refers
to individual objects. However, it can be shown that, while Aristotle sometimes uses the
term “this” as a reference to particulars, Aristotle does not always use the term in this
way. Sometimes he uses the term to reference particular kinds: e.g. man, horse, as
opposed to animal.79

77

Cooper 1975, 23. “Aristotle only requires that deliberation issue in a decision to
perform an action of some definite, specific type, and it is a matter of indifference to him
whether the time for implementing the decision is the time at which it is made, or
somewhat later on.. And even in the case where the time for action coincides with the
time of decision, deliberation’s work is done as soon as an action of a suitable specific
type is hit upon as a means of achieving, or beginning to achieve, the end in view.”
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid, 28-9.

55
What is the motivation for this revision of the standard view about
deliberation? The issue is about the proper characterization of the deliberative process. Is
it a process through which one thinks generally about the sorts of actions which count as
good? Or is it a process through which one determines how, specifically, one ought to
act in the circumstances in a way that depends heavily on moral perception? Cooper
favors the former interpretation for the following reasons. First, we might want to resist
the view that the practical syllogism forms part of the process of deliberation and thus the
idea that deliberation is syllogistic in form. According to a standard reading of Aristotle,
the practical syllogism is the last part of the deliberative process. Deliberation is not over
until the agent arrives at an action he can perform. This is the picture suggested by
Aristotle’s remarks in NE III, which can be naturally read as the point that the agent
arrives at a decision only after he has considered whether the action captured by the
decision is practicable. For Aristotle claims that deliberation concerns what is up to us
and doable (peri tôn eph hêmin kai praktôn) (1112a31; 1141b10-11). Most
commentators take Aristotle to mean that deliberation must establish, in part, that the
means needed to carry out the decision are available. Hence, the thought that deliberation
partly involve perception.
But we might want to resist this account of deliberation on the grounds that it
gives a phenomenologically false picture of deliberation.80 According to Cooper, the
standard account assumes that the we are interested in carrying out the decision right then
and there. However, we often postpone carrying out our decisions. To see Cooper’s
objection, consider the following example. Suppose that you have a bad headache, but
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you decide to take aspirin, rather than migraine medicine, which would alleviate the
pain better, but would also make you sleepy. Need it be the case that, in the course of
deliberation, you establish what it would take actually to have the medicine in your
mouth? No, according to Cooper. “He knows where the aspirin is and what it looks like,
so he does not need to “bring the starting-point back to himself” by noting that there
(mentally pointing) is the bathroom or (once standing before the open medicine-chest)
that that is the aspirin, or that this (an act of grabbing) is taking.”81 These additional
thoughts are not part of deliberation. Rather, they are the work of perception.
A second reason to resist the idea that deliberation involves means-ends reasoning
is that it pushes us to think that deliberation is characterized by moral perception, rather
than, say, reflection on the rules that we think are indicative of good action. Recall that
the earlier stages of Dorothea Brooke’s deliberation about promises and husbands. Her
reflection was quite general, for it concerned the question: what is right, in general? That
is, Dorothea reflected on the nature of relationships generally and the extent to which the
husband-wife relationship called for sacrifices of one of the partner’s projects. She
thought generally about the gravity of making a solemn promise to a dying person. By
contrast, her reflection about the terms under which she should actually make the promise
and her specific grounds for making the promise reflected considerations about her own
life: the degree to which Causabon had cut her out of his life, the degree to which he was
a sensitive man in need of compassion, the degree to which she personally had a
commitment to compassion for others and to helping others realize their projects. Then,
of course, there is the quotidian reflection about the actual means by which to realize
81
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one’s decisions – e.g. by waiting to discuss the promise until tomorrow in the garden
during a daily stroll.
Suppose that, as a commentator, one wants to highlight the sense in which moral
reflection concerns the former stage – namely, the stage in which one thinks about what
is right. Suppose too that one wants to drive a wedge between relfection about what is
right and moral perception of the kind that the particularist emphasizes. If so, one might
want to follow Cooper’s lead and interpret deliberation as a process that does not involve
means-ends reasoning and that just involves a stage of reflection on moral problems
during which we consider what is right.
1b. Blueprint
The next main interpretation of deliberation is one according to which the
phronimos has a filled-out conception, theory, or blueprint of the good that guides his
decisions. By ‘blueprint’ or ‘plan,’ one should understand, at the very least, a
determinate and well-defined plan of the good life – one that takes the form of basic
principles which are lexically ordered with respect to one another. For example, one’s
plan for life might include both commitment to career and to one’s children, but in such a
way that the commitment to career is weighted more heavily than the commitment to
one’s children. Cooper describes the plan as follows:
The life defined by such a plan – ends together with weights or other ordering
principles – would be regarded as a single comprehensive end which one has
constantly in view and which one is seeking to realize in each and every decision
one makes” (Cooper 1975, 96).
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This blueprint or plan is acquired through habituation, first of all, but is later enhanced
by knowledge of the grounds according to which some values are privileged over
others.82 To make eu prattein a plan is to pursue a second-order end that one’s plan be
effected or that one’s life realizes a plan – hence Aristotle’s requirement that one pursue
an ultimate end as his single object of pursuit.83
Terence Irwin subscribes to a blueprint picture of deliberation. According to
Irwin, the conception of happiness (H) is arrived at by “considering myself and my life as
a whole, since the final good has to be something whole and complete….” (65). Included
in “myself and my life as a whole” are the multiple stages of life, one’s capacities, desires
and aims (65). The phronimos takes an impartial position in deliberating about his life,
according to Irwin.
“The fact that I am now at this particular stage of my life, and the fact that I am
especially interested in this particular project or aim, will not be allowed to warp
my conception of myself as a whole extended both over different times and over
different desires and capacities. Other people fall short of the holism and
impartiality of the wise person’s point of view” (66).
The problem with the others who cannot sustain impartial reflection on their lives is that
they are susceptible to false notions of the good life. Granted, these conceptions may be
holistic. However, their general and holistic conceptions of life are dominated by
immediate goods – e.g. sex or pleasure. Such people tend to oscillate between life
pictures that are dominated by these immediate goals – whatever they happen to be at that
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moment - and life pictures in which the desirability of the immediate goals are
tempered by long-standing or enduring goals. In addition, such people fail to see that the
oscillation in ends at which they aim is caused by the deeper structural problem of having
both the short-term and the long-term goals (66).
Irwin argues that, since the general conception of happiness is so general,
additional linking devices are needed to explain how one can move from the general
conception of eudaimonia to the major premise (a rule) that informs the practical
syllogism.84 For Irwin, the process of deliberation is envisioned syllogistically, and to the
extent that deliberation is a syllogism, there is a question: how does one select the
relevant major premise in any given situation? Indeed, how does one go from the
conception of happiness to the major premise? The explanation is a linking device. The
linking device is an end that I pursue on a particular occasion. For example, I may
pursue generosity in a particular situation. However, my pursuit of generosity, as a
matter of course, can be derived from my conception of happiness.85 If agents accept that
a general conception of happiness is their end, they also allow that this conception of
happiness should determine the end in the particular situation. This end – say,
generosity, determines which major premise I should adopt in the situation – for example:
choosing to give money over not giving money. Ends and major premises should

84

See the interchange between Irwin 1988 and McDowell 1988. Irwin introduces the
linking principles, technically, to explain the possibility of akrasia. McDowell has
worried about this conception of linking rules; he complains that there is no evidence for
any such thing in Aristotle’s texts.
85
“To claim that H should determine R is to claim that the end I rationally aim at on a
particular occasion should be, or should be ultimately derived from, the end I recognize
as my ultimate good.” (Irwin 1988, 65).
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preserve that impartial quality of the conception of happiness. They should represent
particular aims and rules that the agent would endorse from an impartial perspective.
They will also agree that these should be the principles that guide action (66-7).
Two points should be noted in order to avoid misunderstanding. First, all
reasoning in practical decision-making can be traced back to that conception of
happiness. Nevertheless, it is not required, on this picture, that one consciously reflect on
the conception of one’s end in every deliberative situation. Rather, it is required merely
that one be able to justify his or her decision in light of the plan. Second, though one
pursues a single plan of life, on this reading, that single plan may have a variety of ends –
some political, some philosophical, some personal. Hence, in pursuing the single plan,
one is not necessarily in the grip of the pursuit of a single kind of life or single kind of
goal. In this way, the blueprint account of deliberation is not tied to value monism.
Some critics of the blueprint model of deliberation have focused on the sense in
which this account of eu prattein resembles a technical conception. For commentators
who accept the analogy between craft (technê) and phronêsis, there will be a something
like a ‘technical picture in phronêsis, just as there is one in technê. That is, those who
accept the analogy between craft and phronêsis also accept the idea that phronêsis has
something like a technical picture, just as craft does. For example, Sarah Broadie –
referring to ‘blueprint’ or “picture” has in mind the sort of organized body of knowledge
that constitutes a craftsman’s training. 86 Consider, for example, the theory of health in
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the case of medicine. The theory of health consists of the tried and true observations
that one finds in a doctor’s textbook. This is the ‘technical picture’ to which a craftsman
appeals.
One might criticize the blueprint model on the grounds that it makes deliberation
too easy. As Sarah Broadie points out, we can imagine a rich and complex moral theory
from which one might arrive at choices about particular situations. But such an account
is implausible if it is meant to account exhaustively for all forms of moral reasoning. For
it means that deliberation takes the form of deductive reasoning, thus placing all the
burden or difficulty of moral reasoning on the conjuring of the right moral theory. Once
the right theory is in place, deduction happens as if an afterthought.
A number of additional objections can be made. First, the blueprint model does
accomodate revision as a matter of course. But it seems unlikely that one would arrive at
an unchanging moral theory. We frequently revise our values or goals on reflection. Not
only is it improbable that anyone might have an unchanging plan for the good life, it may
not be desirable to have such a plan. There are certainly important virtues associated
with the person who admits ignorance about what is good – for example, humility in the
face of a truly difficult question. Similarly, there may be vices associated with the
possession of a well-defined plan for life (self-righteousness, a tendency to be judgmental
and dogmatic). Moreover, on some conceptions of good life – those which emphasize the
importance of experience and experimentation, say - having a well-defined plan of life is
undesirable.
state of affairs to be brought about or in terms of some action to be done providentially
designed to take care of them” (234).
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2 Particularism
The third account of deliberation to consider is the particularist’s. According to the
particularist’s interpretation of deliberation, eu prattein is a content-less conception of the
good, and this conception simply amounts to the sum total of propensities to read or
perceive particular situations in light of the kalon. These can be thought of as the
deliverances of a perceptual faculty, or perceptual scenes. Because the deliverances of a
perceptual faculty are so fine-grained and variable, there can be no set of rules to which
they neatly correspond. Phronêsis, on this reading, involves perception of particulars. On
this view, Aristotle means to say that decisions (prohaireseis) issue solely from
perceptual judgments. No further processing – in the form of consultation of principles –
is necessary.
The particularist rejects the view that moral reasoning resembles theory building and
deductive reasoning – the sort of account we have just seen in the blueprint and rule-case
models of deliberation. The central feature of those models to which the particularist
objects is the idea that deliberation resembles deductive reasoning. 87 That is, one
possesses a correct theory of the good – say, a sort of blueprint or plan according to
which various goals are represented and ranked in order of importance. Once one is
acquainted with the non-moral facts of particular situations, one is in the position to make
the required deduction. E.g. (1) My theory of the good requires that I fulfill my duties to
my husband; (2) here is an opportunity to fulfill those duties; and (3) therefore, I should
fulfill them. The particularist argues that, on this conception of deliberation, too much
work goes into the theory-building or rule-casting aspect of deliberation and not enough
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into the difficult weighing of various alternatives against one another and the seeing of
the morally salient features of the situation.
The particularist will also object to the blueprint and rule-case interpretations of
deliberaiton on the grounds that, first of all, Aristotle often claims that there are not
universal truths in ethics (cf. 1009b12-23). Hence, it is unclear why the other
interpretations help themselves to numerous universal – like entities (i.e. rules) in ethics.
Second, the others account cannot make sense of Aristotle’s remarks about the role that
perception plays in phronêsis. According to the blueprint account, the function of
perception in phronêsis is to acquaint the agent with his surroundings and then to use the
deliverances of perception to decide which rule to invoke. The same goes for the rulecase interpretation. As McDowell puts it, “ in the “rule”-“case” picture, the most obvious
role for perception is to contribute awareness that certain conditions, which are in fact the
conditions specified in a rule, are satisfied.”88
There are two problems with these readings of the role of perception in moral
reasoning. First, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that moral perception plays a far more
robust role than merely acquainting agents with the fact that the right conditions hold for
the application of a rule. Rather, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that moral agents see
situations in different ways, depending on their characters. (Aristotle says that things
appear differently to people, depending on their character.89) If this is so, then perception
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acquaints agents not merely with non-moral facts, but with moral facts as well, and
thus that moral perception plays all the difference in motivating good conduct.
While the sensibility theorist’s account is motivated by a rejection of the blueprint
model, it is also motivated by a reading of certain passages about inexactness and
perception. Particularist readings are persuasive on the following textual grounds:
1 First, Aristotle claims that the subject matter of ethics is inexact. The subject
matter (hulê) of politics is human good (ta anthropina agatha), and about such matters,
there is much variability (diaphora)(1094a16). According to Aristotle, matters
concerning the human good are either good or bad, depending on the situation. As a
result, we should not seek the same exactness (akribeia) in politics as we might in other
sciences.90 For matters in politics hold only ‘for the most part’ (1094b21). As a result,
we must indicate the truth ‘in outline’ (en topoi) (e.g. 1094b11-27). These passages have
been taken to indicate that Aristotle views the subject matter of ethics as too fluid and
variable to admit of codification, as the particularist suggests.91
2 Second, Aristotle claims that phronêsis involves perception, and he insists that
phronêsis involves perception of particulars.92 Since phronêsis is practical (praktikê),
and practice is concerned with the particular (kath hekasta), phronêsis involves
90
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perception of particulars (1141b15, b16). Familiarity with particulars comes from
experience (1142a13). The result is that learned people are not necessarily wise, for they
may lack experience (empereia)(1141b3-5). Similarly, while young people can be good
at math and such things, they cannot be wise, for they lack experience (1142a15-9). The
emphasis on the perception of the particular suggests that practical knowledge is
expressed through perception of the morally salient features of a situation, rather than
through any expressible or contentful claims. Similarly, the image of the phronimos as
experienced in life suggests that phronêsis cannot be expressed in terms of knowledge or
contentful claims. For it is strange to imagine that the experienced person is wise
because he or she knows some rules by which to live. Rather, the experienced person
seems simply to get it naturally – i.e. without overthinking things.
3 Finally, Aristotle distinguishes phronêsis from technê and epistêmê. One might
take this to mean that practical reasoning is neither technical or scientific reasoning. If
one assumes that both technical and scientific reasoning can be modeled syllogistically,
one might construe Aristotle’s point as a denial of the claim hat practical reasoning is a
form of syllogistic or deductive reasoning. The apparent absense of any such rules in the
discussions of deliberation seem to underline the suggestion that deductive reasoning is
not part of the paradigm of practical reasoning (NE III.5, VI.4).
How does the particularist account for the role of rules given his account of
ethical knowledge? Rules are summaries of wise decisions or generalizations from past
decisions.93 They summarize, in particular, wise decisions – for example, that such and
93
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such a thing was expedient in such and such a case. What I have in mind here is
something like a football team’s play book. The playbook show how the ball should be
moved down the field. It specifies what each player is responsible for, and how each
maneuver is supposed to work. Notice that these playbooks can be very precise.
Suppose, for example, that the Arizona Cardinals football team has drawn up a set of
tactical principles that have helped them win against the Philadelphia Eagles in the past.94
The idea is that a rules summarize wise decisions just just as the playbook summarizes
the successful past plays.
The function of rules is heuristic for the particularist95 They aid in the decision
making process, but they do not necessarily determine what one should do. For one can
disregard the advice of my rules just as one can disregard the advice of a trusted
councilor. The mere fact of disregarding the advice is not wrong. It is just that, on some
occasions, a person seem to know better. Let me provide an example of the way we
might understand heuristic here.96: Consider the Arizona Cardinals’ list of tactical
maneuvers again.. Suppose that Kurt Warner realizes on the third down that, by
94
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disregarding the principle that the quarterback should not run, the team can get a first
down. He disregards the rule, seeing that another strategy will work well here. He
makes the renegade play and gets the first down. The coach does not give much thought
to the fact that Warner has disregarded the playbook. He is pleased that the play worked,
and thinks to himself: that Kurt Warner. He’s an inspired quarterback – the idea being
that Kurt Warner is the kind of person who knows when to use the play book to make a
call and when to use his own discretion. Thus, by heuristic here, I mean to capture the
idea that we are morally permitted to disregard rules if our perception of particular
situations prompts us to act differently.97 Rules are only aids to good decision-making,
but not definitive of good decision-making.
We should attempt to avoid misunderstandings and caricatures of this position
about rules. First, one might think that, according to the particularist, moral expertise is
the art of knowing when to make exceptions to the rule – i.e. the art of an unprincipled
person. Given the degree to which we are prone to self-deception, does it not seem on
the whole better for us not to be allowed to decide, perhaps whimsically, or in a selfserving manner, when we feel like we know better than the rules? Thus, an objection to
the particularist’s construal of rules might go: is this process of seeing a kind of free-forall, haphazard and unprincipled act of pure discretion? If so, it’s not for me. Here, the
particularist may respond that the act of perceptual discretion that is called for is
undergirded by a set of emotional propensities. In the ideal case, these are habituated
correctly. If habituated correctly, the person wil feel the appropriate emotions,
motivations and responses to situations.
97
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A second possible misunderstanding is the idea that the moral expert either
follows the rule book or he throws it to the wind, using his own expert discretion. That is:
whenever our principles seem to fall short, we ought to use perception to settle the
situation. This is a false dichotomy where the particularist’s expert is concerned. The
agent is not to be conceived as someone who, in grasping that the rules do not cover his
case, says to himself: aha! I will now use perception to settle the matter. That is, he is
not to be regarded as employing either rules or discretion to make decisions. Rather,
each process is to be envisioned as informing the other.98 Consider, for example, the way
that the practically wise person simultaneously makes use of both rules and particular
features of a situation.
The basic feature of the particularist’s account, for our purposes, is the rejection
of the idea that deliberation appeals to action-guiding principles. As we have seen, the
particularist accepts that deliberation may appeal to action guiding principles as heuristic
devices. But these principles are not definitive of good decision-making. Their role in
decision-making is always secondary to moral perception, or the seeing of the morally
salient features of the situation. In future chapters, I will question the extent to which this
account of deliberation maps on to Aristotle’s account of deliberation.
Conclusion
This chapter presented an overview of Aristotle’s account of deliberation, an account of
the generalist and particularist interpretations of deliberation. We saw that the generalist
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appeals to action-guiding principles for deliberation and that the particularist allows
only that such principles play a heuristic role in the decision-making process. We also
briefly considered the textual evidence for the particularist reading of Aristotle’s ethics.
The evidence included Aristotle’s remarks about ‘exactness’ (akribeia), the ‘particular’
(kath hekasta), claims that hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu), the ‘outline’ (tupos)
and ‘variation’ (diaphora).
The next chapter will reposition that textual evidence in the context of Aristotle’s
scientific thought about exact science. I will show that the evidence can be usefully
repositioned in a debate about the status of the various sciences in ancient Greek thought.
Some were considered more science-like than others because they had the properties
associated with the ‘exact’ (akribeia) sciences such as geometry and arithmetic.
Repositioning the textual evidence for particularist readings of Aristotle’s ethics will help
us to see why that evidence does not, in fact, support the particularist interpretation.
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Chapter 3
Exact Science in the Nicomachean Ethics
In the previous chapter, we saw that there is a question about the extent to which a
conception of the good informs the choice of action in a particular situation. I sketched
several explanatory accounts – among them, the particularist account, according to which
the conception of the good that guides deliberation takes shape only in particular
situations through a process of grasping the morally salient features of the situation. We
saw that the reading of Aristotle as a particularist is based on Aristotle’s claims that
politics lacks exactness; that the subject matter of politics is human good; and that there
is much variability about such matters. Indeed, matters in politics hold only ‘for the most
part.’ As a result, we must indicate the truth ‘in outline.’ The particularist uses these
passages to suggest that Aristotle views the subject matter of ethics as too fluid and
variable to admit of codification.
In this chapter of the dissertation, I would like to place Aristotle’s remarks about
these features in their broader context as a feature of scientific discourse in fifth and
fourth-century Greece. In the period’s literature on technê, there was widespread
agreement that exactness was the mark of a true technê. In turn, exactness was associated
with measurement, method, rigorous proof and mathematical abstraction. By contrast,
the inexact sciences were associated with the lack of these features. Indeed, the natural
sciences like medicine and political science dealt with matters that were not easily
codifiable in mathematical terms.
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The first part of this chapter describes the history of the exact sciences in
Aristotle’s era and the influence of Plato’s late philosophy on Aristotle’s understanding
of exact science. The second part of the chapter provides a discussion of three criteria
that Aristotle uses to define the exact science. In the third part of the chapter, I discuss
the sense in which political science fails to be exact. Aristotle’s claims about exact
science and politics and his explanation for the lack of exactness in politics. I also
discuss a possible link between exact science and the notion of ‘difference’ (diaphora)
that we find in Aristotle’s works. I conclude the chapter with a brief summary of various
terms Aristotle uses to convey the idea that a science was inexact.
1 The Exact Sciences
The term ‘akribês’ has a pre-philosophical origin. It was related to the technai involving
carpentry or sculpture.99 The word was used to indicate that the craftsman’s project
showed a great degree of finish or detail. For example, in Aristotle’s De Caelo, the term
is used to compare the sphere that composes the material world with the celestial world.
Aristotle claims that the matter from which this sphere is composed does not have the
same “regularity and finish” as the enveloping, celestial matter (287b19). This use of
akribês to mean careful craftmanship is also seen in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle
claims:
Wisdom in the arts we ascribe to their most finished (akribestatois) exponents,
e.g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of statues, and here we
mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art (NE VI.7, 1141a9-11).
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As Stewart points out, the use of akribestatois here is synonymous with wisdom. Any
craftsman – e.g. carpenter, sculptor, poet or musician – who excelled in his art was also
referred to as wise or sophos.100 As the passage goes on to suggest, the most exact
craftsman is excellent insofar as he has a grasp of the fundamental principles of his craft.
Or, as Aristotle puts it, the wise person has not only knowledge of the first principles
(archai), but also of the truth of the first principles (a17-8; cf. a19). Hence, wisdom
(sophia) is the “most finished” (a16-7) of the forms of knowledge.101
But, in its main use, the term ‘akribês’ applies to the well crafted speech or
argument. This sense of the term can be seen in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. There, Aristotle
claims that the written style of rhetoric tends to be ‘more finished’ (akribesteron, 1413b
9; cf. 1355a25). The sense of craftedness here sometimes refers particularly to
discussions that include thorough explanations or great detail. The defendant’s speech
that gives more thorough argumentation or evidence of a point would have been
‘finished’ (Antiphon, Third Tetralogy, 4.3.1). But in this latter context, the word had
both a negative and a positive connotation. For it is possible to give a sketch of one’s
argument – a sketch that gets the basic point across all the while recognizing that the
subject deserves a more detailed, fuller treatment. So, for example, in Plato’s Statesman,
Socrates contrasts a discussion that has been ‘sufficient’ with one that is truly exact
100
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But it is also possible to go into too much detail and obscure the main lines

of one’s argument. Indeed, this can be done purposefully, in the manner of a sophist.
Hence, Isocrates writes in his speech To Philip that one can best understand the
willingness of a city to go to war if one reviews “neither in general terms nor yet with
excessive detail the principal facts in their present situation” (To Philip, 46). Similarly, in
the second Tetralogy, Antiphon suggests that ‘subtlety’ of argument indicates that a
speaker is engaging in sophistry.
Akribês was often associated with measurement. Thus, in Plato’s Philebus,
Socrates ranks the technai by the exactness each can achieve in measurement (55d-56c).
Some are more closely related to knowledge, and others are less so. For example, the
technai more closely related to knowledge are ‘purer’ (55d). Those less closely related to
knowledge are less so. The former are futher characterized as being the sciences of
arithmetic, measurement and weighing (55e). These are contrasted with the sciences
which operate by conjecture and through experience, perception, and knack (55e).
Achievement in these arts is gotten through practice and toil (55e). For example, music
might attain harmony through guesswork, rather than through measurement (56a). The
result would be lack of clarity about the pitch, rather than certainty (56a; cf. 59c).103
Sciences which proceed in this manner, according to Socrates, include: medicine,
music, farming, navigation and generalship. All are less mathematical and precise. The
real technai are those that use measurment and tools, all of which give it certainty and
make it more like genuine knowledge (epistêmê) than the other arts. These crafts
102
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include: shipbuilding, housebuilding, building, and carpentry. They use tools of
measurement like the compass, rule, and the line (56c). With the distinction between the
mathematical and non-mathematical sciences in mind, Socrates proposes that the arts be
divided into two classes: those that are more exact like building, and those that are less
exact, like music (56c).
In a more limited use – one that is derived from Plato’s works akribês was
associated with the objects of study themselves. The nature of the object of study made
the science exact or inexact. For Plato, the stable structures behind apparent change are
the proper objects of study. Hence, in the Philebus, Socrates suggests that some
properties make an object the proper study of an exact science: purity (59c), an unmixed
quality (59c), absence of inequality (anisos), and ‘reality’ (59c; cf. Republic, 522c531c).104
Plato’s remarks are a reprise of the familiar position that the most true and the
best sciences study what really exists, rather than what is merely apparent. In the
Philebus passage, for example, Socrates claims that arithmetic should be distinguished
into two kinds. The first form is for the people, and the second, for the philosophers.
The former calculate with unequal units like armies and oxen. The latter deal only with
units that are identical to all other units. With this distinction in mind, arithmetic and
measurement used for practical purposes is unlike philosophical geometry. For
arithmetic, as philosophers practice it, is ‘more clear’ in that it has the higher amount of
exactness (57c; cf. 58c).
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2 Aristotle and the Criteria of Exact Science
The influence of Plato’s notion of an exact science as one that studies what really
exists can be seen in Aristotle’s understanding of the exact sciences. Aristotle also uses
the term akribês to distinguish the exact sciences from the inexact sciences. Every
science deals with a particular subject matter or studies a particular kind of object,
considered in a certain respect or aspect (Meta M.3, 1077b33). Like Plato, Aristotle
conceives of the most exact sciences as those that study the ontological entities that are
most real.
Aristotle provides three defining criteria for the exact science in the Posterior
Analytics.105 He writes:
One science is more precise (akribestera) than another and prior to both (1) if it is
at the same time of the fact (tou hoti) and of the reason why (di hoti) and not of
the fact separately of the science of the reason why; and (2) if it is not said of an
underlying subject and the other is said of an underlying subject (e.g. arithmetic
and harmonics); and (3) if it depends on fewer items and the other on an
additional posit (e.g. arithmetics and geometry) (I mean by an additional posit,
e.g. a unit is a positionless substance, and a point a substance having position –
the latter depends on an additional post.) (Posterior Analytics, I.27, 87a31-36). 106
The three criteria show us that an exact science: (1) studies explanations in addition to
facts; and (2) studies objects in abstraction from their matter. Finally, an exact science
studies objects (3) stripped of most of their properties – matter and others.
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According to the first criterion, an exact science studies facts through their
explanations rather than by simply studying the facts.107 For example, one may know
that ‘the sky is blue.’ But it is an entirely different matter to know that ‘the sky is blue,’
all the while knowing, in addition, why it is blue.
To see Aristotle’s meaning fully, it is necessary to review the distinction between
understanding the fact the ‘that’ (hoti) and the explanation the ‘because’ (di hoti).108 To
grasp the ‘because’ (di hoti) is to have the ability to demonstrate the fact (hoti) from prior
and immediate facts (An. Post. 71b21). Priority is a reference to causation and, in
particular, the relationship of causes to one another. A cause is prior to another if it is the
cause of another. For example, if a is the cause of z, then a is therefore prior to z.
Immediacy is also a reference to relationships among causes and in particular, the
proximity of causes to some result. A cause is relatively proximate to a result, if it is
more directly the cause of that result than some other cause. For example, a, b and c
might all be the causes of z, and a the cause of b, b the cause of c, and so on. . In this
case, c is more directly the cause of z than a or b. Thus, c is the proximate cause of z
with relation to a and b.
An example will illustrate the nature of Aristotle’s claims about priority and
proximity. Suppose that you use a telescope to observe that the planets are near to the
Earth. With your naked eye, you observe that they do not twinkle. You also suppose that
the two phenomena are related – i.e. the fact that the planets do not twinkle and that they
107
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are also near. But there are several questions to ask about the way in which these two
phenomena might be related. First of all, what is the order of explanation? Do planets
fail to twinkle because they are near to the Earth? Or is it the case that they are near to
the Earth because they do not twinkle? As it turns out, planets do not twinkle because
they are near. For Aristotle, getting the order of explanation correct is identifying the
right ‘middle term’ of a demonstration (78a23-b33). Aristotle frames this point in
another way by noting that a science like harmonics, which deals with actual chors and
sounds, does not provide explanations of the phenomena that it studies. Instead,
arithmetic provides those explanations (Post An, I.13, 79a1-7; cf. Post An I.7; I.10). That
is, both study relations among numbers, but arithmetic concerns itself with the
explanations of chords and sounds (79a3-7). It is only qua knower of arithmetic that the
phenomena of harmonics can be explained (cf. Post An I.10, 76b4).
Second, what is the most direct cause of the planets’ not twinkling? Planets do no
twinkle because they are near – this is true. But is there some explanation that has more
explanatory power? We might say – supplementing the Aristotelian account that the
better explanation is the following. If a relatively large amount of light from a source
reaches the eye reaches the eye, the source does not appear to twinkle. If a small amount
of light from the source reaches the eye, the source appears to twinkle. Since the planets
are close to the Earth, a relatively large amount of the light rays reflected from their
surface reach the Earth. Thus, nearness does explain why the planets do not twinkle, but
is not nearness per se that explains the lack of twinkling. Rather, it is the amount and the
velocity of light rays, or the intensity of light given from a source that indicate whether
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something will twinkle. Hence, we might say that light intensity, rather than nearness,
is the proximate cause of the planets’ twinkling (or failure to twinkle).
With these two ideas in hand – priority and proximity – we are in a position to
see the nature of the exact science. An exact science is one that provides both the prior
and proximate causes of the phenomena in question. It would be a science, in effect,
which provided an explanation of the fact that the planets’ not twinking, and it would
explain this fact by appealing to the most helpful (or proximate) explanations – namely,
the fact that the intensity of light rays reaching the eye accounts for the extent to which a
source may or may not twinkle.
The second criterion for an exact science is that the science is not “said of an
underlying subject” (hupokeimenon).109 Aristotle refers here to a distinction between
sciences that study objects qua enmattered objects – thus having a hupokeimenon - and
those that study objects abstracted of their form. For example, a biologist studies plant
and animal life, all of which exhibit shapes, quantities, relations of numbers, and so on.
The mathematician studies the same objects, but without taking into account the matter of
these things. The mathematician is not interested in real, enmattered spores in nature, as
the biologist might be. Rather, he is interested only in the properties of the spore that can
be abstracted from its matter – namely, its spherical shape (Met. XIII.3; (Post An I.13,
79a8-12). Similarly, the biologist might be interested in pinecones and the material
which allows them to best serve as seed transporters. By contrast, the mathematician

109

Reeve reads Aristotle’s claim here as being a point about matter. The criterion “states
in other terminology – matter is the underlying thing to which it refers – that exactness in
a science is a function of its level of abstraction from matter” (Reeve 1995, 140).

79
might be interested only in the fact that the pinecone displays the pattern of the
Fibonacci series. For Aristotle, sciences like mathematics which study objects abstracted
from their matter are more exact than those which do not (De Cael, 306a27; Met.
995a15-6).
According to the third criterion for exact science, a science is more exact if it (a)
“depends on fewer items and (b) “posits few principles.” To claim that an exact science
depends on fewer items means that an exact science deals with objects that have
relatively few properties. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle refers to this state as ‘simplicity’
(to haploun) simplicity is the state of the object having the fewest properties.110 To the
degree that we deal with things that are prior in formula and simpler, knowledge has
greater accuracy, i.e. simplicity. Aristotle goes on to define simplicity in terms of
abstraction of magnitude, movement, and, in particular, irregular motion.
A science which abstracts from the magnitude of things is more precise if it
abstracts from movement, but if it take account of movement it is most precise if
it deals with the primary movements, for this is the simplest (haploustatê), and of
this again uniform movement is the simplest form (Met. XIII.3, 1078a10-14).111
The object of study may be ‘without magnitude’ (cf. Met. 1025b26-1026a). The object of
study may be with or ‘without motion.’ The object can be not only motionless, but it
may have uniform motion of the kind that is primary. What sort of objects does Aristotle
110

This claim may be related to Plato’s remarks about purification in the Philebus (55e).
ai\ o3sw| dh_ a2n peri\ prote/rwn tw|~ lo&gw| kai\ a(plouste/rwn, tosou&tw| ma~llon
e1xei to_ a)kribe/j (tou~to (de\ to_ a(plou~n e0sti/n), w3ste a1neu te mege/qouj ma~llon h2 meta_
mege/qouj, kai\ ma&lista a1neu kinh&sewj, e0a_n de\ ki/nhsin, ma&lista th_n prw&thn:
a(plousta&th ga&r, kai\ tau&thj h( o(malh&. o( d' au)to_j lo&goj kai\ peri\ a(rmonikh~j kai\
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xwri/saj, o3per o( a)riqmhtiko_j poiei= kai\ o( gewme/trhj. e4n me\n ga_r kai\ a)diai/reton o(
a1nqrwpoj h|{ a1nqrwpoj: o( d' e1qeto e4n a)diai/reton, ei]t' e0qew&rhsen ei1 ti tw|~
a)nqrw&pw| sumbe/bhken h|{ a)diai/retoj. o( de\ gewme/trhj (ou1q' h|{ a1nqrwpoj ou1q' h|{
a)diai/retoj a)ll' h|{ stereo&n.
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have in mind? Mathematical objects serve as one likely category. As items of
thought, mathematical objects lack dimension and motion. But Aristotle also has in mind
items like planets. They are in motion, but in regular or circular motion. Hence, the
study of the planets (e.g. through astronomy) is more exact than the study of physics
since the latter studies objects that exhibit irregular motion.112
Aristotle also claims that an exact science posits relatively few additional
principles. The meaning here can be clarified by considering a distinction between mixed
and pure definitions. In Metaphysics 1030b15, Aristotle refers to the distinction between
mixed (ek prosthesiôs) and pure definitions (ex aphaireseôs) (cf. Cael. 299a17). A mixed
definition is one in which the definiendum cannot be defined without reference to the
special sort of thing in which they inhere. So, for example, snubness can be only in a
nose. But whiteness can be in a man, a plant, an animal, etc. Hence, ‘snubness’ will
yield a mixed definition, while ‘whiteness’ will not (Met. VII.5, 1030b14-27; cf. Cael.
299a17). ‘Mixed’ here means something like ‘parasitical,’ for there can be no concept of
snubness without the prior concept of a nose. Similarly, there can be no science of
geometry without the prior notion of number. In hypothesizing that there is magnitude –
or numerous spatial units – geometry presupposes that there is number. Yet, number is
hypothesized by arithmetic. Hence, geometry is parasitic on the arithmetic. Again, we
see that geometry is less exact than arithmetic.
Before moving on to the next topic, it is important to see that an exact science is
not just one category of science types among others for Aristotle. Rather, it is the
quintessential form that science takes. The best sciences or the most scientific sciences
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are the exact sciences. For the most exact sciences are those that deal, most of all, with
the first principles (Met. I.2, 982a25). The science that deals with the first principles is
the most knowable (982b1-2), and the most knowable thing is the knowledge pursued for
its own sake (982a30-1). While the science that studies first principles is therefore the
least necessary, it is also the best (983a10-11). To the fullest extent, this science is first
philosophy, or theology.
3 Politikê as an Inexact Science
We have seen that Aristotle uses the term akribês to capture the notion of an exact
science – namely, a science which focuses on first principles and studies phenomena in
such a way as to abstract from them as many qualities as possible. But Aristotle also uses
the term to reference other, related ideas as well.113
First, Aristotle sometimes writes as if cognitive states were inexact or exact. For
example, the states associated with perception are relatively inexact, while those
associated with epistêmê and reason are more exact. Similarly, Aristotle claims that there
can be greater exactness in theoretical statements than in the statements of perceptual
facts. “We ought not to require the same accuracy (akribeian) in theory as in the facts
given by perception” (Pol. 1328a20). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines
wisdom as the “most finished” (akribestaton) kind of knowledge (NE VI.7, 1141a 16).
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Finally, in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle claims that nous is the most precise
(akribestaton) state of understanding, for it exceeds epistêmê in accuracy and truth (Post
An II.19, 100b8).
Exactness also refers to written accounts (logoi) (HA 753b14-8; Pr. A, 46a29;
24b14; EE II.10, 1227a11; NE 1174b2; Topics 153a11; cf. Phy. I.9, 192a35). Consider
the following passage.
The whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline (tupôi) and not
precisely (akribôs), as we said at the very beginning that the accounts (logoi) we
demand must be in accordance with the subject matter; matters concerned with
conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than
matters of health. The general account being of this nature (katholou logou), the
account of particular cases (ho peri ton kath hekasta) is yet more lacking in
exactness (t’ akribês); for they do not fall under any art or set of precepts, but the
agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion,
as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation (NE II. 2, 1104a1-8). 114
Two accounts (logoi) are mentioned here: (1) the ‘general account’(katholou logou) and
(2) the account of particular cases (ho peri ton kath heksta logos). Aristotle claims that
neither is exact (1104a6-7). The first account’s lack of exactness explains the second
account’s lack of exactness: “the account of particulars is even less exact because the
account of the universals is inexact” (1104a5-7). Logos, notoriously, can mean many
things (e.g. speech, the written word). However, the use in this passage seems to refer to
the account of politics itself i.e. the lecture addressed to those who are “hearing” or
learning about political science (I.4, 1095b5-6).
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Such passages strike me as significant because they suggest that Aristotle is
referring to his own account. I refer to this literary phenomenon as authorial selfreference.115 By this, I mean the author’s reference to himself as a writer and the
reference to his work as a written work. There are several common examples of authorial
self-reference – first, the case in which the author directs a reader to some other portion
of the text. The author may say, for example: “as I wrote earlier” or “as I explain
elsewhere.” Another example is the case in which the author explains that or why
something is not addressed. The author may say: “this is not worth writing about.”
Finally, the author may refer to his achievement in writing something. For example, he
may write: my predecessors have neglected the issue, but in writing this, I will ameliorate
the situation. Such phrases foreground the author’s conception of himself as a writer and
his conception of his work as a written work.
An important case of authorial self-reference, insofar as our analysis of Aristotle
is concerned, is that in which the author claims that the account given in writing is
schematic. By ‘schematic,’ I mean that the account is unfinished, lacking in detail, or
leaving out some information. For example, in giving directions, one might say: “go
straight for about a mile until you see a McDonalds; then, turn right.” The phrase “about
a mile” is not exact. One could make it exact by saying: “1.2 miles.” Consider a second
example: the dictum that you should return what you’ve borrowed. What if you have
borrowed a knife from a person who has turned out to be a maniac? Should you return it?
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No, but in other cases, you should return what you’ve borrowed. What other cases? It
would be an arduous task to discuss them all. So, we keep the simple dictum: return what
you have borrowed. But we recognize that the dictum, as stated, leaves out information.
So, by ‘schematic,’ I mean to imply nothing about the nature of the information in
question and whether it could, in principle, be set out. That is, it could, in principle, be
written down, but it may take too long to do so.
We can find references to schematic accounts in the Hippocratic Corpus. These
are passages that make reference to the wealth of cases to discuss and the prospect of
writing about all these cases. Time and efficiency do not permit that all the cases can be
addressed. Therefore, the reader must make inferences based on the material provided.
Consider, for example, On the Sacred Disease, the Hippocratic treatise dealing with
epilepsy. The author claims that the manifestations of epilepsy are too numerous to
describe. “Many other instances, of various kinds [of cases of epilepsy], could be given,
but time does not permit us to speak of each separately” (On the Sacred Disease, 1).116
He therefore discusses only a few such cases, and these are supposed to be representative
of the many.
Similarly, the author of On Joints reports that he can give only a schematic
account of the wiring or threading together of a broken jaw. The reader must form a
general sense of the procedure from the text, with the understanding that he will only
truly learn how the operation works when he performs it. The text explains that, if the
jaw is broken across completely, one should adjust or realign the jaw, and then the teeth
should be fastened together. To do this properly, the teeth must be fastened together with
116
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a thread. While a gold thread is best, a linen thread is adequate. The thread should be
tied at the ends and left on the jaw until the bone heals (32-3). The reader must operate
from the description of the operation in these two chapters. The author owns that a more
detailed description might be wanted, but that it would be impossible to give. “It is not
easy to give exact (atrekês) and complete details of an operation in writing (en graphê);
for the reader should form an outline (hupotupeisthai) of it from the description (ek tôn
gegrammenôn)” (On Joints, 33).117 Presumably, the meaning is that operations, in
particular, are difficult to describe fully and a manual about operations can give only an
incomplete account.
This foray into the idea of a schematic account helps us to read the passage from
the Nicomachean Ethics above. When Aristotle claims that the account of the universals
and particulars lacks exactness (1104a6-7), he means that the accounts in question are
schematic. Indeed, the account of the particulars is more so. Recall that Aristotle
explains the lack of exactness in the account of particulars by saying that the particulars
“do not fall under any art or set of precepts, but the agents themselves must in each case
consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of
navigation.” This explanation bears a great deal of resemblance to the idea that, when
following dictums, one takes the dictum to be a general rule – i.e. one that needs to be
thought about in light of a specific situation. Thus, you generally return what you have
borrowed. But if you have borrowed a certain kind of thing (a weapon) from a certain
kind of person (bloodthirsty), it may be best not to return what you have borrowed.
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We have just seen that exactness is a term of description for accounts. Let us
now consider the various reasons why an account might not be exact. Aristotle has two
answers to this question. First, the precision of the account must be consistent with the
aim of the account. If the aim of the account is practical, less precision is demanded.
Second, the precision of the account must be consistent with the subject matter of the
account. If the subject matter is inherently variable – as the subject matter of politics is –
then we can expect that the science which studies this subject matter is less exact than
other sciences. Aristotle states:
We must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in
all things alike; but in each class of things such precision as accords with the
subject matter and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a
geometer look for right angles in different ways; the former does so insofar as the
right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort
of thing it is (ti esti) for he is a spectator 118 of the truth. We must act in the same
way, then, in all other matters as well, that our main task may not be subordinated
to minor questions. Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is
enough in some cases that the fact be well established, as in the case of the first
principles (NE I.7, 1098a20-b2). 119
Let us first consider the claim that the precision of the account should be consistent with
the aims of the inquiry.
Accounts take their form based on their various purposes. That is, the same
information can be explicated in different ways or adjusted to different purposes. For
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Perigegra&fqw me\n ou}n ta)gaqo_n tau&th|: dei= ga_r i1swj u(potupw~sai prw~ton,
ei]q' u3steron a)nagra&yai….memnh~sqai de\ kai\ tw~n proeirhme/nwn xrh&, kai\ th_n
a)kri/beian mh_ o(moi/wj e0n a3pasin e0pizhtei=n, a)ll' e0n e9ka&stoij kata_ th_n u(pokeime/nhn
u3lhn kai\ e0pi\ tosou~ton e0f' o3son @1oi0kei=on th|~ meqo&dw|.kai\ ga_r te/ktwn kai\ gewme/trhj
diafero&ntwj e0pizhtou~si th_n o)rqh&n: o4 me\n ga_r e0f' o3son xrhsi/mh pro_j to_ e1rgon, o4
de\ ti/ e0stin h2 poi=o&n ti: qeath_j ga_r ta)lhqou~j. to_n au)to_n dh_ tro&pon kai\ e0n toi=j
a1lloij poihte/on, o3pwj mh_ ta_ pa&rerga tw~n e1rgwn plei/w gi/nhtai. ou)k
a)paithte/on d' ou)de\ th_n ai0ti/an e0n a3pasin o(moi/wj, a)ll' i9kano_n e1n tisi to_
o3ti deixqh~nai kalw~j, oi[on kai\ peri\ ta_j a)rxa&j.
119

87
example, one might present Aristotle’s ethics in the form of an introductory book for
undergraduates whom one hoped to improve morally through the presentation. By
contrast, one might present the same information, but in serious scholarly monograph,
where there is no hope of moral improvement. Consider another example. Suppose that
we were charged with giving a lesson about the right angle. If our audience were
composed of builders or carpenters, we should present information that is useful with
respect to their work. But if our audience were composed of geometers, we would aim
for a very different kind of account. Namely, we would tell the geometers ‘what right
angle is’ and ‘what sort of thing it is’ (ho de ti estin ê poion ti).
One might think that the two types of accounts introduced in the examples map
onto Aristotle’s distinction between the practical or theoretical sciences, but I want to
keep the notion of an account and its aim distinct from the notion of a science and its aim.
The examples given above help us see how we can keep these apart. One can give a
practical account of the nature of right angles to builders. But one can also give a
theoretical account of the right angle to geometers. Similarly, one gives a theoretical
account of a practical science when one writes a scholarly monograph. But one gives a
practical account of a practical science when one addresses undergraduates with the hope
of improving them morally. The contents of a practical science can be relayed with either
a practical or theoretical aim in mind. It depends on the audience and the purpose of
giving the account in the first place.
If the Nicomachean Ethics were to fall into the category of practical or theoretical
account it is likely that Aristotle regards it as an account of the builder’s sort – namely,
one that imparts information in a way that is useful for the work, for he states on
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numerous occasions that the purpose of the Ethics is practical (NE II.2, 1103b26-9; EE
I.5, 1216b16-25). Though, this is not to say that it falls squarely in the same camp as the
builder’s account, since the aim of politics is good action (eupraxia), rather than products
such as speeches, health or houses. That is, a distinction should be drawn between
political science, which has eupraxia as its aim, and productive sciences such as rhetoric,
medicine and housebuilding, which all aim at the production of things – speeches, health
and houses, respectively. When I use ‘practical’ from here on, I shall mean practical in
that former sense in which political science is practical.
How is information presented in the practical versus the theoretical accounts?
The Eudemian Ethics provides two important points of guidance about this point – more
than that offered by the Nicomachean Ethics. As we learn from the Eudemian Ethics,
first of all, knowledge of the nature of virtue is insufficient to make one good. While it
may be the case that one becomes a geometer upon learning geometry, one does not
become virtuous upon learning about virtue (EE I.5, 1216b4-10). There is a disanalogy
between the theoretical and practical sciences in this regard. While it is true of the
theoretical sciences that one acquires the relevant virtue in learning about the associated
definitions, it is not true of practical disciplines. As Aristotle claims, “we do not wish to
know what bravery is but to be brave, nor what justice is but to be just….” (b21-23).120
While the practical and theoretical accounts are different in this last respect, the
accounts (logoi) in practical and scientific inquiries alike should be given
‘philosophically’ (philosophôs)(EE I.6, 1216b35-6). By ‘philosophical,’ I mean that the
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inquiry must always provide an explanation for phenomena. That is, it should provide
not merely the facts, or what is apparent, but the ‘because’ (dia ti, b37-8). As mentioned
earlier in the chapter, the ‘because’ refers to the direct and prior cause of a phenomena.
For example, the reason for the planets’ failure to twinkle is the nearness of the planets.
The planets do not twinkle because they are near. But if it is true that both practical and
theoretical accounts must be philosophical, we can draw the interesting conclusion that
the practical account need not be intellectually or scientifically uninteresting – quite the
opposite. Aristotle means that, in order to be practically effective, one must know the
‘because.’121
But what does this mean for Aristotle’s claim that the precision of the account
must be consistent with the aim of the account? For one, it does not mean that the
practical account can neglect explanations. But what type of explanation does Aristotle
have in mind? Will we find the same reasons in a practical account that we find in a
theoretical account? I suggest that the Eudemian Ethics passage we have been
considering provides us with a clue. The context of the Eudemian Ethics passage shows
that Aristotle’s worry is about types of arguments. He aims to show that not all points
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must be argued for with a reasoning argument (meta logou, 1217a2). “For there are
some who, though thinking it to be the mark of a philosopher to mark no arbitrary
statement but always to give a reason, often unaware give reasons foreign to the subject
and idle” (1216b40-1217a3).122 In some cases, the argument from perception (tois
phainomenois) is sufficient (a13).
In saying this, Aristotle probably means the following. First, some make the false
assumption that the philosophical method the giving of rational arguments for all claims.
Hence, Aristotle claims that there are some who think that it is the mark of a philosopher
not to speak in a ‘likely way’ but always to give an argument (legein alla meta logou,
1217a1-2). But some arguments may be based on perception. Indeed, some arguments
should be based on perception, rather than reason. For both the argument from
perception and from reason may end up with the same conclusion. But the argument
from reason will have reached the conclusion in the wrong way.
Aristotle may be making the very sound point that arguing for some things in
ethics – though one may be able to present a good argument and though ones argument
may be true – is inappropriate and shows a lack of sense. Philosophers are quite guilty of
this. For example, suppose some philosophers are talking about ‘love,’ and one claims:
“I cannot say that I am in love until I know the definition of love.” This is true, in a
sense. One cannot truthfully utter “I am in love” without knowing what she means.
However, this also represents an overextension of the theoretical stance. There is
certainly a sense in which one can fall in love and truthfully utter “I am in love,” without
ever knowing the definition of love. Indeed, Aristotle’s point seems to be that the person
122
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who insists on having the definition has missed something. As he would say, the
person is uneducated or uncultured (1217a8).
If practical accounts rest on facts of perception, as the Eudemian Ethics passage
suggests, then we have an explanation for the relative inexactness of practical accounts.
Recall that Aristotle regards some cognitive states as being less exact than others. For
example, states of perception are less exact than states of knowledge. Recall the
following claim: “we ought not to require the same accuracy (akribeian) in theory (epi
tôn logôn) as in the facts given by perception (tôn gignomenôn dia tês aisthêiôs) (Pol.
1328a20). I leave it to another paper to determine what Aristotle meant in claiming that
the facts of perception are less exact than those associated with logos.

4 Diaphora and Akribeia
Now that we have considered one explanation for the lack of precision in a
philosophical account, let us consider a second explanation for the lack of precision. As
Aristotle claims, precision should be sought in accord with the subject matter
(hupokeimenên hulên) (1098a a27-29, 1104a3, 1094b13). So, in order to establish why
political science might be lacking in exactness, we should inquire about its subject
matter. How does Aristotle mean to characterize the subject matter of political science
such that it makes political science inexact?
According to some commentators, the fundamental explanatory features here are
matter (hulê) and ‘for the most part.’

Matter explains why political phenomena are only

‘for the most part’ – the latter being a locution for the idea of (a) statistical frequency or

(b) natural necessity.
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Generalizations, and therefore arguments, in politics hold only

hos epi polu because they concern entities that are enmattered. Numerous passages
throughout the corpus support this point (e.g. GA 763b25 ff.; Met 1025b26 ff.). Recall
that we have some evidence that Aristotle viewed enmattered-ness as an obstacle to exact
science. For example, in the Metaphysics, he claims that the accuracy (akribeia) of
mathematics can be achieved only in “the case of things which have no matter” (Meta,
II.3, 995a). Similarly, in the Meteorology, he argues that disorganized and relatively
formless kinds of matter – e.g. flesh and fire – are especially difficult to define accurately
(IV.12, 390a19).
Granted, the fact that the objects of political science are enmattered explains why
political science is not exact. But it is not the whole explanation. We ought also to pay
attention to the idea of diaphora, or variation. Diaphora, in the sense I will describe
here, is variation, and in particular, the individuating features of an entity. This can be
represented as variation along a set of categories: what, where, why, whom, to what
extent, etc. I would like to argue that diaphora too, can explain why political science
lacks precision. That is, political science seems to be inexact in that it depends on
variation (diaphora) – i.e. individuating features of a person’s condition and
environment.
First, let me distinguish the use of diaphora above from the more conventional
notion of diaphora that Aristotle uses in his logical works. Aristotle uses the term
diaphora in a technical sense, where it means the distinguishing feature of a species (i.e.
differentia). For example, the human being is an animal, but the feature that distinguishes
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it from other animals is its ability to reason. Any definition consists of the genus plus
a differentia. Hence, in the History of Animals, Aristotle writes:
Variations (diaphora) are manifested in modes of subsistence, in habits, and in
actions as follows: some animals live in water and others on land. And of those
that live in water some do so in one way, and some in another: that is to say, some
live and feed in the water, take in and emit water, and cannot live if deprived of
water, as is the case with the great majority of fishes; others get their food and
spend their days in the water, but do not take in water but air, nor do they bring
forth in the water…. (Historia Animalium, I.1, 487a14-22; cf. Met X.3, 1054b1055a; cf. Met. VII.12).
In this passage, Aristotle explains that an animal may be analyzed according to certain
categories, including: subsistence, habits, actions, and habitat.
There is another way in which Aristotle uses the term diaphora, where it means,
in a related but more general sense, ‘individuating feature.’ What I have in mind by
‘individuating feature’ can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose that you are
given a loan. In general, we tend to think that one ought to pay back a loan. Your
intention, in keeping with the norm, is to pay back the loan. But what if you have a
conflicting duty? Suppose, for example, that your father is about to lose possession of his
house to mortgagers, and you are in the position to help him regain possession of his
house through supplying some of your loan on his behalf. Would it be appropriate to pay
back the loan speedily? The decision presents some difficultly because one wants to
fulfill both obligations. But in the end, it is probably best to postpone payment of the
loan. The right thing to do is to use the money to fix the problem for your father.
There are two things to notice about this scenario. First, when deliberating about
situations that present conflicting duties, one considers multiple claims: duties to lender,
duties to the father and duties to oneself. One needs to ask: what duties do I have here?
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To whom do I have the duty? How can the claims of these duties be compared?
Second and obviously, decision-making is difficult because one has multiple and possibly
conflicting obligations to weigh against one another.
We are now in a position to see what diaphora as ‘individuating feature’ may
mean. I have in mind the idea that a situation will have particular features that a decision
maker must take into account. The decision maker in the story above, for example, must
take into: the duty to repay the loan, the person to whom the duty is owed, the amount of
the loan, the circumstances under which the loan was given, and so on.
Aristotle uses diaphora in this sense in the following passage from the
Nicomachean Ethics:
Surely all questions are hard to decide with precision (akribôs). For they admit of
many variations (diaphoras) of all sorts in respect both of the magnitude of the
service and of its nobility and necessity.
He explains the case in the following manner:
But that we should not give the preference in all things to the same person is plain
enough; and we must for the most part (hôs epi to polu ) return benefits rather
than oblige friends, as we must pay back a loan to a creditor rather than make one
to a friend. But perhaps even this is not always true; e.g. should a man who has
been ransomed out of the hands of brigands ransom his ransomer in return,
whoever he may be (or pay him if he has not been captured but requests
payment), or should be ransom his father? It would seem that he should ransom
his father in preference even to himself. As we have said, then, generally
(katholou) the debt should be paid, but if the gift is exceedingly noble or
exceedingly necessary, one should defer to these considerations (NE IX.2,
1164b28-1165a4; cf. EE 1244a).
In this passage, Aristotle explains that, as a general rule (katholou), one ought to repay
one’s debts. However, there are cases in which one has a conflicting duty, such that
paying one’s debts is not the thing to do. For example, suppose that your father were
abducted and his captors demanded a ransom. Would you, having earlier secured a loan
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from the bank, opt to pay the bank back rather than using the loan to pay the debt?
Certainly you would not. Hence, there are cases in which paying back loans is not the
right thing to do, even though it is generally (katholou) the right thing to do.
What does it mean to claim that there are variations (diaphorai) in terms of
magnitude of the service, nobility and necessity? Stewart suggests that the reference to
kalon and anankê stands for the claim that the moral ideal versus that of material
necessity. The final lines of the passage show that the gift (i.e. the loaned amount) may
be more or less noble. It is the noble thing to do, for example, to ransom one’s father
before oneself. Similarly, one’s circumstances may be more or less dire. It may not be
possible to pay back the loan immediately, if the situation is dire enough. It is in this
respect that the loan can present questions of nobility or necessity.
The lesson of such cases is twofold. First, it is not possible to state unequivocally
whether a loan ought always to be repaid. In general, it is not possible to achieve
certainty about any of these rules, where “feelings and actions” are concerned:
“discussions about feelings and actions have just as much definiteness as their subject
matter (NE IX. 2, 1165a5-14). This is a reprise of Aristotle’s earlier methodological
remarks (1094b11-27; 1098a26-33). Second, the reason for the difficulty, according to
this passage, is diaphora, or the fact of particular and individuating features of a case. As
Aristotle goes on to explain in more detail, these features take the form of questions about
the person to whom one repays the loan or gives the gift:
That we should not make the same return to every one, nor give a father the
preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is plain
enough; but since we ought to render different things to parents, brothers,
comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to each class what is appropriate
and becoming (NE IX.2, 1165a14-7; cf. NE III.1, 1110a27-35).
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We should not avoid the task of giving an account in each case, according to Aristotle,
but do the best we can (1165a35).
I want to suggest that diaphora in this second and looser sense as ‘individuating
feature’ explains Aristotle’s remark that the subject matter of political science makes it
unapt for exact science. Diaphorai are those variations between paying a father’s ransom
versus paying a friend’s ransom (to whom?), between paying back a generous loan versus
a smaller loan (what quantity?), and so on. These sorts of things must be brought to the
table when deliberating about what to do. I believe that Aristotle thought of these
features as the very features which prompt him to say that matters in political science
hold only ‘for the most part.’ In the next chapter, I develop this idea in more detail,
explaining what those individuating features of a person’s condition and environment
might be and the way in which we can find the same account of deliberation and
diaphora in the Hippocratic Corpus.
We have now seen ways to explain why an account of politics might be inexact.
First, the account has a practical aim, rather than a theoretical aim – namely, to make
people good. The result is that less precision is required from the account. But this lack
of precision should not be envisioned as a relaxing of explanatory standards. That is,
even the person giving the practical account must provide a ‘because’ to back up his
claims. However, the explanation in question may rely upon facts of perception, rather
than rational arguments. Since the former are less exact than the latter, Aristotle will
claim that the practical account is relatively inexact.
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Second, the account of politics is inexact because of its subject matter. Most
commentators explain this point by appealing to matter (hulê) – i.e. enmattered objects
are prone to variation and the breaking of patterns determined by form. While I do not
think that this is incorrect, I believe it is not the entire story. Aristotle also appeals to the
notion of diaphora to characterize the nature of the subject matter of politics and the
sense in which politics is inexact. Diaphora refers to the variations or individuating
features of a situation that are introduced into the deliberations of agents. They include
matters such as: to whom? How much? To what extent? How long? And so on.
5 Terminology for Inexactness
With this explanation of the inexactness of politics in hand, we can move on to
consider briefly the various artful ways of communicating the fact that the account in
question is not exact. One such idea is that of the outline, or tupos. For example,
Aristotle claims that the “whole account of matters of conduct” must be given in outline
(tupôi) and not precisely (akribôs).” Tupos originally referred to a ‘blow’: hence, its
related meanings: impression, mould, engaving, or sculpture. For example, Aeschylus
uses the term to describe the appearance of Argonaut women in Suppliant Women. They
appear to have the “Cyprian impress” that craftsman give to their images of Cyprian
women. Similarly, Plato sometimes refers to the idea of the soul as being a mould on
which a stamp can be imprinted (Th. 191d, Rep. 377b). 124
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The references to ‘tupos,’ in particular, are numerous. Aristotle uses the term in the
dative: ‘in outline’: De Anima, 413a9, 416b30, 424a16. Politics, 1276b19; 1302a19;
1323a10; 1335b5. Topics 101a18, 101a22, 103a1, a7; 105b19; The uses in the
Nicomachean Ethics are especially numerous (at eleven). In some cases, Aristotle means
‘for example’ (tupôi, Cat. I.1, 1b28; I.10, 11b20).
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Aristotle uses tupos to refer to an outline. Because detail would be contrary to
the purpose of the inquiry, an outline of the idea is sufficient. Hence, in the Topics,
Aristotle writes that only an outline of deduction is needed. He contrasts an outline of the
definition with a more precise definition. The outline, according to Aristotle, is sufficient
for our ability to understand what follows.
The foregoing must stand for an outline (tupôi) of the species of deduction. In
general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed and to those which
we shall discuss later, we may remark that that amount of distinction between
them may suffice, because it is not our purpose to give a precise definition (akribê
logon) of any of them; we merely want to describe them in outline (tupôi): we
consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to
be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way (Top. I.1, 101a18-24).
The purpose of the treatise is to get at the nature of dialectical deduction (110a23).
Hence, the discussion of deduction, at large, takes one away from the purpose of the
inquiry. With that in mind, Aristotle defines deduction; the two kinds of deduction,
demonstration and dialectical deduction; and fallacies briefly (100a25-101a17). Each is
the subject of its own inquiry in other treatises. Epistêmê is the subject of Prior Analytics
and of Posterior Analytics, insofar as they are treated as one work (Pr. An. I.1, 24a1011). Deduction is the subject of the Prior Analytics. Aristotle claims that it must be dealt
with before proceeding to a discussion of demonstration, since demonstration is a kind of
deduction (Pr An, I.4, 25b27-31). Demonstration is dealt with in the Posterior Analytics.
Fallacies are treated in Sophistical Refutations. Of course, dialectical demonstration is
the subject of the Topics. Aristotle’s claim in the passage, then, can be read as the point
that, in effect, ‘this is the subject of another work.’
A second reason for giving an outline is to offer a summary of the text to come.
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For example, Aristotle writes in an introductory section of Historia Animalium that his
aim, so far, has been only to convey a summary of the topics that will be dealt with in the
rest of the treatise:
These preceding statements, then, have been put forward in outline (en tupôi), as a
kind of foretaste (geumatos) concerning the number and sorts of things we will
consider (theorein), because we will speak with more precision (akribeias) about
them later, so that, to begin with, the variations (diaphora) and common
properties (sumbebekota) will come into view (my translation) (Historia
Animalium, I.6, 491a7-10).
These sorts of remarks are also often accompanied by a promissory note. The outline
will be filled in later in greater detail (Historia Animalium, 487a12, 491a8), by others
(NE I.7, 1098a25), or in a more appropriate place (De An II.6, 416b30).
A term closely related to tupos in its use is graphos or perigraphos. Both graphos
and perigraphos have the connotation ‘picture’ or ‘sketch.’ Aristotle uses graphos and
perigraphos to capture the idea of a sketch that can be filled in or made more detailed.
Hence, he writes:
Let this service as an outline (perigraphos) of the good, for we must presumably first
sketch (hupotupesthai) it roughly, and then later fill in the details (anagrapsai). But it
would seem that anyone is capable of carrying on and articulating what has once been
well outlined (perigraphos)….(NE I.7, 1098a20-4; cf. 1113b21, 1113a15-6).
Similarly, in Generation of Animals, Aristotle explains the order in which different parts
of the body are generated in an embryo using perigraphos as a metaphor. He claims that
the upper half of the body develops first, then the lower half. Each organ, meanwhile,
takes on the inchoate shape it will more definitely adopt later. Aristotle compares this
process with that of the artist who first draws his main lines, only later filling in the
colors.
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All the parts are first marked out in their outlines (perigraphais) and acquire
later on their color and softness or hardness, exactly as if nature were a painter
producing a work of art, for painters, too, first sketch (hupograpsantes) in the
animal with lines and only after than put in the colors (Generation of Animals, II.
6, 743b20-22).
A rendition of a thing in broad brushstrokes can be either good or bad, to the artist’s
purpose or not. It can enhance the important aspects of an image; but it can also obscure
important information. Aristotle takes the latter view when he remarks in the
Metaphysics that an outline of the nature of substance shows that it is not predicated of a
subject, but it is that of which other things are predicated (VII.3, 1029a7-8). The account,
as it stands, is unclear (1029a8). Moreover, the account in outline form suggests that
substance is matter. Further reflection shows that the latter point is unacceptable:
substance should be separable and individual, but matter is neither (1029a27-8).
Conclusion
In the previous chapter, we saw that the particularist interpretation of Aristotelian
deliberation is based on Aristotle’s remarks about inexactness and exactness, the
variability in the subject matter of politics (1094a16), the claim that politics hold only
‘for the most part’ (1094b21), and the idea that principles in politics can be expressed
only schematically, or in ‘in outline’ (e.g. 1094b11-27). According to the particularist,
these passages show that, for Aristotle, there are no principles according to which we
deliberate about ethical matters.
In this chapter of the dissertation, I have attempted to place Aristotle’s remarks
about akribeia in the context of scientific thought in Aristotle’s time. We saw that
Aristotle associated exactness with a class of sciences that are characterized by simple
and abstract objects of study. We also saw that politics is not an exact science for
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Aristotle, and we considered some of the reasons why this might be so. The
Nicomachean Ethics presents a practical account of politics, and the degree to which
precision can be achieved in such an account is small; similarly, the subject matter of
politics makes any account of politics imprecise. I suggested that diaphora, or variation,
might play an important role in explaining why politics is inexact from the perspective of
the deliberating agent. This chapter should have shown that the texts to which the
particularist appeals take on a different guise when viewed in the context of Aristotle’s
thoughts about exact science.
In the next chapter, we will see that many of the same ideas and concerns were
echoed in the Hippocratic Corpus. Medical writers also claimed that medicine lacks
exactness. They insist that claims in medicine also hold ‘mostly’ and that only schematic
accounts of medicine can be given. For medical claims hold ‘in summary.’ Medical
writers also appeal to ‘variation’ to explain why medicine lacks exactness. These are
important parallels between Aristotle’s ethics and the Hippocratic Corpus.
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Chapter Four

Inexact Science in the Hippocratic Corpus
In the past chapter, we saw that exactness was a scientific ideal for Aristotle and that
politics fell short of that ideal. Aristotle expresses this fact by claiming that politics is not
‘exact’ (akribês) and by calling attention to the fact that matters concerning the human
good hold ‘for the most part’ (hôs epi to polu). Because politics has these features, one
can give only a schematic account of politcs a sketch or ‘outline’ (tupos). To explain
why politics is inexact, Aristotle invokes the notion of ‘variation’ (diaphora).
The purpose of the current chapter is to show that important parallels can be
drawn between the aforementioned aspects of Aristotle’s account of politics and the
Hippocratic Corpus. (1) Just as Aristotelian politics is not exact, medicine is also
described as lacking exactness. Similarly, (2) just as claims in politics hold ‘for the most
part’ (hôs epi to polu), claims in medicine also hold ‘mostly’ (hôs epi to pleiston, polu, de
polu. Moreover, medical writers claim – as Aristotle claims about politics that only
schematic accounts can be given of empirically messy phenomena, and they express this
idea by writing that medical claims hold ‘in summary’ (en kephalaioi). (3) Finally,
medical writers also appeal to ‘variation’ (diaphora) to explain inexactness in medicine,
just as Aristotle appeals to diaphora to explain inexactness in politics.
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The first part of the chapter shows that medical writers describe medicine as
inexact and that they use several important terms and related ideas to do so: akribeia and
atrekeia. The second part of the chapter charts the use of ‘for the most part’ claims in the
Hippocratic Corpus. It also presents the Hippocratic equivalent of Aristotle’s notion of a
schematic account of principles – the account given ‘in summary’ (en kephalaioi). In the
third section of the chapter, I discuss possible causes of medicine’s inexactness – for
example, the complexity of cases and the extent to which success with patients depends
on the patient’s report of his or her own condition. The fourth part of the chapter shows
that, just as Aristotle explained inexactness by appeal to ‘variation,’ medical writers also
explained inexactness by appealing to ‘variation.’
1 Inexactness in Medicine
Just as Aristotle describes politikê as inexact, ancient medicine was also described as
lacking in exactness. Moreover, several of the features associated with the inexact
science – namely, variation among cases (diaphora), phenomena that hold only ‘for the
most part’ (hôs epi to polu), and the outline form (tupos) are also alluded to in the
Hippocratic Corpus.
In the Hippocratic Corpus, akribês has much the same meaning it has in
Aristotle’s works, for it refers to the idea of precision.125 In some cases, it refers to the
idea of a careful diet or therapeutic procedures (Aphorisms, I.4, I.5, I.6; De Aff. 13;
Vectiarius 35; De Fract. 8, 26). In some cases, it refers to the idea of well defined
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For references to akribeia, or the lack of it, see: Prog. Ch. 20 L II 168.16 ff, Fract.
Ch. 7, L III 440.2 ff., Art. Ch. 69, L IV 286.7 ff, Morb. I. ch 16, L VI 170.2 ff. Vict. I
ch.2, L VI 470.13 ff. Vict. III ch. 67, L VI 592.I ff., 594. I; VM ch. 9-12; CMG I, I 41.20.
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periodicities in diseases (De Morbis, I.2). It is also related to the precision of one’s
knowledge (VM 9.14; 20.13; De Diatae in Morbis 6).
According to some treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus, medicine lacks exactness.
For example, the author of Regimen writes that, to the extent that health consists in a
balance between good eating habits and exercise, a balance between eating and exercise
cannot be achieved. The balance cannot be struck with ‘nicety.’126 Here, the use of
akribês is in reference to precise measurement.
As I have said above, it is impossible to treat of the regimen of men with such a
nicety (akribeian) as to make the exercises exactly proportionate to the amount of
food (III.67.1-5).127
The basic methodological principle of regimen is that health can be controlled by diet.
But Regimen adds successive layers of complication to that principle. The regulation of
food, by itself, is insufficient to maintain health (I.2). It is also necessary to take
exercise. Food and exercise have opposite effects on the body. The exercise ‘uses up’
the materials in the body. By contrast, food makes the body grow. Health is constituted
by the correct balance between food and exercise (III.69). If food overpowers exercise or
if exercise overpowers food, the patient becomes ill. The regimen for restoring the
balance involves alterations to diet, to exercise patterns, abstinence, sexual intercourse,
vomiting, extra walks and baths. But adjusting the amount of food needed to the amount
of exercise taken is not a straightforward matter.
126

Compare the notion of balance here to that of ‘kata logon’ in Prohhretic II.23 (cf.
Prorrhetic II.1)
127
Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the works of the Hippocratic Corpus are
from the Loeb series, with the exception of On Ancient Medicine, for which I use
Schiefsky’s commentary. The Greek here is: Peri\ de\ diai/thj a)nqrwpi/nhj, w3sper
moi kai\ pro&sqen ei1rhtai, cuggra&yai me\n ou)x oi[o&n te e0j a)kribei/hn, w3ste pro_j to_
plh~qojtou~ si/tou th_n cummetri/hn poie/esqai tw~n po&nwn:
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Other passages explain why it is difficult to find the precise balance between
food and exercise. As might be expected, finding the balance requires knowledge of the
strength of the exercises and the right relationship between food and exercise. But the
doctor must know much more than the mere facts about food and exercise – namely, the
constitution of the patient (phusis), his age, the season of the year, how the wind behaves
where the patient lives, and other features of the place in which the patient abides. To
discover the precise relation of food and exercise for any individual patient, all of this
must be known.
However, there are many obstacles to knowledge of these things, such as variation
among patients’ constitutions, ages, places, seasons, times of year, and so on. There are
also variations among food.
As I have said above, it is impossible to treat of the regimen of men with such a
nicety (eis akribeiên) as to make the exercises exactly proportionate to the amount
of food. There are many things to prevent this. First, the constitutions of men
differ (hai phuseis tôn anthrôpôn diaphoroi) dry constitutions, for instance, are
more or less dry as compared with themselves or as compared with one another.
Similarly, with moist constitutions, or with those of any other kind. Then, the
various ages have different needs. Moreover, there are the situations of districts,
the shiftings of the winds, the changes of the seasons, and the constitution of the
year. Foods themselves exhibit many differenes; the variations between wheat
and wheat, wine and wine, and those of the various other articles of
diet….(III.1).128
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Peri\ de\ diai/thj a)nqrwpi/nhj, w3sper moi kai\ pro&sqen ei1rhtai, cuggra&yai me\n
ou)x oi[o&n te e0j a)kribei/hn, w3ste pro_j to_ plh~qojtou~ si/tou th_n cummetri/hn
poie/esqai tw~n po&nwn: poulla_ ga_r ta_ kwlu&onta. Prw~ton me\n ai9 fu&siej tw~n
a)nqrw&pwn dia&foroi e0ou~sai: kai\ ga_r ai9 chrai\ au)tai\ e9wutw~n pro_j au)ta_j kai\
pro_j a1lla ma~llon kai\ h{sson chrai\, kai\ u(grai\ w(sau&twj, kai\ ai9 a1llai pa~sai:
e1peita ai9 h(liki/ai ou) tw~n au)tw~n deo&menai: e1ti de\ kai\ tw~n xwri/wn ai9 qe/siej, kai\
tw~n pneuma&twn ai9 metabolai\, tw~n te w(re/wn ai9 metasta&siej, kai\ tou~ e0niautou~
ai9 katasta&siej: au)tw~n te tw~n si/twn pollh_ diafora& puroi/ te ga_r purw~n kai\
oi]noj oi1nou kai\ ta1lla o3sa diaiteo&meqa, pa&nta dia&fora e0o&nta a)pokwlu&ei mh_
dunato_n ei]nai e0j a)kribei/hn cuggrafh~nai.
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The factors discussed here can be grouped conveniently into ‘internal’ and ‘external’
obstacles to knowledge. The internal are those that manifest themselves in the patient –
for example, age and constitution. The doctor must know whether the patient’s
constitution is dry or wet. In connection with this point, it is worth mentioning that the
patient’s constitution might have been difficult to discern, based as it is on internal
features – hidden from the doctor’s view – of the patient’s body. The doctor would thus
have relied on signs (semeia) to determine a patient’s nature. There are also relevant
external factors. These include location, winds affecting the location, and season.
Finally, there are also external factors related to food and drink. The author claims that
food and drinks themselves have many variations.
Variation among all these things, the author concludes, “prevent its being possible
to lay down rigidly exact rules in writing” (III.1). In the Greek, ‘eis akribeiên’ functions
as an adverbial clause modifying the sungraphanai. Hence it refers to the written
account of medicine, rather than the subject matter. The author likely means that, given
both the multitude of factors affecting the proper balance of food and exercise for any
given patient and the range along which any of these factors might be relevant, all of the
rules of determining the balance of food and exercise cannot be written down. For
example, once it become imperative to make different versions of a rule for each age –
young, adult, elderly – one can see that the number of written rules would grow by three
times its original size. When we consider the prospect of doing the same for each of the
categories mentioned above – constitution, age, time of year, winds, places – we can see
that the number of written rules would grow exponentially.
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In addition to akribês, the Hippocratic Corpus also uses atrekês to express the
notion of exactness. The term atrekês is closely related to akribês but different in that it
more frequently refers to accuracy in counting.129. Hence, Herodotus uses atrekês to
capture the idea of an accurate count (arithmos) of the people in Xerxes armies (7.187;
cf. 7.60). He also uses atrekês to refer to the length of time needed to make a journey –
for example, whether it will take twenty days or twenty-one days (5.54).
In the Hippocratic Corpus, atrekês is quite commonly used to express the idea of
precise measurements of length of time. For example, in Prognosis, the author writes
that acute diseases tend to heal in certain intervals of time: typically, intervals of four to
twenty days. But, the author writes, it is difficult to calculate the length of time in terms
of whole days.
So in the most acute diseases, keep on adding periods of four days, up to twenty, to
find the time when the attacks end. None of them, however, can be exactly (atrekeôs)
calculated in whole days (Prog. 20 L II 168.16; cf. Fleshes,19).130
This passage refers to crisis theory. This is idea that diseases displayed patterns of
development with critical moments at which the disease would change – for better or
worse – happening at particular intervals. The passage explains that attacks in acute
diseases take place a regular intervals. These intervals may not be given in full days (e.g.
four days), but rather in fractions (e.g. four and a half days).
Atrekês is also used in the Hippocratic Corpus to capture the sense in which a
time interval could be exact or inexact. For example, in Fractures, the author writes that
129

For an excellent summary of the distinction between these terms, see Schiefsky 2005,
203-205.
130
Au{tai me\n ou}n e0k tw~n o)cuta&twn noushma&twn dia_ tessa&rwn e0j ta_j ei1kosin e0k
prosqe/sioj teleutw~sin. Ou) du&natai de\ o3lh|sin h(me/rh|sin ou)de\n toute/wn @1
a)riqme/esqai a)treke/wj.
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It takes about thirty days altogether as a rule for the bone of the forearm to
unite. But there is nothing exact (atrekes) about it, for both constitutions and ages
differ (diaphora) greatly (On Fractures. 7).131
According to the author, the forearm typically heals in thirty days. But depending on the
constitution of the patient, there may be some variation (diaphora). The passage suggests
that, if the patient is especially old, for example, a broken arm may take longer to heal. If
the patient is young and fit, the arm may heal more quickly. Atrekês can also attach to the
notion of time intervals, but in the sense of knowledge of time intervals. For example, the
author of De Morbis writes that it is difficult to know exactly the period within which a
patient will die, even to the extent that it is difficult to determine whether the period will
be long or short (Morb. I. 16).
2 ‘For the Most Part’ claims in the Hippocratic Corpus
A number of other terms alert us to the presence of uncertainty or inexactness in
medicine, including hôs epi to polu.132 So, for example:
(1) Those who have frequent dislocations of the shoulder are usually (hôs epi to
pleiston/ polu) able to put it in for themselves (On Joints, 2).133
(2) To sum up – dislocations and slipping of joints vary among themselves in amount
and are sometimes much greater, sometimes much less. In cases where the
slipping or dislocation is greater, it is, in general (de polu) harder to reduce (On
Joints 59).
Hôs epi to polu is used in these passages to announce the status of a generalization about
phenomena. It refers to generalizations to which there may be exceptions. For example,
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En trih&konta de\ ma&lista th|~si cumpa&sh|si kratu&netai (5)o)ste/a ta_ e0n tw|~ ph&xei to_
e0pi/pan: a)treke\j de\ ou)de/n. ma&la ga_r kai\ fu&sij fu&sioj, kai\ h(liki/h h(liki/hj
diafe/rei.
132
See Von Staden 2007.
133
Osoisi me\n ou}n pukina_ e0kpi/ptei o( w}moj, i9kanoi\ w(j e0pi\ to_ plei=ston au)toi\
sfi/sin au)toi=sin e0mba&llein ei0si/n
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consider the claim above that patients who frequently dislocate their shoulders can
often (hôs epi to polu) put their shoulder joints back into place. The author is saying, in
effect: patients usually put their shoulders back into place. In some cases – the relatively
rare ones – patients are not able to fix their own shoulders. Similarly, consider the claim
that the larger the dislocation, the greater the difficulty of replacing the joint. The author
means that, in most cases, a greater dislocation makes replacement of the joint more
difficult. However, there is the unusual case in which it does not.
Notice that the claims above are probably not merely backwards-looking. That is
to say, they do not merely describe what the doctor has observed in the past. Rather, the
claims apply to future treatment as well and can be useful in future treatment. For
example, it is useful for a doctor to know that patients who frequently dislocate their
shoulds are usually able to put them back into place. One might surmise, moreover, that
the purpose of noting that something happens ‘for the most part’ is not to indicate that, in
the past, the doctor has noted that, nine times out of ten, patients can replace their own
shoulders. Rather, the purpose is to alert the doctor to the reliability of that claim as
advice for future treatment. It says, in effect, that if you are the doctor, know that this
almost always works, but sometimes it does not.
Hôs epi to polu occurs in other contexts as well. It acts sometimes as description
of location. For example,
(1) Even when you expect bones to come away you should use in all such cases the
method of separate bandages, as I said, beginning generally (hôs epi to polu) with
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the middle of the bandage as when an under-bandage (hupodesmis) is applied
from two heads (On Fractures, 32).134
(2) Regulate the process with a view to the shape of the wound that it may be as little
as possible drawn aside or averted by the bandaging… (On Fractures, 32).
In this passage, the author recommends that the bandage interfere with the wound as little
as possible. To accomplish as much, he recommends that the bandage be applied, one
side starting from the left side of the arm, the other from the right (the method of separate
bandaging). The hôs epi to polu applies to the place from which the bandaging should
start. The practitioner should start from ‘about’ (hôs epi to polu) the middle of the
bandage, so that the sides can be applied equally. The author seems to be referring to the
same set of considerations we adopt when lacing shoes – i.e. start lacing so that there are
roughly equal lengths on both the right and left sides of the laces.
Another important term for indicating the distinction between precision and
imprecision is ‘in summary’ (en kephalaioi). It can mean giving a summary or the main
point. Hence, in the Laws, the Athenian makes several particular statements about the
proper education for children (643bd). At the end, he says in reiteration of his guiding
thought, that ‘first and foremost’ (kephalaion) education consists in guiding a child
towards the occupation he will one day master (643d). Kephalaios can also refer to
giving a general idea, as opposed to a specific one. Hence, Xenocrates contrasts the term
with the term ‘clear’ (saphes) in Cyropaideia. A soldier reports to Cyrus that he
attempted to find an accurate (saphes) count of soldiers in the enemy’s army (6.3.18).
Cyrus replies that he wants a ballpark figure (to plêthos …en kephalaion). In this vein,
134

Xrh_ de\, kai\ h2n me\n e0lpi/zh|j o)ste/a a)posth&sesqai, tw|~ tro&pw| tw~n o)qoni/wn e0pi\
pa~si toi=si toioute/oisi th_n e0pi/desin poie/esqai, e0k me/sou tou~ o)qoni/ou a)rxo&menon
w(j e0pi\ to_ poulu_, w(j a)po_ du&o a)rxe/wn u(podesmi\j e0pidei=tai:
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the term can be contrasted with akribeia and compared to tupos. Hence, Aristotle
writes that he means only to give a brief discussion of liberality, with the intention of
filling in his remarks later. He writes:
At present we are giving a mere outline (tupôi) or summary (epi kephalaiou), and
are satisfied with this; later these states will be more exactly (akribesteron)
determined (dihoristhêtai) (NE II.7, 1107b14).
In the Hippocratic Corpus, kephalaios refers to giving the general idea, as opposed to a
specific one. So, for example:
Speaking generally (en kephalaion) all parts of the body which have a function if
used in moderation and exercised in labors to which each is accustomed, become
thereby healthy and well-developed, and age slowly (On Joints 58; cf. On Fractures,
45; 43).
In the passage, describes specific cases in which overuse or underuse of a limb causes its
atrophy – for example, the joints of the hip bone. If they are dislocated and left
unreduced, the leg atrophies from misuse and lack of proper exercise. “If, then, the
displacement is unreduced, the thigh bone gets short and the whole leg deteriorates, and
becomes much more undeveloped and devoid of flesh because it gets no exercise” (58).
The author concludes with a statement of the general principle this case instantiates. He
claims that the parts of the body have a use, and function well in that use, provided that
they are not overused or neglected.135 One can observe the same use of the term, but at
the beginning of the passage, where it indicates that the specific information to follow
fills out the general claim (On Fractures, 26; cf. 31.14). Synonyms for kephalaios
include (1) sumpan, where it can mean ‘in general’ or ‘as a whole’ (On Joints, 13.15);
and (2) epipan, which means ‘on the whole’ or ‘in general’ (On Joints, VII.3; for an
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example that follows the use in Cyropaideia). We also see the use of the general, as
opposed to the specific, idea in On Fractures (7.6, 14.18, 31.16, 33.11).

3 The Causes of Inexactness
We have seen that the Hippocratic writers acknowledged a certain amount of
uncertainty in their prescriptions, and that in expressing the idea that medicine was not
exact, they used terms and ideas much like those Aristotle uses to capture the idea that
politics is inexact. But to what did they attribute the cause of the inexactness?
One reason is that there were so many stages of the treatment during which the people
involved – both the patient and the physician - could make a mistake. Consider, for
example, one particular case: the procedure that would have lead to the healing of a
broken arm. In On Fractures, the author claims that fractures usually heal in thirty days,
but that there is nothing ‘exact’ (atrekês) about this number. He cites the difficulty in
prediction as being related to the ‘variation’ (diaphora) among the patient’s cases. We
will come back to the term diaphora in a moment. But in the meantime, let us consider
the obstacles to making such a prediction.
Many circumstances will affect the rate at which the arm heals. The opening chapters
of the treatise convey the difficulty of getting the initial stage of the bandaging for a
broken limbs correct. It is very important to make the initial set of bandages in a natural
position for the arm – i.e. so that none of the bones will be in a distorted position (3.33).
The experienced doctor will be able to detect as much (3.52). The bandaging process
itself requires that the linen bandage be applied so that the patient’s hand is a little higher
than the elbow. Differential pressure should be applied at the wrappings for each part of
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the arm. Finally, another set of bandages should be applied from either the top of the
arm to the bottom, or the bottom to the top of the arm (4).
Whether this has been done correctly will depend on the report of the patient. The
patient should report that, for the first few days, the pressure of the bandage feels as if it
increases, rather than decreases. This is a sign of due measure (5.7). The patient’s hand
should begin to swell a little (5.9) – another sign of due measure. Hence, the author
writes:
If any of the said conditions are lacking, you may conclude that the bandaging was
slacker than the mean (metriou)… and if you first bandaging hit the proper mean, this
one should be a little tighter. (On Fractures, 5)136
The writer does not remark that the doctor’s dependence on the patient’s report
compromised his case. However, the fact that doctors depended on patient’s reports of
their conditions was an important consideration for several Hippocratic writers in
assessing the degree to which doctors could have exact knowledge of patient cases. (On
Ancient Medicine, 1, 9; Morb. I. ch 16, L VI 170.2 ff.)
On the third day, the pressure should decrease and the bandages should loosen. If this
does not happen, the doctor can conclude that the bandaging was in deficiency of the
mean (5.17-8), and the next round of bandaging should be made tighter. Similarly, if the
bandage was too strong to begin with, the next round of bandages should be looser (5.202). This careful attention to the tightness of the bandaging (5) and the position of the
bandages (6) continues until a splint is put on the arm (6). Splints should be left on the
136

This is one of several passages in On Fractures which refers to the idea of the mean.
In general, the treatise is excellent as an example of the doctrine of the mean put to
scientific use. It uses terms related to the mean, such as: metriotates, meso(i), epikairos
and kairos.
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arm for approximately twenty days (7.1-4). During this period and afterwards, the
patient should take a light diet, avoiding meat and wine (7).
One can imagine that, at any stage of this process, the doctor will make an error about
the proper positioning of the arm in the bandage, the tightness or looseness of the
bandages, the decision when to apply the splint, and the length of time during which the
splint should be on the arm. The doctor’s assessment, moreover, will depend on the
patient’s report of his own condition (“Does it feel as if the bandage is getting
increasingly tight over two days time?”). Any number of mistakes can be made along the
way.
Hence, the writer acknowledges, we cannot say for certain how long it will take the
forearm to heal, and the claim is meant quite literally. The rate at which the bone heals
could take any length of time. Thirty days is an estimate. But the author also makes
clear that his aim in composing the treatise on fractures is not to give precise estimates of
the length of time it take bones to heal, the number of wrappings which should be made
around a broken limb, the tightness with which the bandage should be applied, and so on.
Rather, the author states his aim simply as:
This discourse (logos) gives a sort of normal rule (nomos dikaios) for the treatment of
fractures, how one should handle them surgically, and the results of correct handling
(7.28-30).
If anything goes wrong, moreover, the author cites lack of care in the bandaging. While
the beginning of the treatise gives an overview of the proper treatment for a broken limb,
the rest of the treatise provides specific information about the way to treat certain kinds
of injuries.

115
We have just seen that Hippocratic doctors might justifiably have believed
that the complexity of patient’s cases – along with complicated paths of diseases – made
medicine an inexact science. This point is also reflected in the broader historical trends
in medical treatment of the time. Techniques of regimen became increasingly complex in
the late fifth and fourth centuries, ultimately requiring that a doctor master a large range
of information about particular patients and their environments in order to administer
successful treatment.
Originally, regimen was not a philosophical or theory-laden science. It had
consisted exclusively in the administration of food and drinks.137 However, in the late
fifth century, the doctor Herodicus of Selymbria communicated his medical findings to
intellectuals and philosophers (Rep. 405d-406c).138 Afterwards, there was a flurry of
interest in spelling out the details of regimen in a more theoretical and systematic form.
Several treatises on regimen date from this period of burgeoning theoretical inquiry:
Regimen, Epidemics, Regimen in Health, Regimen in Acute Diseases, Airs Waters Places
and Nutriment.
Regimen was to undergo yet more significant developments later in the fourth
century in the work of Mneistheus, Praxagoras, Dieuches and Diocles of Carystus.139
These scientists conducted more sophisticated and detailed research on regimen than their
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Nutton 2004, 96.
See also Regimen I.1, which reports that “many” have written on the subject of
regimen. Similarly, see Democritus, DK 58.
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For the full list: Acron of Agrigentum, Philistion of Locri, Dieuches, Erasistratus,
Galen (Health, 1-6; On the Faculties of Foods, 1-3). Oribasius (books 1 and 4),
Hierophilios
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Hippocratic predecessors.
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For example, Mneistheus made observations of the

effects of diets on children. Praxagoras advanced the study of the various structures of
the body and the effects of food upon these, including the womb, heart and blood vessels.
Diocles wrote a long treatise on dietetics, Hygiene, in which he spoke not only to the
treatment of illnesses, but to the maintenance of health through exercise and proper
diet.141 Some fourth century doctors advanced regimen by writing extremely detailed
studies of the effects of various foods upon the body. While this kind of work had been
attempted in the Hippocratic treatise On Regimen, there was more widespread pursuit of
the project in the fourth century. Diphilus of Siphnos, for example, gave a thorough
catalogue of foods, dwelling on specific foods such as cherries, mushrooms, and mussels.
He explains, in detail, the effects of green apples on the stomach, distinguishing between
ripe and unripe green apples. The unripe apple causes constipation and the production of
bile. The ripe apple, on the other hand, acts as a laxative.142 Dieuches also wrote at
greater length than the Hippocratics about the preparation of food. For example, he
recommends that dry breads are good for treating illnesses associated with excess
phlegm. He also explains the way to make dry bread: Make a dough from spelt, making
sure that the flour is fine and thoroughly milled. The dough must be softer than that
which could be cooked in a earthenware vessel; it should be placed on the fire, in the
ashes and covered with ashes, the embers on top in order that the surface of the bread is
scorched.
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discussion of green apples.
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One of the major developments of this time period was the view that regimen
dealt not only with food, drink and their effects on the body proper. Instead, as the view
developed, the subject matter of dietetics included several other aspects of life as well. A
doctor must take any of the following into account: the age of the patient, the season of
the year, the disposition of the land (i.e. whether it is a typically arid or humid region);
the patient’s habits (e.g. whether he tends to have two or three meals a day, how many
baths, at what time, etc.); last, he must know the patient’s constitution (phusis). For
example, the author of Regimen in Health claims that, the doctor must know: “ age,
season, habit (ethos), land, and physique” (2). Similarly, in Regimen, the doctor is
expected to be familiar with the following domains of expertise: the primary constituents
of the cosmos, phusis, food, exercise, weather, geography, and astronomy.
4 Diaphora
In the current section of this chapter, I would like to examine this idea of
categories of information with which the doctor should be familiar in order to treat a
patient. During the period from which most Hippocratic treatises date, this idea was a
topos of many medical texts. Moreover, a semi-technical term was often used to convey
the idea– namely, diaphora for ‘variation.’ I believe that this is the closest the medical
corpus comes to giving a formal explanation of inexactness in medicine.
In the previous chapter, I suggested that Aristotle uses diaphora in at least two,
distinct ways. First, there is the technical meaning of the term – i.e. the notion of
diaphora as differentia, or the quality that distinguishes a species from other members of
the same genus. Aristotle also uses the term to capture the idea of relevant, individuating
characteristics. I suggested that this notion of diaphora was used in the Nicomachean
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Ethics to explain the inexactness in political science. There, diaphora is a property of
the subject matter of political science, such that it refers to important individual variations
from case to case.143
In the Hippocratic Corpus, diaphora is less precisely defined. Like our notion of
‘variation,’ the term takes on several everyday meanings. For example, diaphora can
refer to the substantive ‘variation’ – as in a variation in a quality for example, length.
Hence, Herodotus writes that there is a small ‘variation’ in the stadia from the
Mediterranean Sea to Heliopolis and from Athens to Pisa (2.7). Diaphora can also refer
to variations as in ‘it makes a variation.’ Hence, in On Joints, the author writes, “it makes
a great ‘variation’ if the patient lies down, and fourteen days suffice if he keeps at rest”
(14).
But diaphora also crops up as a semi-technical term in methodological
discussions.144 A claim will take the form of: (a) multiple variations among patient’s
cases; and (b) the variations introduce inexactness in treatment or knowledge of patients.
For example:
Some patients that have the diseases of this kind and from these factors, succumb
within a short time, others drag on much longer. For one body differs (diaphora)
from another, one affection from another, and one season in which to be ill from
another; some patients are more able to endure the stress of diseases, while others
are totally incapable of enduring. It is certainly not possible to know precisely
(akribes) and to state correctly the period within which a patient will die, not even
whether it will be long or short. (Morb. I.16. 1-9).145
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Passages not mentioned below, but relevant, include: Airs Waters and Places, 13, 24;
Prorrheticon 2; On Foods, 25.
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For pre-Aristotelian accounts of categories, see the Pythagorean table of principles
and Plato, esp. Sophist (being, rest, motion, same and other); Philebus (infinte, finite,
mixture, unity and cause of unity);
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Ou{toi o(ko&soi toiouto&tropa noush&mata i1sxousi kai\ a)po_ tou&twn, e1nioi me\n di'
o)li/gou a)po&lluntai, e1nioi de\ poulu_n xro&non e3lkousin: diafe/rei ga_r sw~ma
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The author’s claim is that there are variations (diaphorai) among patients in terms of
affections, seasons, bodies and capacity for endurance. Because there are such variations,
it is impossible to know exactly when a patient will die. We see that phusis refers here to
the individual constitution (“one body differs from another”). A second individuating
feature of the case is the individual’s capacity for endurance, and this is probably a
consequence of the strength of his constitution. The phusis of the disease is relevant as
well. Just as the human body follows a path of development delineated by its phusis, a
disease, too, might have a phusis, and thus a certain path of development.
Other passages introduce additional categories of variation, as I mentioned earlier:
the age of the patient, the season of the year in which the disease was contracted, the
season of the year in which the patient is being treated, the disposition of the land, the
patient’s habits and constitution (phusis). Relevant categories of variations may even
include weather patterns, geographical location, and patterns of stars during contraction
of the illness.
These accounts invite some comparison with an Aristotelian doctrine of the
categories, which also proposes that ‘things that are said’ (ta legomena) can be analyzed
according to a set of ten categories including: substance, quantity, quality, relations, and
so on. A more natural comparison is the group of categories in Aristotle’s doctrine of the
mean. In order to hit the mean in being angry, for example, the decision maker must
sw&matoj, kai\ h(liki/h h(liki/hj, kai\ pa&qhma paqh&matoj: kai\ oi9 me\n talaipwro&teroi/
ei0sin e0n th|~si nou&soisin, oi9 de\ panta&pasi talaipwre/ein a)du&natoi. Ou1koun e0sti\ to_
a)kribe\j ei0de/nai (5)kai\ tuxei=n ei1panta tou~ xro&nou, e0n w|{ a)po&lluntai, ou1te ei0
pollo_n, ou1t' ei0 o)li/gon: ou)de\ ga_r ou{toj o( xro&noj a)kribh_j, o4n e1nioi le/gousin,
w(j ta_ polla_, ou)de\ au)to_ tou~to e0kpoie/ei: diafe/rei ga_r kai\ e1toj e1teoj, kai\ w3rh
w3rhj, e0n h|{ a2n nose/wsin:
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consider a number of features of his situation: e.g. how long to be angry? To what
degree to be angry? Towards whom to be angry? But the tendency among medical
writers to classify the various items relevant to a patient’s case might equally be part of
the classifying tendencies that we see most of all in the Hippocratic school of Cos
(Regimen in Acute Diseases, 1; cf. Diseases II.A). For example, according to Regimen
in Acute Diseases, the Cnidians were responsible for categorizing twelve diseases of the
bladder and four diseases of the kidneys.
In the medical case, the most important instance of diaphora is phusis, or ‘bodily
constitution.’ In the Hippocratic Corpus, phusis encompasses a set of features of a being,
and in particular, those associated with it by birth. It refers also to the idea of the path of
development of a being from birth to death. As Heinrich Von Staden suggests, phusis is
the idea of a “regularly recurring cluster of characteristics by which one can always
recognize a thing as what it is.”146
In some cases, phusis is construed as a cause and contrasted with ‘thought’ as a
cause. Hence, in Epidemics, the author writes that the various activities associated with
the phusis of the human being proceed ‘not from thought,’ but automatically and ‘without
instruction,’ which makes nature a good doctor in that it corrects itself:
The body’s nature (phusis) is the physician in disease. Nature finds the way for
herself, not from thought. For example, blinking and the tongue offers their
assistance, and all similar things. Well trained, readily and without instruction,
nature does what is needed. Tears, moisture of the nostrils, sneezing, ear wax,
production of saliva in the mouth, the intake of breath, exhalation, yawning,
coughing, hiccoughing, in a variety of ways” (6.5.1).
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The metaphor here is that the phusis acts as a physician. By controlling bodily
functions that speed recovery – e.g. tearing, sneezing, coughing, etc. – phusis acts, in
effect, as a physician. Some of the other examples in the passage – exhalation, yawning,
and blinking – are less obviously associated with recovery from illness, but rather refer
more directly to the day-to-day maintenance of the body.
In some cases, phusis refers to a specific individual’s nature. We can see this
contrast between the individual phusis and the study of nature (peri phuseôs) in the
following passage from On Ancient Medicine.
…It is impossible to have any clear knowledge about nature (peri phuseôs) from
any other source than medicine….I mean this science that consists in knowledge
of what the human being (anthrôpos) is and by what causes it comes to be and all
the rest, with precision. For this I think is what it is necessary for a doctor to
know about nature (peri phuseôs) and to make every effort to know, if he is going
to do any of the things that he must: what the human being is in relation to foods
and drinks (20.2-3).
This passage uses phusis in two ways. First, there is the mention of a study peri phuseôs.
Peri phuseôs here may refer to the study of nature in the sense that the Presocratics
studied nature. In this case, it means an account of human nature “from the beginning, in
terms of what the human being is and how it originally came to be and from what things
it was compounded” (20.1). These aspects of the study of human nature can be
summarized as the study of: (1) the origins (ex archê) of the human being; (2) the ‘what’
of the human being; and (3) the material of which the human being is composed. We
lack only the notion of a final cause in order to have an Aristotelian-looking account of
the four causes.
But there is another use of phusis in the same passage, and this use should be
interpreted as a notion of phusis of the individual:

122
Hence, the natures (ai phuseis) of these people differ, and the variation
concerns the very thing in the body that is hostile to cheese and is stirred up and
set in motion by it (20.6).
In this passage, the author argues that no simplistic theory of regimen will be sufficient
for making patients healthy. For example, one cannot simply adopt the principle that
cheese or wine is harmful if taken in too much quantity. Instead, one must say that the
extent to which cheese or wine can be harmful depends on the constitution of the patient.
But the constitutions of people differ from one another. Hence, the doctor should say not
‘simply’ (haplôs) that cheese is harmful if one eats too much. Rather, he should explain
‘what trouble, and why, and which of the things in the human being it is inimical to.’147
Why? Foods and drinks affect the human being ‘differently.’
The notion that cheese affects people differently requires a notion of the
individual nature – i.e. some structure that each person has such that he does not share it
with others. At the same time, however, there is certainly grounds for the claim that, in
general, cheese eaten in too great a quantity tends to have a negative effect on health.
Hence the author claims that ‘cheese is a harmful food’ (2.3). Similarly, he claims that it
is true that large quantities of unmixed wine are unhealthy. It is true in the sense that “all
who see this state would recognize that this is the power of wine and that it alone is
responsible” (2.4). Nevertheless, the author claims, the idea is incomplete. For wine –
though it is generally bad when consumed in large quantities – is bad to different degrees,
depending on the drinker.148 The conclusion of this line of thought is that the right
theory of medicine is one that studies the relationship between food and people’s bodies
147
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The doctor should be in the position to state the relationships that hold between kinds
of foodstuffs and individual natures.
A second individuating feature of a case is the season. The seasons are typically
divided into four: winter, spring, summer and fall. But they might also be divided by
solstices: i.e. winter solstice, spring equinox, rising of the Pleiads, summer solstice,
autumn equinox and setting of the Pleiades (Diocles of Carystus, fragment 183a.6, trans.
Van der Eijk).149 The seasons were regarded as having an effect on the development of a
disease both in terms of treatment and contraction. Recovery might be easier in some
seasons as opposed to others – e.g. the winter rather than the summer. A disease might
also be contracted only during certain seasons.
But there were also common changes to regimen for each season – in very much
the way that, during the hot summer months, people eat lighter meals. For example,
Diocles recommends that, during the winter solstice, one should drink hot liquids, but
diluted; one should have unmixed wine (wine without water) and decoctions of oregano;
finally, one should have sexual intercourse (6). This course of regimen is recommended
not merely because of the season. Rather, the more immediate cause is that, during the
winter solstice, an increased amount of moisture flows downward into the lower regions
of a person’s body. Diocles prescribes allopathic remedies (remedy through opposites):
hot drinks and undiluted wine to counteract the effects of increasingly cool and watery
moisture in the lower parts of the body.
Medical advice for the seasons sometimes sounds as if it were more appropriate to
a gourmet’s cookbook. For example, in the Hippocratic Corpus’s Regimen, there is a
149
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detailed list of the various properties of food and the seasons during which to take the
food. Similarly, the fourth-century writer Diocles of Carystus wrote extensively about
food, seasons, and their effects on health. For instance, Diocles observes that, in the
winter, the following practices should be observed:
Garlic and onions and dried fish and thick soups and especially lentil soup are
appropriate to that season, and of the other dishes roasted rather than boiled food,
and in general dryer ones rather than wet ones. More [appropriate] to the winter,
too, are cardamom and mustard. As for drinking during dinner, one should take
dark, thin wine, moderately soft, not young, mixed just a little. Appropriate to
that season are roasted almonds, myrrh, roasted acorns, filberts, both boiled and
roasted.
Mention is made of the food, the preparation of the food, and the appropriate wine and
spices. One gets the sense that the focus of this sort of advice is less geared towards
individual patients as much as towards gourmet season-specific meals. Indeed, as
Diocles remarks earlier in the passage: “a bunch of white grapes is good for everyone
during dinner” (7).
The focus on living well in these passages – rather, say, than treating diseases
with food – reflects the fact that regimen was not solely about restoring health, but rather
about living well too. We can see this preoccuption both in Diocles’ writings, but also in
treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus (e.g. Regimen III).

While the term for ‘regimen’

diatae, i.e. ‘diet’, has a medicine-specific connotation, it has a broader meaning as well.
In its medicine-specific context, it refers to a prescribed manner of life, regimen, and in
particular, diet. For example, in the Republic, Socrates remarks that the guardians should
not copy the diet (diêtae) of athletes, since it will make them to drowsy, like athletes who
have eaten too much (cf. Lovers, 132), and it will be bad for their health, since even a
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small departure from the prescribed diet has serious effects (Rep. 404a).
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But diêtae

has a broader meaning as well: a way of living or mode of life. For example, in the
Cyropedia, Xenophon describes the Median ‘way of life’ (diêtae) as tacky. The Medians
favor makeup and wigs; they wear purple tunics and jewelry. The Persians, on the other
hand, lead a plainer life (Cyropedia, 1.3.2).151 The passage above deals with diet in this
latter sense – namely, as a way of life.
Another kind of diaphora is the age of the patient. Time of life affects health.
Regimen in Health represents the idea as follows. The younger a person is, the drier and
hotter his constitution. The older a person is, the wetter and colder his constitution
(Regimen in Health, 2). In many cases, prescriptions are made for specific times of life:
infancy and old age, for example. Regimen in Health recommends that infants be washed
for a long time in warm water and be administed well-diluted wine (6). Diocles
recommends that old people seldom wet their heads; and instead, that they content
themselves with anointing themselves occasionally. In the summer, the liquid to use is
olive oil mixed with water; in the winter, olive oil mixed with wine (Fragment 182.6, van
der Eijk).
Gender should also be taken into account when recommending a regimen to a patient.
There are four main treatises dealing with women in the Corpus: Diseases of Women 1
and 2, Barren Women, and Nature of Women. Women were recommended to have a diet
that induced drying properties, since their constitutions were regarded as being naturally
soft and moist. (See, for example, Regimen in Health, 6). Vivian Nutton notes that the
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special affordances made for women were especially noticeable where pharmacology
was concerned. Substances used to treat women’s ailments were markedly different from
those of men, containing far more exotic and disgusting materials – for example,
excrement. Nutton suggests that the symbolic function of these substances is important.
If a woman is polluted – for example, by menses – then only a suitably polluting
substance can be used to treat her. Another treatment reserved for women was “odor
therapy,” designed to treat uterine displacement. The therapy was the placement of either
sweet or fetid smelling substances near the women’s vagina or nose. The operative
assumption, as it is described in the Timaeus (91ad) (the womb is an animal in the
woman’s body), is that a woman’s womb is a sentient being.152 As a result, it is repulsed
by bad smells and attracted to good ones. One might, for example, waft the smell of
sulphur under an ailing woman’s nose (Morb. Mul. 2).
Last, there are a number of subjects which might be generally grouped as
geographical. These include: soil, waters, winds, and the location of the patient’s city.
First, for example, region, affects the state of the body. In general, southern locations are
said to be dry and hot, thus promoting dryness and hotness in the body. Similarly,
northern locations are said to be moist and cold, thus promoting a preponderance of those
qualities in the body. Second, winds affect patients. This can be seen in the following
ways. Regimen II, for example, opens with a discussion of the way a doctor may relate
winds to the patient (38). All winds, the author claims, have a cooling and moistening
effect, since all winds are from cool and moist places. But there are variations because
there are northerly versus southerly winds. There are also winds that have passed over
152
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the seas, snow, lakes, rivers, land, etc. All of this changes the degree to which the
wind possesses qualities of moistness and coolness. The southern winds which effect
Libya, for example, are hot and dry for two reasons. First, the wind has passed under the
influence of the sun for quite a while as it made its way up from the southern hemisphere.
Second, the wind does not pass over water as it makes its way.
The discussions of the effects of geography on health are most famous, perhaps, in
the Hippocratic treatise Airs, Waters and Places. The treatise, thought to have been
composed roughly in 430 B.C. is written for the traveling physician who needs to know
what sorts of diseases to expect in various regions he visits. The first part of the treatise
presents a theory of the causes of disease. The second part develops an account of the
relationships between region and the physical and mental characteristics of its
inhabitants. The prologue or epangelma to the piece argues that, to practice medicine, one
ought to learn the basic principles of environmental theory. In addition to factors already
named, these include: properties of water, position with respect to winds and the risings
and settings of the sun and soil (e.g. bare, dry wooded, watered).
Conclusion
Chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation have shown that important parallels can be drawn
between Aristotle’s account of politics and the Hippocratic Corpus. Both politics and
medicine are not exact. Claims in both politics and medicine hold ‘for the most part’ or
‘mostly’ (hôs epi to polu/ epi to pleiston/ polu/ de polu). Only schematic accounts can be
given of both politics and medicine. Finally, both Aristotle and the medical writers
appeal to ‘variation’ (diaphora) to explain inexactness in their respective studies.
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In the next chapter of the dissertation, I will try to draw some conclusions
from these parallels. Recall from chapter 2 that the claims associated with inexactness
have been used as textual evidence for the particularist reading of Aristotelian
deliberation. The next chapter establishes that, in the medical case, the claims associated
with inexactness do not warrant the conclusion that medical deliberation calls upon no
action-guiding principles. Rather, we find the opposite – namely, that medicine is
inexact, but medical deliberation calls on action-guiding priniples. I make this argument
by examining the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine, which shows that we cannot
draw the particularist’s conclusions from the claim that medicine is inexact.
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Chapter 5
Principles in the Hippocratic Corpus

Aristotle claims that politics is not an exact science, and he expresses this idea in a
number of ways. For example, the “account of matters of conduct” has to be written in
outline form (tupôi). Similarly, matters with which politics is concerned – namely,
conduct and questions of human good or advantage - “have no fixity.”153 Both the general
account of politics (tou katholou logou) and the account of particulars lack exactness, the
latter even more so. Accounts of politics do not “fall under any art or set of precepts.”
Rather, agents must determine, on a case by case basis, what is appropriate in each case
(ta pros ton kairon) (NE II. 2, 1104a1-10).154
On the basis of claims like those above, some commentators have inferred that
Aristotle is particularist about deliberations.155 That is, the claim that politics is inexact
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ta_ d' e0n tai=j pra&cesi kai\ ta_ sumfe/ronta ou)de\n e9sthko_j e1xei.
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See Martha Nussbaum 1990, 68. Similarly, John McDowell famously argued in
McDowell 1979 that deliberation does not resemble deductive reasoning – i.e. reasoning
from determinate moral principles. In later works, he allowed that principles might play
some function in deliberation. However, following Nussbaum, principles are allowed to
play only a heuristic function. The are “rules of thumb.” See McDowell 1996. David
Wiggins argues for a particularist interpretation in Wiggins 1975.
See also Sherman 1996. Sherman writes: “while “for the most part” rules can be thought
of as giving some common or characteristic examples of the circumstances in which
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just means that there are no true action-guiding principles according to which an
agent might deliberate.
I want to suggest that Aristotle’s claims about inexactness do not merit this
inference. The Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine proposes that medicine is not an
exact science. But it also aims to provide action-guiding principles through which the
doctor can deliberate about patient’s cases. Thus, the treatise’s claim about inexactness is
consistent with its endorsement of action-guiding principles. I suggest that an analogous
point might be made about Aristotle’s account of deliberation. That is, Aristotle’s claim
that politics is inexact is consistent with the endorsement of action-guiding principles for
the deliberating agent. The purpose of this chapter is to show that while On Ancient
Medicine (1) argues that medicine is not exact, it also (2) endorses action-guiding
principles in medical deliberation.
The chapter has six parts. The first three parts of the chapter make stage-setting
points. In the first part, I contextualize the topic of exactness in 4th-century skepticism
about medicine. One of the skeptical charges against medicine is that medicine is
inexact. This historical background will help us understand why medical writers would
have responded defensively to the claim that medicine was inexact. In the second part of
the chapter, I provide a summary of the textual evidence for lack of exactness in medicine
and politics from chapters 3 and 4. The third part of the chapter reviews the
particularist’s interpretive claim about the textual evidence regarding inexactness.

required ends can be finely realized, they don’t go substantially beyond that. To say they
are even presumptive rules seems to strong” (Sherman 1996, 270).
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In the fourth part of the chapter, I show that the author of On Ancient
Medicine claims that (1) medicine is not exact (akribês, atrekês). The fifth part of the
chapter shows that, far from acceding that medicine lacks principles for being inexact, On
Ancient Medicine provides a robust account of the method by which the discoveries of
such principles are made. In the final part of the chapter, I describe the body of
discoveries in question and show that they consist of a set of action-guiding principles
that the doctor uses in deliberating about the best ways to ‘hit the mean’ in treating
patients.
1 Skepticism about Medicine
Worries about the exactness of medical science are part of the larger problem of
skepticism about medicine’s status as a technê in the fifth century. Was precision of
measurement and inexactness possible in medicine? If not, was medicine nevertheless a
science on other grounds?156
Skepticism about medicine may have been prompted by the expansion of a medical
education beyond the traditional class of those descended from Hippocrates. Originally,
medical education was offered only to the descendants of Hippocrates. However, the
school was eventually opened to others – hence, the creation of the famous Hippocratic
Oath, which ensured allegiance to the ideals of the Hippocratic family.157 The pool of
those who could now be educated in medicine would have been enlarged by the
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For a discussion of these themes, see Hutchinson 1988. Hutchinson focuses on Plato’s
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doubted that sciences like medicine and rhetoric were forms of knowledge, and they
thought that medical and rhetorical success were the product of luck (26-7).
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publication of manuals or handbooks, which allowed people to study medicine on
their own, for the circulation of such treatises would have made it possible to learn
medicine without being trained directly in the Hippocratic family or its associated
schools.158 No qualification tests were required of medical practioners, and, as a result,
anyone could advertise himself as a physician.159 Indeed, there were many groups
involved in healing: midwives, drug sellers, sellers of charms and incantations, temple
physicians.160 The practice of medicine became increasingly deregulated, and the result
may well have been skepticism about the extent to which medicine was, in fact, a technê.
The most extended discussion of skepticism in any of the Hippocratic treatises comes
from On Art. 161 It reports that there are four main skeptical arguments. The first is that
patients are cured through luck, not art (4). Indeed, if medicine is truly a technê, it ought
to achieve its aim in every case. But some patients are cured, and some patients are not.
So, we have to conclude that the patients restored to health are not cured through the
technê, but through luck. The second objection presents a variation of the first. Patients
are cured without the help of medicine (5). Hence, the reason a patient has recovered has
some cause other than the doctor’s care. The third objection is that patients die under the
care of physicians (7). Finally, if medicine is a technê, it should be able to cure anyone.
But some physicians refuse to treat some patients – the hopeless cases. This shows that
the physician acknowledges his powerlessness (8) (cf. On Joints, 58). These objections,
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Several Hippocratic treatises raise the issue of skepticism about medicine: On Art,
Precepts 9, Regimen in Acute Diseases 8, and Ancient Medicine, for instance. For
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for the most part, concern the inefficacy of medicine: there is little evidence of a
consistent relationship between the recovery of the patient and the efforts of a doctor.
The same sort of argument can be found in On the Sacred Disease, but directed
towards religious medicine, rather than medicine as a whole. Medicine which is based in
religion lacks the means (1.11) to cure patients for two reasons. First, it operates without
an accurate account the proper manner by which to treat disease. For the treatments
religious practitioners used included purifications and incantations. More colorfully, they
recommended: the meat of dogs, pigs, goat and deer; the wearing of black; and the
avodance of baths (2). The author claims that religious practitioners impose these
spectacular treatments because of the ostensible divine origin of the disease (2.27-8). The
religious practitioner does not either know or admit that diet, rather than religious
methods are the cures of diseases (2.44-6). This point is established on the basis of
observed correlation between recovery and change to diet. The author claims:
If these things give rise to the disease and increase it when they are eaten and brought
to the patient, and when they are not eaten, there is a cure, no longer is the god
responsible nor do purifications help, but the foods are what cure and harm, and the
god’s power disappears (2.40-46).
The second reason for the inefficacy of religious medicine is that it operates without
knowledge of the nature of the disease, which is not divine. Rather, it is caused by the
brain (6.1)….. The author claims that every illness can be cured, provided that the doctor
has knowledge both of the nature (phusis) and ability (dunamis) of the disease (18). In
order to do so, the doctor needs to know “how, judging the right moment (ton kairon) for
each he will give nourishment to one thing and increase it, and take nourishment form
another and reduce it” (18.4).
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On Ancient Medicine is also an important source for reconstructing the skeptic’s
position. The author writes that medicine contended with the following objections:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

it has no method and principle
its success is due to chance
it is not a comprehensive science
there cannot be sciences of inexact subject matter.

First, there is the claim that empiricist medicine has no method and principle. The
author reports on the rationalist trend in medicine of making postulates concerning
meteorology (1.23-4). But, there is no criterion to establish whether the claims about
postulates are true. In fact, medicine has no need of the postulates. It already has a
principle and method of discovery. The method has long allowed discoveries to be made,
and will continue to foster discovery, until the point at which there will be a complete
science.162 This is possible if inquirers are up to the task, and if they know what was
discovered from previous research.163
As The Sacred Disease shows, one source of skepticism was the commonplace
quack doctor (2.3-4). A high incidence of quackery among physicians – with its
sensational claims about the power of healing – encouraged public cynicism about
medicine. A discussion of quackery in Precepts, for instance, raises two problems. The
quack doctor is fine when the people in his charge are healthy, but when health takes a
turn for the worse, the quack is in straits, having no medical abilities. This is why the
quack will not take difficult cases – because he cannot cure them. He will take only the
case where the patient is healthy to begin with (7; cf. Ancient Medicine 9; On Art).
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Part of the problem of quackery stemmed from public susceptibility. First, the
public was apt to underestimate the expertise needed to administer regimen correctly.
Hence, the author of Regimen on Acute Diseases remarks that, because regimen involves
nothing more than adjustments to diet – as opposed to a battery of medicines, say – the
public believes that they can master the art easily:
… It is in the proper treatment of these illnesses that ordinary folk show their
most stupid side, in the fact that through these diseases chiefly quacks get the
reputation of being physicians. For it is an easy matter to learn the names of the
remedies usually given to patients in such diseases. If barley-water be mentioned,
or such and such a wine, or hydromel, laymen think that physicians, good and bad
alike, prescribe all the same things.
Since everyone knows something about diet and cooking, and this encourages the view
that medical science – the old kind, at least – is not really a science at all (cf. On Ancient
Medicine, 4). A second problem is that patients requested strange and fantastic treatment.
Thus, the author of Precepts explains that the patients “ask for what is out of the way and
doubtful, through prejudice deserving indeed to be disregarded but not punished.
Wherefore you must reasonably oppose them, as they are embarked upon a stormy sea of
change “(5.1-2). The writer of On Joints explains that patients, their friends and family
express delight at elaborate techniques of bandaging, although he notes that the patients
quickly tire of wearing the elaborate bandages.164 Other ostentatious props included the
physician’s use of “luxurious headgear” and “elaborate perfume” (Precepts, 10). A little
perfume is alright, but just enough to be tasteful (10). Finally, there was the practice of
giving public lectures about medicine. As Plato illustrates in the Gorgias, the physician
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could compete in argument with a sophist masquerading as a physician and expect to
lose (456bc).165
Part of the physician’s challenge came from the fact that important points
regarding treatment were disputed among physicians. The author of Regimen On Acute
Diseases writes that medicine has a bad reputation among the laypeople, so that “there is
thought to be no art of medicine at all” (8.19). The public sees so much difference of
opinion among medical practioners about the remedies of diseases, that they liken
medical practioners to diviners, who had an established reputation for disagreement. The
author of Precepts also remarks on argument among physicians. The author claims that
physicians should not be wary of calling in other physicians for consultation about their
patients. Indeed, when a patient’s case becomes difficult, there is the most potential for
things to go wrong (8.9-10). On those occasions, a physician really should call in other
physicians. But physicians should not argue with one another in consultation; those that
do are banausic (8).

2 A Summary of the Claims about Inexactness
As we saw in previous chapters, both Greek medical science and Aristotle’s ethics are
inexact sciences. It is worth reviewing, in summary form, the claims that ethics and
medicine are inexact (from chapters 3 and 4).
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This is perhaps an exaggeration, according to Lloyd (Lloyd 1987, 103). But we can
guess at the source of Plato’s antipathy to quacks. Quackery in medicine is a larger
problem than it may seem. It was part of the culture of words rather than substance
(Lloyd 1987, 103).
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Associated terms, ideas

Aristotle

Hippocratic Corpus

akribês,

akribês, atrekês

diaphora

diaphora

Deliberation concerns both
universals and particulars
(kath hekasta).

The doctor must make
decisions on the basis of
assessments of particular
features of a patient’s
situation – i.e. the patient’s
phusis, his age, his gender,
his geographical location,
the winds in his area, etc.
(diaphora).

The subject matter is inexact

The explanation of
inexactness

The account of the
particular and its role in
deliberation

Because the subject matter
is inexact, the account is
inexact.

Aristotle’s emphasis on
practical perception of
particulars..

tupos, perigraphos, en
kephalaion.

en kephalaion, tupos

3 Particularist Interpretations of the Evidence
The evidence above, one might think, supports a particularist reading of deliberation in
both the case of medical deliberation and Aristotelian deliberation. For the claim that a
science is inexact may seem like the claim that no principles hold in all cases with regard
to that science, and this is exactly what both Aristotle and the medical writers seem to
have in mind when they claim that politics and medicine are inexact.
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Two sets of claims, in particular, suggest as much. First, there are claims that
(a) a science is inexact, (b) that the status of generalizations in the science are ‘hos epi to
polu’ and that (c) its account must therefore be inexact. All of this suggests the further
claim that action-guiding generalizations cannot be made in that science. This a core
claim of the particularist.166 Second, there are the claims that scientific practitioners must
pay attention to the particulars (kath hekasta) or to the particular features of a patient’s
situation. This has suggested to particularist interpreters that Aristotle endorses the
second move of particularism – namely, the switch from a cognitivist account of
deliberation to a sensibility theorist’s account of deliberation – i.e. one according to
which the moral assessment of a situation consists in the uptake of the morally salient
features of that situation – an assessment which is sufficient for moral decision making.
A number of passages in the Ethics indicate that Aristotle thought perception
plays two important roles, as far practical wisdom is concerned.167 First, Aristotle says
that things appear differently to people, depending on character.168 Second, perception
acquaints the agent with particulars. As Aristotle claims in his cryptic discussion of nous
from NE VI, phronêsis involves perception of the “last thing.” This passage has widely
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There are many kinds of particularism. I am referring here to particularism that casts
moral generalizations as ‘action-guiding standards’ – following Sean McKeever and
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truth conditions for moral judgment in referring to features of the world that make those
judgments true. They also provide guides for action. See McKeever and Ridge 2006, 67, 9-11, 89-91 for discussion.
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1142a18-30.
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been interpreted as a reference to perception of particulars.
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Phronêsis, on this

reading, involves perception of particulars. The question is: how much so? According to
the particularist, Aristotle means to say that decisions (prohaireseis) issue solely from
perceptual judgments. No further processing – in the form of consultation of principles –
is necessary.
The particularist argues that, to make a decision about action, one does not need a
theory or principles that guide action.170 That is, one does not need to subsume one’s
situation under some moral law, theory, or principles. Rather, perception of the salient
features of any situation is sufficient for making a good decision. The particularist’s
point, however, is not merely about the tools of making good decisions. Instead, her
point is also that truth and falsity claims about generalizations in ethics simply cannot be
made. Granted, lying is wrong. But it is wrong only given the circumstances, according
to the particularist, and may sometimes be right. Hence, the particularist endorses a
ethical holism such that moral principles are correct only in light of a context. Finally,
the particularist can allow that moral principles play a role in deliberation. But she is
keen to establish that the role is restricted. Moral principles can be rules of thumb, but
only in the sense that they give summaries of actions that have been morally successful in
the past in similar circumstances. They are always defeasible.
It is worth contrasting the particularist’s model of deliberation with that of the
moderate theorist. A moderate theory position gives moral principles a more robust
function in deliberation. The moderate-theory position is in agreement with the
169
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particularist about the defeasibility of moral generalizations. There are always
circumstances in which a generalization does not hold true, and deliberation is, in part,
the project of determining whether the situation is one in which the generalization does
not hold. However, the moderate-theory position is in disagreement with the
particularist’s suggestion that the moral generalizations are, at best, summaries of
statistical frequency. For moral generalizations are not merely the claim that ‘lying tends
to be wrong’ or ‘situations are often such that lying is wrong.’171 This makes the
correctness of moral generalization wholly contingent on whether it has happened to be
the case, empirically, that lying is often wrong. That is a point about statistical
frequency, and the moderate theorist would like to say, moral generalizations carry more
import than that. Instead, they represent normative claims that would be true, irrespective
of their being stastically frequent.
The moderate theorist will also object to the particularist’s holism. For ethical
holism allows that any generalization, in principle, might have moral import.172 For
example, it may be the case that drinking from red coffee cups is wrong just as lying is
wrong. For there are situations in which both can be wrong. Drinking from a red coffee
cup may be wrong (imagine something incredible) if it turns out to be the signal by which
a housewife communicates to a contract killer that, yes, he should go ahead with their
earlier plan to off the husband. Imagining that ‘drinking from red coffee cups is wrong’
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in the same way as ‘lying is wrong’ seems to get something fundamentally incorrect
about the status of moral generalizations.
Now that we have considered the distinction between the particularist’s and the
moderate theorist’s approach to moral deliberation, let us move the discussion from
ethics to medicine. The same distinction holds in medical deliberation, if we think that
medical deliberation can operate according to normative principles. For the particularist
will claim that medical principles are statistically frequent claims. For example, ‘eating
excessive amounts of sugar is bad for one’s health’ just means that ‘it has most often
been the case in the past that eating lots of sugar is bad for the health.’ Or ‘around here,
where we consider obesity and high blood pressure unhealthy, eating sugar is not
condusive to health.’ On the other hand, the moderate theorist will think of medical
principles as having normative punch. It is, in fact, the case – given our natures as human
beings – that eating sugar is bad for our health.
Let us consider an example to illustrate the distinction between the two
approaches to deliberation fully. The example is: eating cheese. Suppose that we adopt
the principle ‘eating excessive amounts of cheese is bad for one’s health.’ The
particularist will claim that this is a helpful generalization for the beginning doctor, who
needs a set of rules to guide his treatment of a patient. The rule just says: advise your
ailing patients, as a matter of course, not to eat too much cheese. Once you are good
enough at discerning the cause of a patient’s ailment, you can dispense with the rules. It
is helpful to think of the analogy with the cook here.173 A novice cook may have learned
the rule that you should not add sugar to standing yolks. But by the time she becomes a
173
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master chef, she can dispense with the rule and invent dishes, if the time and audience
seem appropriate, in which there are little bits of cooked egg yolks in one’s dessert,
added for special texture. The particularist doctor does not believe that excessive
amounts of cheese is bad for everyone. Rather, the value of cheese intake depends
wholly on the circumstances: who is the patient? What is his internal makeup? Does he
have the enzyme count to process lots of cheese?
By contrast, the moderate theorist argues that the syllogism represents a decision
procedure, a representation of the process of reasoning that leads to the decision to
perform an action.174 The major premise of the practical syllogism expresses the agent’s
will. It can also be codified in terms of a set of general prescriptions or universals about
good actions. For example, the major premise expresses the compassionate person’s
commitment to help those in need. Such a person might have as the major premise of a
syllogism: ‘be kind to those in need’ or ‘atone for past wrongs.’ Knowledge of the major
premise should be construed both as the disposition of the will and as an item of
knowledge – or a content-filled disposition of the will. For the will is required in
addition to knowledge of the relevant reasons for acting.
The minor premise of the practical syllogism merely acquaints this person with
the information as to when there are opportunities for action - the “straightforward facts
about the situation at hand.”175 For example, the minor premise might correspond to
one’s seeing that there is an opportunity to be kind (by helping someone carry groceries)
or that there is an opportunity to atone for past wrongs.
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There are two problems with the this account of deliberation, according to
critics.176 First, Aristotle often claims that there are not universal truths in ethics
(1009b12-23). Second, the account cannot make sense of Aristotle’s remarks about the
role that perception plays in phronêsis. The moderate theorist will claim that the function
of perception in phronêsis is to acquaint the agent with his surroundings and then to use
the deliverances of perception to decide which rule to invoke. As McDowell puts it, “ in
the “rule-case” picture, the most obvious role for perception is to contribute awareness
that certain conditions, which are in fact the conditions specified in a rule, are
satisfied.”177 Notice that, according to this interpretation of the function of perception,
perception functions this way for everyone. Everyone, in other words, uses perception to
determine his surroundings and to thereby to determine which rule to invoke. One’s rules
could be either the good or the bad sort; either way, he would still use perception in the
same way.
4 On Ancient Medicine and Exactness
The Hippocratic treatise, On Ancient Medicine, a mid-fifth century treatise in the
Hippocratic corpus, defends the view that the study of medicine is properly directed at
the constitution of the human being (phusis) and its relation to food and drink. 178 To tell
the story of the constitution of the human being is to describe the balance of four humors
in the body and the structure of the body’s internal organs. On Ancient Medicine argues
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against the view that medicine should study the human being as the composition of
the basic elements of the universe. He must know, in other words, the ultimate
constituents of nature and the manner in which they contribute to the makeup of the
human being.179 On Ancient Medicine develops a polemic against the view that
knowledge of the constitutive elements of human nature is necessary for medicine. These
primary elements coincide with those of the universe. It criticizes the practice of
explaining diseases and treatment of disease through appeal to hot, cold, moist and dry.
The first section of On Ancient Medicine presents a polemic against philosophical
medicine – i.e. the view that knowledge of the constitutive elements of human nature is
necessary for medicine (chs. 1-2). The author then turns to a discussion of the origins of
medicine in cooking (chs.3-12). Third, the author gives a detailed critique of
philosophical medicine (chs.13-22), ending with his most sustained critique of
philosophical medicine (chs.20-22). Finally, he turns to a discussion of the structures of
the organs of the human body (chs.22-24). The treatise has been interesting to scholars
for a number of reasons. First, it presents not only the first, but the most sustained attack
against philosophical medicine in the HC.180 Second, it presents the first history of
medicine.181 Finally, it is also the first attempt to give an account of medicine as the
product of observation and experience.182
The author of On Ancient Medicine claims that medicine is not exact (trans. Mark
Schiefsky):
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…The doctor’s tasks are much more varied and require more precision
(akribeiês). For one must aim (stochazessthai) at a measure (metron); but you
will find no measure – nor number nor weight besides– by referring to which you
will know with precision (akribeiês), except the feeling of the body. Hence, it is
difficult to acquire knowledge so precise (akribôs) that one errs only slightly in
one direction or the other. And I would strongly praise this doctor, the one who
makes only small errors; perfect accuracy (atrekes) is rarely to be seen (9; cf.
Regimen 2).
To see the author’s point, it is necessary to review some of the important terminology in
the passage. First, there is the term akribês itself. While the term can refer to ‘precision’
or ‘exactness’ in the sense that information might be absolutely correct (Thucy.
Peloponnesian War, I.22) or that generalizations might be always correct (Pl. Laws
769d), it can also refer to precision in the sense that an organization or a body would have
been well-ordered. Hence, Thucydides says that the navy has ‘exactness’ (Historiae,
VII.13.2). In a similar vein, akribês can also have the connotation of ‘finished’ or
‘masterful,’ as in ‘his skill is sculpture is masterful.’ In the passage from On Ancient
Medicine, akribês seems to be used in both ways – namely, as a way of referring to the
precision or orderliness of one’s mechanical skills, but also in the sense that one’s
information is precise.
To see the author identify akribês with precision as skill, note the opening line of
the passage in which the doctor’s tasks are said to require precision: ‘the doctor’s tasks
are much more varied and require more precision….’ This claim seems to be much like
Thucydides’ remark that the navy has (and has lost) its ‘exactness.’ Note too that akribês
is defined, at one point, in terms of number, weight and measure: ‘you will find no
measure – nor, number, nor weight besides – by referring to which you will know with
precision, except the feeling of the body.’ We get the sense here that the author is
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referring to a measurable quantity, such as might have been associated with the tools
of measurement that Greek scientists possessed at the time – the tornos or compass, for
example (Pl. Philebus 51c).183 The trio of measure, number and weight was a standard
locution for measurable quantities, if we can judge by Plato’s treatment. As Plato writes
in the Laws, one kind of equality is the sort we encounter in manipulating “measure,
weight and number” (Laws 757b3-6; cf. Politicus 284ce; Gorgias, Fragment 11a196).184
Hence, there are multiple cases in which the author identifies akribês with precision as
skill.
But akribês is used in the sense of ‘precise information’ in the passage as well.
For example, the reference to aisthêsis pushes us in this direction. The passage makes an
association between akribeia and the ‘feeling of the body’ (aisthêsis): ‘you will find no
measure (metron)… by referring to which you will know with precision (akribeiês),
except the feeling of the body (aisthêsis).’ The reference to measure (metron) might
seem to push in the direction of akribeia as measurement. However, the term metron has
a wide range of connotations, not least of which is its capacity to span the mathematical –
moral bridge that we associate with the Greek philosophical tendency to see the
mathematical notions of orderliness, evenness and measuredness as indications of moral
rectitude. Metron need not mean measurement directly here, but rather something like:
due measure or limit (Pl. Laws.836a); or measure – as in Protagoras’s claim ‘man is the
measure of all things’ (Pl. Theatetus,183c). According to one interpretation, the author
means, if measurement is a criterion of exact science, then medicine, too, can make
183
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However, it seems to me that

metron might as easily have the connotation of ‘due measure’ here, in which case the
author’s mean would be something along the lines of: it is necessary that the doctor
know how the patient feels – e.g. what degree or kind of pain – in order to procure
precise information about the success of his treatment. Given the reliance on patient selfreporting of pain - as we saw in the discussion of Fractures from chapter four, such an
interpretation seems viable. Thus, I argue, the passage suggests that the doctor depends
on the feeling of the body to procure precise knowledge, but the feeling of the body does
not render precise enough information. It is likely that the author is referring to the sense
in which patient self-reporting provides important information, but information that can
be inaccurate (cf. 2.3).186
The lack of perfect information about patients makes the doctor err with respect to
the mean. As is the case in Aristotle’s Milo example, the mean is expressed through diet.
Just as the trainer can administer a weak diet to Milo and an overstrong diet to a
beginning athlete, so too can the doctor miss the mark in giving a patient a diet that is too
strong for his constitution (it ‘overpowers’ the patient’s constitution), or the doctor can
undershoot in administering a diet, giving the patient a regimen that is too weak to sustain
him. Because a full determination of the extent to which the diet overpowers or
undershoots a patient’s constitution depends on patient’s reports of his own states, it is
“difficult to acquire knowledge so precise that one errs only slightly in one direction or
185
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the other.” While the notion of ‘erring’ in one direction or another is a marker of a
the doctrine of the mean, the term ‘stochazesthai’ for ‘aim’ or ‘conjecture’ is also a
marker of the doctrine of the mean. For the doctrine of the mean is the idea that the agent
aims mark in between excess and defect. We see that knowledge plays an important role
in determining the mean. The clear suggestion of the passage is that, because the doctor
lacks the requisite knowledge, he therefore misses his mark in treating the patient.
5 Responses to Exactness
At this point, let us take stock of the shape of the issue. The particularist argues that
to attribute inexactness to a discipline is to endorse the particularist position – namely,
that deliberation does not employ principles. As we have seen, the author of On Ancient
Medicine claims that medicine is not exact. According to the particularist, this would
essentially the claim that medical deliberation does not proceed according to principles.
As we have seen, this is an entirely reasonable supposition. For there is a way to cash out
the notion of exactness and exact science in such a manner so as to establish,
conceptually, the connection between inexactness and lack of principles for deliberation.
However, it is now time to consider whether this position has any merit as a historical
claim. That is, if we take off our philosopher hats and put on our historian hats, we can
ask if the particularist interpretation is supported by the historical facts. I argue below
that it is seriously at odds with the historical trends. The trend I have in mind is the
burgeoning, but early development of non-mathematical sciences such as medicine. We
can chart their development by looking at charges that such disciplines failed as sciences.
These charges were expressed in two related ways – through skepticism about medicine
and through the claim that medicine was not exact.
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In the fourth chapter, we saw that skepticism about medicine as a technê was
common in fifth and fourth century Greece. Numerous treatises of the Hippocratic
Corpus respond to the skepticism, describing the various claims associated with the
skeptic and the means by which defenders of medicine might respond.187 The central
objections made to medicine’s status as a technê are that success in medicine is a matter
of luck, rather than art, and that medicine has no curative power, as evidenced by the
doctor’s refusal to take on serious cases and by the fact that patients sometimes died
under their doctor’s case. Quackery also abounds among so-called “doctors”;
spectacular bandanging methods, healing contraptions, special doctor headgear and
excellent speeches about medicine are no substitute for real healing powers.
Medical writers made ready admission of the fact that medicine failed to meet
scientific ideals represented by exact science. Aristotle describes the paradigmatic exact
science in the Posterior Analytics (I.27, 87a31-36). Exact science provides explanations
(di hoti) in addition to facts (hoti); it studies objects in abstraction from their matter and
stripped of properties such as dimensionality. By contrast, an inexact science does not
provide full explanations. It also studies objects as they are in the world – replete the
messy properties like: matter, dimension and movement. First philosophy, or theology, is
the most exact science, since it studies the one property which cannot be stripped from
any object – being (Met. XI.7, 1064a1-5). Mathematics is a relatively exact science,
since it studies under the aspect only of properties such as shape, line, and form. By
contrast, physics is a relatively inexact science, since it studies objects in motion –
187
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indeed, objects in non-uniform motion. The best sciences or the most scientific
sciences are the exact sciences because they are concerned, most of all, with the first
principles (Met. I.2, 982a25) and their principles are the most knowable (982b1-2).
There was both skepticism about medicine’s status as a technê and admission by
medical writers themselves that medicine failed to meet the scientific paradigm of exact
science. There is an interesting historical question to ask about all of this. How did
medical writers respond? Did they admit that medicine was an irremediable failure by
scientific standards? Did they reject exactness as a criterion of good science? Did they
attempt to redefine scientific standards?
The best way to describe the response made on behalf of medical science is to say
that medical writers whole-heartedly rejected the idea that medicine somehow failed as a
science. Of course, this meant that the burden was on medical writers to explain that,
despite the fact that medicine manifestly failed to meet some scientific standards, it
nevertheless merited scientific status. But this is the task taken up by writers in treatises
such as On Art, On Ancient Medicine, Regimen and Places in Man. In what follows, I
would like to examine one such effort to respond from On Ancient Medicine.
On Ancient Medicine makes two claims to which I will draw attention. The first
is that medicine may not have achieved exactness in one sense, but it has achieved
exactness in another sense – namely, through careful reasoning (logismos). I read this
claim as an attempt to direct attention away from the ways in which medicine fails as a
science and towards the ways that it has succeeded. For logismos involves deliberation
according to principles. (Yet, this is precisely what the particularist denies.) I note, in
particular, the fact that the author reappropriates the terms akribês and atrekês in the
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passage, redefining them so that medicine is very nearly exact. Finally, I try to show
that this new sense of exactness is connected with method (hodos). That is, any
discipline which has a well-established and honed method (hodos) succeeds in being
exact and succeeds in being a technê. Again, this point is significant because method
(methodos) is associated with the use of principles. Yet, the particularist denies as much.
The argument of On Ancient Medicine is that medicine has attained a significant
amount of exactness, even though it fails to meet the ideal of exactness fully. Rather than
marveling at the extent to which it yet fails to be exact, one ought to marvel at the extent
to which it made progress towards exactness:
It is difficult when such precision (atrekês) is required by art (technê) always to
attain perfect accuracy (tou atrekestatou). Yet many aspects of medicine….have
arrived at such precision (akribeia). So I deny that the ancient art should be cast
aside on the ground that it does not exist or that it is not being investigated in an
admirable way, if it does not possess precision in everything; rather, since it has
been able to come, by means of reasoning (logismôi), from profound ignorance
close to perfect accuracy (tou atrekestatou), I think it is much more appropriate to
marvel at its discoveries as having been made admirably, correctly and not by
chance (12).188
As we saw in chapters three and four, the paradigmatic technê is the exact technê. The
author responds to that ideal in this passage when he writes: ‘it is difficult when such
precision is required by art….’ I take this to be another acknowledgment that medicine
fails to meet the criteria for an exact science. The term used for ‘exactness’ in this
section of the passage is atrekês, which tends to refer to precision in measurement. But
188
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the author uses the term synonymously with akribeia in this passage, as the use of the
pronoun tosautên suggests. This passage also acquaints us with some of the common
skeptical charges against medicine - for example: medicine ‘does not exist’: medicine
arrives at its results ‘by chance’; and medicine ‘is not being investigated in an admirable
way.’
The author argues that, despite medicine’s apparent lack of exactness in one
respect, it has nevertheless achieved exactness in several other important respects.
Medicine has done so through ‘reasoning’ (logismôi), which allows it to come close to
the “most accuracy.” Note that, in making this claim, a bait and switch has occurred.
The author’s initial move in the passage is to admit that medicine is not perfectly exact.
However, only a line later, the author claims that medicine has come close to perfect
exactness because it involves a process of reasoning (logismos). This is an attempt to
direct attention away from the way that medicine fails as a science – namely, in its
reliance on patient’s reports of their own conditions. Similarly, it is an attempt to draw
attention to the way that medicine succeeds as a science – namely, insofar as it involves
‘reasoning.’
But how is the term logismos being used in the passage? On Ancient Medicine
does not provide much by way of illustration of the term logismos. However, if we
assume that logismos is used in On Ancient Medicine in the same way that it is used in
On Art, where there is a sustained discussion of the term, then we should read logismos as
a reference to the reasoning that the doctor uses to discern the nature of diseases that are
internal to the body and which cannot, therefore, be perceived. This makes logismos the
process of reasoning that the doctor might exercise with respect to specific patient cases.
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Through ‘reasoning,’ in this sense, the doctor discerns the nature of the particular
patient’s internal disease.
In the Hippocratic treatise On Art, logismos is the process by which the doctor
discerns with the “mind’s eye” the hidden diseases of a patient by reading signs about his
or her condition. On Art introduces a distinction between diseases whose manifestation
can be seen and those diseases which are internal and must consequently be discerned
indirectly through signs (9.6-10). Those diseases that can be seen manifest themselves by
things that can be directly sensed – for example: color and swellings that can be felt as
moist or hard, and so on. But of the illnesses that cannot be directly observed, the doctor
must take a different tact. He must acquire knowledge of the various structures of the
human body – e.g. cavities, muscles, interstices, vessels, veins, and sinews (10).
Similarly, he must read signs (semeia)(10.10) such as: clearness or roughness of the voice
(13.5-6) and rapidity of respiration (13.6-7). A doctor cannot see these with his eyes, but
he can learn to see them with the mind rather than the eyes – i.e. with the “mind’s eye”
(tês gnômês opsei, 11.11): “the attendant in fact, as could neither see the trouble with his
eyes nor learn it with his ears, tried to track it by reasoning (11.15-7).189
The upshot for our passage from On Ancient Medicine is that, even though
doctors rely on patient’s reports of their conditions and even though medicine is therefore
not exact, medicine is nevertheless quite close to being exact. For doctors can perform
logismos in order to discern the hidden aspects of their patient’s internal conditions. That
is, they rely on the process of reading signs like raspiness of the voice and their
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knowledge of patients’ internal structures in order to gauge the patient’s internal
states. The presumption is that this process works quite well, making up for whatever
loss of information taking place when a patient fails to self-report correctly. Hence,
medicine is “close to perfect accuracy.”
The second and more important way that author argues for medicine’s status as a
technê is to point out that medicine has a method (hodos). Of course, method plays a
very important role in Aristotle’s philosophy, where the notion of method is fairly well
defined and always dealt with carefully at the outset of a treatise. One such method is
dialectic, a form of argument that proceeds deductively or inductively from premises that
are common beliefs (endoxa) (Topics, 100a20-101b4). (By contrast, demonstration starts
with demonstratively certain premises.) What it means for a premise to be ‘endoxon,’ is
that the premise is generally accepted, that it is reputable, or that it is accepted by the
most eminent philosophers. Obviously false or perverse views do not count as dialectical
premises, even though they may be held by eminent philosophers. That is, we start by
stating the commonly accepted views about a topic under debate, and we reject from
consideration those views that are obviously false, even though they might have been
held by eminent philosophers.
The notion of method is far less universally defined in medicine. The term hodos
can be used either in the concrete sense of ‘path’ or ‘way’ or as the more intellectual
notion of method of reasoning.190 Hence, Epidemics defines method as a process of
increasing generalization from experience:
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The summary comes from the origin and the going forth, and from the very
many accounts and things learned little by little, one gathers them together and
studies them thoroughly…This would be the road (hodos) (Epidemics VI.3.12).191
The sense we get from the passage above is that the author is referring to the intellectual
process by which one makes generalizations after encountering many instances or much
experience of a certain kind of phenomenon. The concrete sense of hodos, by contrast,
means something more like the manner or mode of treatment – as in applying salts baths
or administering oxymel (a honey and vinegar drink) to a patient. In this case, hodos can
have ‘way’ (tropos) as a synonym.192
In On Ancient Medicine, method should be understood in the former sense of
hodos – namely, as the intellectual process through which discoveries are made in
medicine.193 The method of medicine is an advanced form of dietetics and cooking.194 As
the author claims, there is no difference between the physician’s art and method of
dietetics and cooking. For they use the same mode of reasoning and the same method of
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discovery:…”their reasoning (logos) was identical and the discovery one and the
same” (7.7-8).
While medicine appealed to the same process of discovery as cooking, it was by
no means unsophisticated. In the initial stages of development in medicine, there was
experimentation with diet among the peoples willing to curb their desires for the sake of
health – i.e. the Greeks (5.2). First, the quantity of food consumed was simply lessened
(5.3). But this treatment proved to be unsuccessful in some cases (5.4). Since some
patients could take only the smallest quantity of food, it was thought that they needed
milder food. So began the process of mixing food with water and boiling foods. Patients
who could not even eat the slops or the boiled foods were put on liquid diets (5.5). And
so the process of developing foods in which humors were well balanced began.
Method here is best understood in relation to discovery (heuresis) – since the
method in question is a method through which medical knowledge is discovered (2.1-2).
In technical treatises, the acquisition of knowledge, or learning (mathêsis), tended to be
explained by one of two intellectual processes: imitation (mimêsis) or discovery
(heurêsis).195 The idea of a first discoverer, or origintor of a field, was a common topos in
scientific treatises.196 Prior to the fifth century, the first scientific discoveries were
attributed to gods and to wise men of other countries. Egypt, in particular, was thought to
be a source of first discoverers. During the fifth century, however, we see Greek writers
shift towards attributing themselves with inventions and discoveries. Aristotle, for
example, attributes to himself the unique advancement of rhetoric (Sophistical
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Refutations, 183b36). In particular, he is the first to discover the art of sophistic
sullogismos, since such an art never existed before, despite the work of sophists such as
Gorgias.
On Ancient Medicine connects method and discovery so that method is the means
by which discoveries are made in medicine:
Medicine has long since had everything it needs, both a principle and a discovered
method, by which many admirable discoveries have been made over a long period
of time and those that remain will be discovered, if one who is adequate to the
task and knows what has been discovered sets out from these things in his
investigation (2.1).197
In On Ancient Medicine, discovery is the product of methodical investigation, and it
issues in a body of knowledge that the doctor can use in treatment. Indeed, discovery
seems to be synonymous with content of the science.198 The output of the
methodological approach is a body of discoveries about the relationship between food,
drink and the human being – in effect, the science of regimen. In On Ancient Medicine,
knowledge of regimen can be broken down into two domains or areas of expertise. First,
there is the subject of the effect of various foods, drinks, exercise, baths and other such
things on the human body. Second, there is the subject of the internal structures of the
body. Both domains of knowledge will be explained in greater detail in the last section
of the chapter. For now, it is sufficient to see that discoveries of medical knowledge are
produced by a methdological investigation – one closely resembling experimentation –
into types of foods, drinks, exercises, etc. and their relations to human beings.
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How does all of this provide a response to the skeptic about medicine and to
the point that medicine lacks exactness? Recall a passage quoted earlier:
I deny that the ancient art should be cast aside on the ground that it does not exist
or that it is not being investigated in an admirable way, if it does not possess
precision (akribeiên) in everything; rather, since it has been able to come, by
means of reasoning (logismos), from profound ignorance close to perfect accuracy
(tou atrekêstatou), I think it is much more appropriate to marvel at its discoveries
as having been made admirably, correctly, and not by chance (12.2).199
We are now in a better position to assess the depth of the author’s claim. This passage
follows the author lengthy description of the cooking method by which medical art has
acquired information about types of food and drink and their typical effects on the human
body. It is with this body of knowledge that the doctor is able to engage in reasoning
(logismos), the process by means of which he ascertains the illnesses that effect patients,
even if they are hidden in the body or obscured by imperfect patient reports. By
reasoning in this fashion with this body of discoveries acquired through methodical
investigation, medicine has approach nearly perfect accuracy. Rather than dwelling on
the degree to which medicine fails to be exact or fails as a science, it is more appropriate
to “marvel” at the discoveries made in medicine. These discoveries were made through a
method, the merits of which have been demonstrated. They are admirable, correct and
make it the case that medicine is opposed to chance.
6 Principles and Theory in On Ancient Medicine
It is time to describe in more detail the body of discoveries that methodical investigation
has produced. What follows is a brief review of the main points of that body of
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discoveries. It is important to see that the principles produced by the investigation
both explain and guide the decisions that practitioners would make.
According to On Ancient Medicine, food and drink are composed of a number of
humors. Each kind of food or drink consists of various combinations of humors and can
be prepared in any number of ways (e.g. boiling, roasting, etc.) (14.1-6). The result is
that foods have different sets of capacities. Substances can be mixed together without
losing their distinctive capacities.200 Indeed, new capacities are gained in the process
(13.3). Foods have the power to cause disease if they contain powerful concentrations of
any one humor (14.4-6). The effect that the food has on a person depends on the
interaction between the humors of the person and the humors contained in the food. Food
which is not well blended can cause disease, for the humors contained in the food have a
tendency to “separate off” (apokrinesthai). In particular, the patient’s constitution is
unable to overcome the power of the concentrated humor in the unblended food, and he
therefore becomes ill (14.1).
Food needs to be well-blended. It is best for the eater not to ingest pronounced
amounts of any one humor in contradistinction to the rest. Since the basic principle of
health calls balance among the humors, it is best too that food preserve such a balance so
as not to upset the body’s balance. For example, it is better that bread be made from
well-kneaded dough and from dough that holds adequate amounts of water, rather than
from dry dough which has a disproportionate amount of drying properties of wheat to the
moistening properties of water (14.1). Food which is not well-blended announces itself
by the extremity and unpleasantness of its taste. For example, the food which contains
200

Anaxagoras DK 59 B; Empedocles DK 31 B; Nature of Man, 3.

160
the most of the sweet humor also tastes the sweetest (14.4). It is no surprise, then, the
the typical fare of the human diet tends to be well-blended– for human beings take less
pleasure in the strong tastes of unbalanced foor, or so the author suggests (14.6).
The account of food is extended by a discussion of the transformative powers of the
humors in food (24). Besides mixing and blending, the humors also transform into one
another by exploiting their commonality or kinship. For example, sweet wine turns to
vinegar spontaneously (24.1). The idea is that the sweet and the acid are closely related –
not as opposites, but as having comparable constituents. The author does not explain, but
we can imagine that he refers to the sense in which sweet wine and vinegar both have
acidic and sweet properties, but in different proportions. Hence, they have different
compositions, but are closely related to one another. The result is that, if one is called for
in a remedy, its counterpart is comparably effective. For example, if giving a patient a
sweet thing is best, giving him an acidic thing is second best (24.2).
Ultimately, On Ancient Medicine never tells us exactly what is in any of our food.
Unlike other Hippocratic treatises on regimen, it does not present a mini-rule book of the
various foods one should eat in the different seasons and the various exercises that one
should take in the different seasons. On Ancient Medicine only refers obliquely to such
texts when it discusses the status of rules like ‘do not allow patients to eat too much
cheese.’ The work of the treatise is to examine the status of those claims, rather than to
present a battery of them.
Other treatises in regimen offer far more specific accounts of individual foodstuffs.
The stated purpose of Regimen, for example, is to provide a detailed account of food and
its properties – both according to nature (kata phusin) and according to art (dia technês)
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(39.2) The author writes that he is forced to give an account of each food seperately.
“….it is impossible to set forth these things in general, I will show what power each one
has in particular” (39.14-7).201 What follows is an account of the various kinds of food:
for example, grains such as barley, wheat and “cyceon” – usually prepared as a mixture
of barley, cheese and wine, but also to be combined with honey or milk (Regimen, 41.59). Similarly, there is an account of vegetables and fruit, lentils and beans, and meats
ranging from pig to dog (46.23) are discussed. So, too, does the author discuss the
various properties of dairy products, wines and vinegars, spices and herbs. Coriander, for
example, is said to be hot and astringent and to prevent heartburn (54.22-23). The
author’s assessment of cheese is not terribly different from ours today: cheese is strong
and nourishing (51; cf. De Diatae Acutorum, 18. 38 on the flatulent properties of cheese).
But what is the human being made of such that he reacts poorly to this element of the
cheese? On Ancient Medicine develops an account of human nature (phusis) in answer to
such questions. For the doctor should say ‘simply’ (haplôs)(20.3) that cheese is harmful
if one eats too much. Rather, the doctor must say ‘what trouble, and why, and which of
the things in the human being it is inimical to’ (20.3).202
Like food, human beings consist of a blend or krâsis of humors such as sweet,
bitter, salty, acid, astringent, insipid, etc. (14.4). It is unclear just how many of these
humors might be in the body. The author claims that there are many (14.4). His view
may be likened to that of de Morbis, in which it is claimed that plants and human beings
are compositions of powers manifested as humors. According to de Morbis, these are
201
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identical to the humors which can be found in food and drinks. The powers are
reducible to four substances: bile, water, blood and phlegm, each of which has its own
seat in the body. (The heart is the seat of blood, the head of phlegm, the spleen of water,
and the liver of bile.) Whenever any food or drink enters the body, it is collected in the
stomach, and from there, each humor in the body draws the like humor in the food. If
this is the type of view that the author of On Ancient Medicine has in mind, we can
expect that he envisions the various dunamei in question – sweet, salty, bitter, etc. – as
being reducible to basic humors.
The author used the method of analogy, rather than empirical observation, to
arrive at his account of the human being as a composition of humors. As we saw earlier,
the healthiest food is that which has been well-blended. The powerful dunamei of food
are made healthy through blending with other dunamei, But the same seems to be the
case of the human being (14.1-2). Namely, the healthiest human being seems to be he
whose dunamei are well-blended.
Disease and health are explained through mixture. When the humors in the body
are balanced well against one another, the person is healthy. But if one of the humors
becomes excessively concentrated, it seperates off and the person becomes diseased.203
On Ancient Medicine gives a qualtitative description of what constitutes a good balance
of the humors. The humors are in good balance when they are “cooked” 204 or “blended”
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(19). The blend (krêsis) can be destroyed either by the predominance of a humor or
by the the failure to nourish the humors properly.205 When one of the humors has
‘separated off’ from the mixture, it becomes concentrated, and in this way, it causes
disease (20.6).206
Part of this general account of the human phusis is a discussion of the structures
(schêma) of the human body. The author deals with this topic in a few brief chapters at
the end of the treatise. The structures in question are both internal organs and external
forms such as the head and the neck. The author’s guiding premise in the discussion is
the idea that shape has an effect on the processes of blending in the body. He focuses on
shapes such as: tapering and hollowness. The tapered structures, for example, are better
for drawing up liquids; the author uses the analogy with a straw to induce as much.
(There is widespread appeal to the method of analogy in the discussion of structure.)207
We have now seen a brief description of the body of medical discoveries that
methodical investigation produced. I have been assuming all along that the doctor would
have to apply this body of discoveries. How does this work? This answer is quite
simple. Medical discoveries consist of a body of principles that constitute the types of
relationships between food and drink.208 For example: an excessive amount of unmixed
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wine has harmful effects. Or: an excessive amount of cheese has a harmful effect. In
deliberating about the case of a patient who is prone to drinking wine or a patient who
reports digestive problems and a great love of cheese, the doctor will consider the fact
that cheese and wine have these known harmful effects. The first step of his deliberative
process will be the thought: some cut-backs are necessary. This patient will have to drink
less wine or eat less cheese. But the deliberative process does not end there, for the
doctor must consider who the patient is, such that he or she is effected in such and such a
way by wine or cheese.
In chapter four, we saw that there were several categories of questions that a
doctor should ask about his patients. These included: constitution, age, gender, and
geographical location, to name a few. Thus, the second stage of deliberation involves the
asking of all these questions about the particular patient. One might establish, for
example, that patient x is a young woman from the cold, dry and arid regions of the
North. Her constitution is relatively strong.209 She is not easily overcome by a strong
diet and can manage two meal a day. If there is any disruption to this pattern, her
digestive cycles are not much disrupted.210 With this kind of information, the doctor is

conclusions of their research. “It is not the case that the writers conducted their
observations merely to confirm rules that they had already formulated in detail. Rather
those detailed rules are, in the main, generalizations which they arrived at on the basis of
their particular observations including, no doubt, many others besides those recorded in
the case-histories as we have them” (Lloyd 1999, 155).
209
Note that Airs, Waters, Places draws a connection between the strength of phusis and
geographical location. The people of the North, from the dry, cold and arid regions, are
said to be hardier than most people (12). See also Aristotle’s Politics VII.7 for discussion
of the character of peoples of different regions.
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I draw inspiration for this example from On Ancient Medicine, 10. 1-12.1. The text
contains a discussion between the various manifestations of and problems associated with
a weak constitution.
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able to complete a second stage of deliberation in which he assesses more precisely
the amount to which the young woman should cut back on her consumption. As a hardy
young woman, perhaps she does not need to limit herself to half a glass of mixed wine a
day. Rather, she simply needs to stop drinking five glasses of unmixed wine a day. In
his effort to hit the mean, the doctor recommends that the patient have two glasses of
unmixed wine a day, or some such comparable amount. Similarly, the doctor may
recommend that, if the woman suffers from excessive cheese intake, that she limit herself
not completely, given her hardy constitution. If she were to eat no cheese, she might fall
ill from “depletion,” as we saw earlier. Rather, she should eat four ounces of cheese a
day, rather than her customary ten. Again, the doctor is aiming for the mean in
recommending that the woman neither undershoot nor overshoot the appropriate amount
of cheese, given her constitution.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a counterexample to the particularist’s claim that (1) if a
science is not ‘exact,’ then (2) the science does not offer action-guiding principles for
deliberation. In the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine, it is argued that (1)
medicine is not exact. Nevertheless, the author endorses action-guiding principles for
medical deliberation.
We saw this in two ways. First, the author provides a rigorous account of the
method through which such principles are discovered. This account of method,
moreover, is meant to counter skeptical objections to medicine’s status as a science.
Though medicine is not perfectly exact, the author claims, it nevertheless approaches
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exactness very closely by having a rigorous method of discovering principles.
Second, we saw that the method of discovery renders a substantial body of action-guiding
principles - principles like ‘excessive amounts of wine are harmful.’
I will venture to speculate a bit in conclusion. Particularist readings of Aristotle –
those of McDowell and Nussbaum – for example, are enchanted with the idea that
Aristotle embraced the context sensitivity needed for apt practical reasoning. There is no
doubt that Aristotle is an advocate of the importance of context-sensitive reasoning.
However, this emphasis in his account is not supported by the texts on akribeia and
related terms and ideas. Rather, we get Aristotle’s emphasis on context-sensitive
reasoning by considering his doctrine of the mean “in relation to us.” This is the topic I
take up in the next chapter.
In the meantime, it is important to see that, if the acknowledgment that a science
is inexact in medicine does not mean that the scientist, therefore, refrains from seeking
principles – but, in fact, the very reverse. It is worth considering whether the same might
be true of Aristotle’s acknowledgment that politikê is not exact. Indeed, if Aristotle
pursues the strategy that we have seen in On Ancient Medicine, the admission that
politikê is not exact is only a prelude to a determined effort to seek principles for politikê.
And is this not the very thing that we should expect Aristotle to mean when he claims
that, though exactness is hard to achieve in giving an account of politikê, “we must do
what we can” (NE IX.2, 1165a35)?
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Chapter 6
The Doctrine of the Mean in the Hippocratic Corpus

Aristotle argued that virtue is a mean relative to us (pros hêmas). It is not obvious
how we ought to interpret this mean. But according to one reading - a particularist
reading – Aristotle’s mean relative to us requires that the standard (horos) in light of
which an agent selects the mean (NE VI.1, 1138b18-24) not be constituted by principles.
Rather, it is constituted by a contentless conception of the good that becomes determinate
only with regard to specific people in specific situations. We might say, in effect, that
this reading of the mean relative to us is a ‘to each his own’ reading of the mean.
Once again, On Ancient Medicine presents guidance about the interpretation of
Aristotelian practical science, for it provides a counterexample to the particularist reading
of the mean relative to us. On Ancient Medicine offers an account of the mean very much
like Aristotle’s mean relative to us. It argues that doctors should determine the mean for
the man in relation to food, drink and exercise. Like Aristotle’s mean ‘relative to us,’ this
mean should be determined relative to patients’ particular cases. However, contra the
particularist reading, the mean should also be determined in light of action-guiding
principles. These principles provide general, but specific, rules for treating patients (e.g.
treat x symptoms with y substances), and in turn, these rules are derived from wideranging principles like the allopathic principle (i.e. treat an ailment with its opposite).
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Thus, in the Hippocratic Corpus, we can find support for the idea that action-guiding
principles are used in deliberation, for they are used in the selection of the mean.
The chapter has two parts. It begins with an introduction to the doctrine of the
mean in Aristotle’s ethics. The second section of the chapter gives an analysis of the
mean in On Ancient Medicine, explained in terms of the contrast between the mean
determined according to ‘what the man is’ and ‘what the man is in relation to food, drink
and exercise.’ (On Ancient Medicine endorses the latter formulation of the mean.) As I
will show, the mean for man in relation to food, drink and exercise was determined
relative to the individual patient’s constitution (phusis). However, doctors were also
instructed to adapt general action-guiding principles to particular patient’s cases. I will
show as much by discussing two kinds of action-guiding principles: the general and
wide-ranging sort and the specific, but general, sort. My examples are the allopathic
principle (treat an ailment with its opposite) and specific principles that are derived from
the allopathic principle (e.g. treat a fever, which has hot properties, with kammaron,
which has cooling properties). The invocation of these general principles in the treatment
of individual patients shows that, at least in the case of medicine, it is incorrect to adopt
the particularist reading of the medical analogue to Aristotle’s mean relative to us.
1 Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean
The doctrine of the mean is the familiar idea that moderation is best, that excess is
to be avoided, and that there is a right time for things. Indeed, the idea is more familiar to
us than we necessarily realize. Consider the famous Byrds’ song: ‘Turn, Turn, Turn.’
The song was adapted from the Book of Ecclesiastes. The Bible passage expresses the
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idea that there is a time for everything: a time to be born, to die, to kill, to heal, to
laugh, etc.
The doctrine of the mean is commonplace in Greek literature and philosophy. It
was expressed by a number of Greek dictums. For example, there are the phrases:
“nothing too much”; “”know thyself”; “observe due measure” (kairos), and “measure is
best” (metron) (cf. Protagoras 343ab). The dictums were initially thought to be the
sayings of the Seven Sages, a group of wise men in Greece. However, they came to be
associated with the cooperative virtues appropriate to living in a city.211 Indeed, in
keeping with the bent of the cooperative virtues, the doctrine of the mean captures the
idea that one should err on the side of mildness. Hence, Isocrates remarks in a speech to
an aspiring leader that the “happy mean is to be found in qualities of defect rather than in
those of excess.”
Keep a watch continually on your words and actions, that you may fall into as few
errors as possible. The best thing is to hit the exact course which the occasion
(kairos) demands, but when that is difficult to discover, choose to fall short rather
than to do too much; for the happy mean (metriotêtes) is to be found in qualities
of defect rather than in those of excess (To Nicocles, 33).212
In this remark, we can detect the same thought that probably drove Aristotle to surmise
that erring on the side of one extreme may be better than erring on the other side. As
Aristotle claims, one of the extremes is more erroneous than the other. Since hitting the
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mean is difficult, a second best alternative is to err on the side of the less harmful of
the extremes (NE 1109a33-35).
The doctrine of the mean is not merely a moral dictum. For it refers more
generally to the idea of opportuneness, whether meant in a temporal or spatial sense. For
example, in the following passage from the Hippocratic Corpus, ‘mean’ (metria) is used
to refer to the proper length of time with which one should use a part of the body:
Speaking generally, all parts of the body which have a function, if used in
moderation (metria) and exercised in labors to which each is accustomed, become
thereby healthy and well-developed, and age slowly (On Joints 58).
In this passage, the mean is used to express the idea that there is a right length of time.
However, the mean can also express the idea of the ‘right moment’ or point in time. For
example, there may be opportuneness in the sense of a ripe moment for action (e.g. ‘it is
time to act’). But there may also be opportuneness in the sense of the right place. For
example, an early use of the mean from the Iliad referred to an unguarded place in a
person’s armor into which one might stick a spear – i.e. a particularly vulnerable spot.
In Aristotle’s philosophical writing, we find two distinct notions of the mean.
Aristotle distinguishes between the mean relative to us (pros hêmas) and the mean
relative to the deed (pros tou pragmatos, kath auto to pragma) (NE II.5, 1106b7; cf.
1106a31, a28, a36).
In everything continuous and divisible, we can take more, less and equal, and each of
them either in the object itself (kath auto to pragma) or relative to us (pros hêmas);
and the equal is some intermediate between excess and deficiency. By the
intermediate in the object, I mean what is equidistant from each extremity; this is one
and the same for everyone. But relative to us the intermediate is what is neither
superfluous nor deficient; this is not one, and is not the same for everyone (my italics)
(1106a26 ff.)
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The mean relative to the deed – also referred to as the ‘arithmetical mean’ - counts as
a mean irrespective of the circumstances (1106a35). A simple example of such a mean is
a mean between two quantities – say, ten and two. The mean or the halfway point
between these two numbers is six (1106a33-34). Four is always the mean between two
and six, regardless of the context or circumstance in which one assesses the mean.
Another such mean might be that between two points. The halfway point on a foot-long
ruler, for example, is the six-inch mark, and this will always be the case, irrespective of
the context in which one assesses the mean.
There is another kind of mean that changes according to the circumstance, and
this is the mean ‘relative to us.’ Diet provides a good example of such a mean. The right
calorie intake for an average, young adult male is approximately two thousand calories.
However, for a professional male althlete of comparable weight, age and constitution, the
right daily calorie intake is much larger. A professional athlete might need twice as many
calories per day. Indeed, Michael Phelps made headlines when it came out that he
ingested more than 12, 000 calories per day. Aristotle uses the Greek wrestler Milo to
illustrate this very point about the mean relative to us. Suppose a trainer considers how
much food his athletes should take. He does not prescribe the same amount of food for
everyone. For the beginner in gymnastics, a relatively smaller amount of food may be
appropriate. But for Milo, who is a well-trained, big, strong athlete, a small diet will not
be enough. The right diet for Milo may require much more.
The mean ‘relative to us’ is importantly related to Aristotle’s conception of virtue.
According to Aristotle, virtue is a disposition to choose the mean ‘relative to us.’ Virtue
was thought to be a skill-like or art-like. The skills associated with discernment or good
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judgment – e.g. rhetoric, medicine - were characterized as dispositions to select the
mean. For our purposes, we might think of this as a way of capturing the idea that skills
associated with rhetorical or medical ability require judgment or discernment. For
example, Isocrates characterizes rhetorical ability as the skill of judging the type of
speech – main point, mode of delivery, allusions – needed for a certain audience. Why
should virtue be this sort of mean rather than the arithmetical mean? It is obvious that, to
the extent that virtue is a form of discernment or judgment, it bears a a stronger
relationship to a mean that needs to be discerned rather than mechanically generated, as
does the mean between two numbers.
As a disposition to select the mean relative to us, virtue is both affective and
intellectual. It is affective insofar as one desires and takes pleasure in the attainment of
certain kinds of ends. It is intellectual, or rational, insofar as selecting the mean requires
determining the specific things that count as instances of the general kinds of things that
one aims to select. It is also intellectual insofar as selecting the mean requires
determining the means by which one might attain one’s specific goals. Aristotle’s way of
phrasing the point that virtue is an intellectual state is to claim that the mean is
determined, in part, by orthos logos:
Excellence, then, is a state concerned with (1) choice, (2) lying in a mean (3)
relative to us, (4) this being determined by reason and (5) in the way in which the
man of practical wisdom would determine it (1107a1-3).
There is a relationship between the affective and rational aspects of virtue. The nonrational part of the human being can share in (metechein) reason (NE I.1). This
relationship, in turn, explains how the affective aspects of virtue can be subject to praise
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in blame. (For one might argue that dispositions over which we have no control – like
the emotions - should not be the subject of praise and blame.) The affective dispositions
associated with virtue are regarded as admirable only insofar as they are consistent with
and “obey” reason.
The sense in which the affective and rational parts of the soul are related is also
expressed in the idea that virtue is concerned with choice (prohairetikê). Choice, or
prohairesis, is both affective and ration. It is the psychological state of an agent as he or
she performs an action. More specifically, it is the agent’s reasoned intention to perform
an action in a specific situation. Choice is affective insofar as it is an intention or desire
to perform a certain action. It is rational insofar as the intention is the product or
deliberation or reasoning about what is good or right to do. Choice entails opting for the
action with deliberation - i.e. as opposed to choosing on the spur of the moment (b9) or
out of spirit (thumos) (b18-9).
Because selection of the mean is an intellectual process as much as an affective
one, Aristotle sometimes describes the intellectual part of virtue – phronêsis, or practical
wisdom – in terms of its relationship to the mean. Aristotle claims, for example, that the
mean is determined in the manner that the phronimos would determine it.213 He also
notes that there is a close relationship between phronêsis and the selection of the mean
(NE 1138b18-34; II.6, 1136b36; cf. EE II.5, 1222b7-8).
It is helpful to contrast the idea of virtue as a mean relative to us with two
competing notions of virtue. The Stoics claimed that virtue was a state of apatheia –
namely, a state in which one does not respond to situations with emotion. Apatheia refers
213

w(risme/nh| lo&gw| kai\ w|{ a2n o( fro&nimoj o(ri/seien

174
to the view that the passions have no place in the moral life and that it is best to
eliminate them entirely. Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean should also be distguished from
the metriopatheia, which is the view that the passions have a place in the moral life, but
only if they are moderate. This is essentially the idea of the arithmetical mean or the
mean relative to the deed that we just saw. This is the idea that one gives a response that
is moderate in every respect in all situations. In any situation, one ought to respond with
a moderate amount of anger, grief, joy, exuberance, etc. In response to a rude action, for
example, the metriopathic response is a moderate amount of anger. Similarly, in
response to a generous action, the metriopathic response is moderate amount of
appreciation. This position about the role of the emotions in the moral life can be
criticized on the grounds that, in some cases, a extreme response seems to be in order.
For example, a terribly rude or harmful action might require not moderate anger in
response, but an very angry response. 214
From the viewpoint of the person choosing, there appears to be complexity in the
possible actions or feelings he can opt for. This point is best illlustrated with an example.
Suppose that someone has done something wrong to you, and you are inclined to be
angry in response. But, how long ought you to be angry? In particular, this is a question
one asks when confronted with any temptation to be angry for a extended amount of time.
For the question arises: is it appropriate for me to be angry for this long, or am I holding a
grudge? You can contemplate being angry for any amount of time: anger for one day,
two days, three days…. Similarly, you choose one of these options (anger for one day,
two days….) by implicitly assigning value judgments to each option: e.g. too long, right
214
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amount of time, too short. Of course, you may be wrong. Being angry for five years
is not appropriate - even though you have deemed it appropriate, given your tendency to
implacable resentment. A person without this character flaw will assess the matter
correctly. That is, she will better determine what counts as too long, just right, or too
little for any given situation.
The need to take into account the particular features of a situation (e.g. time,
objects, persons) introduces the requirement of ‘aiming’ (stochazesthai) at the mean
(1126b29).215 Aiming is the activity of assessing particulars in light of a goal.
The process of aiming works as follows. One bears in mind the goal – e.g. the kalon or
sumpheron. One also considers the particular features of the situation in light of that
goal. But the particulars introduce an element of contingency into the process. For
example, it is not always clear how long one ought to be angry, at what sorts of actions
one ought to be angry, or with whom one ought to be angry and to what degree. As
Aristotle claims, these sorts of particulars make the process of deliberation range over
matters about which generalizations hold only ‘for the most part.’
There are several categories or dimensions the agent must consider in selecting
the mean in a particular situation. Two of the most important categories concern actions
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The term ‘aim’ carries the connotation both of aiming – as in using a bow to aim at a
target - but also of conjecturing or guessing. Aristotle uses the term in a variety of ways
(1128a6;1129b15;1109a30; 1127a8;1160a13; 1126b29;
1106b15;1106b28;1109a22;1141b13). Sometimes, it means ‘aiming’ at the mean
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(1160a13). In still other cases, the goal is something one keeps in mind while making
specific decision. Hence, Aristotle claims that we should ‘aim’ at experiencing pleasure
or avoiding pain while keeping in mind the noble and expedient (1126b29). Note that this
construction typically takes the form: while keeping in mind x (visual verb + pros x), one
aims + genitive case of substantive infinitive (e.g. 1126b29; 1160a13).
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and feelings. For example, one can choose to be very angry or only moderately
angry. Similarly, one can choose a vengeful action or a mildly retributive action. There
are also several other categories to consider when making a decision about how to act or
feel. These include (NE IV.5, 1225b31-2):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Length of time: for how long (hoson chronon) ought one to be angry?
Objects: for what (epi hois) ought one to be angry?
Persons: towards whom (hois) ought one to be angry?
Manner: in what manner (hos) ought one to be angry?
Time at which: when (hote) should one get angry?
For the sake of what: why (hou heneka) should one get angry? (II.9, 1109a259)

Aristotle tends to give other lists of categories as well. He names hos, houtou, epi toutois
and epi tousouton chronon (NE IV.5, 1125b34-6); he also names hoi, hoson, hote, hou
heneka, and hôs, II.9, 1109a25-9. Our most complete list, therefore, is represented
above.
Interpreters have thought Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean –the idea that virtue is a
disposition to select the mean relative to us - works in in one of two ways. The first view
is that one perceives the mean. That is, the practically wise person has an insight or
intuition of the mean. This insight has no communicable content, for it rather like the
idea that the person has a sense of what it means to be good, such that she cannot state
what the good is in terms of a set of principles to which she adheres. (It is not merely the
case that she cannot state the principles, but rather that there are none.) She nevertheless
consistently finds the mean in every situation through perception. Thus, we might think
that, by ‘relative to us,’ Aristotle has a relativist position in mind. That is, if (1) a the
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mean is determined relative to us, (2) the agent does not determine the mean in light
of shared moral principles of deliberation.’216
According to the second view, the mean is determined through deliberation, by
appeal to some action-guiding principles. Deliberation does not proceed along the lines
of hard and fast rules. But there is some set of principles that the person of practical
wisdom consults in attempting to determine the mean. Correct deliberation requires
acquiring the right principles of the good; assessing the non-moral facts of particular
situations correctly; and making the right deductions from the right theory of the good in
light of the particular facts about the world. In order to do this, one must possess a
correct set of moral principles – say, a sort of blueprint or plan according to which
various goals are represented and ranked in order of importance.
The difference between these two interpretations can be seen by considering the
readings of the practical syllogism associated with each. According to the generalist, the
practical syllogism represents a decision procedure in which the major premise of the
expresses the agent’s will –e g. ‘be kind to those in need’ or ‘atone for past wrongs.’ The
major premise should be construed a knowledge-cum-desire state – i.e. a content-filled
disposition of the will.217 The minor premise of the practical syllogism conveys the
“straightforward facts about the situation at hand.”218 For example, the minor premise
might correspond to one’s seeing that there is an opportunity to be kind (by helping
someone carry groceries). In deliberation, one puts together the major and minor
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premise, so she thinks: (1) I am committed to ‘be kind’ and (2) there is an opportunity
before me to be kind right now. She concludes that she should (3) do the kind thing.
The particularist interpretation of the doctrine of the mean presents an alternate
account of the practical syllogism. The practical syllogism represents an explanation of
action, rather than a decision procedure. There is no cognitive operation that corresponds
to the putting together of the major and minor premises on the former interpretation.
Rather, we are to think of the practical syllogism as corresponding to two ways of
describing the psychological state of the practically wise person, both of which are
needed to account for the fact that the agent is successfully motivated to perform an
action. The major premise of the practical syllogism is conceived as an expression of the
agent’s general conception of the good life – something like Aristotle’s notion of
eudaimonia or eu prattein.219 The minor premise expresses the agent’s awareness of the
morally salient features of a situation.
As we have just seen, Aristotle claims that virtue is a mean relative to us (pros
hêmas) rather than a mean ‘in the object itself’ (kath auto to pragma) (NE II.5, 1106b7;
cf. 1106a31, a28, a36), and there are two interpretations of his point. Which of these
interpretations of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is correct? In the next section, we will
canvas some reasons to think that the generalist reading of the doctrine of the mean is the
correct reading. I will show that another presentation of the doctrine of the mean relative
to us appeals to action-guiding principles. This presentation can be found in the
Hippocratic Corpus’s On Ancient Medicine. If intellectual context is an indication of the
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way we should read Aristotle, then this presentation of the mean relative to us should
point us in the direction of reading Aristotle as a generalist.
2 The Doctrine of the Mean in On Ancient Medicine
On Ancient Medicine offers an account of the mean that is analogous to
Aristotle’s mean relative to us. Like Aristotle’s mean ‘relative to us,’ according to On
Ancient Medicine, the mean should be determined relative to patient’s particular cases.
But before considering how this is so, it is worth pausing to show that, like
Aristotle’s Ethics, On Ancient Medicine also presents us with the contrast between the
arithmetical mean and the mean relative to us. As we saw in the previous section of the
chapter, the arithmetical mean involves choosing the halfway point with regard to two
extremes, irrespective of the people for whom one chooses the mean or the actions to
which one responds in choosing the mean. For example, the gymnastic trainer would be
choosing the arithmetical mean if he selected the same, moderate sized and medium
strength diet for both the seasoned and the beginning athlete.
On Ancient Medicine presents the same idea in a different guise. For it presents
the idea that all diets should be the same, irrespective of a patient’s specific constitution.
All diets should err on the side of under-nourishment, since the rule in medicine is that a
diet should not overpower a patient’s consitution.
Now if it were as simple as has been suggested, and stronger foods harmed while
weaker ones benefitted and nourished both the sick and the healthy, then things
would be easy: for it would simply be necessary to lead a patient towards the
weakest diet, and one could do so with a good deal of security (9.1)
Hitting the mean as a doctor would be quite straightforward if it meant only that one had
to prescribe a diet that would never overpower a patient’s constitution. The doctor would
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have to consider only how to make the diet weak or not overstrong. He could
prescribe everyone a medium sized diet of gruels and other medium strength foods, for
example. Such a diet would always work, and the doctor could operate with a ‘good deal
of security.’
While the operative principle here might seem obviously wrong, it corresponds to
an important early stage in the development of medicine. According to On Ancient
Medicine, the early stage of medicine’s development was characterized by the project of
making strong and raw foods suitable for the relatively delicate human digestive system.
What the wild animals could eat unproblematically, the human being could not (3.3). At
this stage, medicine was the art of discovering how to make food and drink mild enough
so as to be suitable for human beings.
Of course, medicine cannot end with the project of weakening overly strong
foods. An overly weak diets can be as dangerous as an overly strong diet:
But in fact, the error is no less, nor does it harm the human being less, if one
administers food deficient in quantity and quality to what is needed; for the might
of hunger penetrates forcefully into the human constitution to lame and weaken
and kill. And many other ills, different from those arising from repletion but no
less serious, also arise from depletion (9.2).
Thus, medical treatment is complicated by the fact that both overpowering and
undershooting the strength of a diet are harmful. The illnesses associated with depletion
are as detrimental to health as those associated with overpowering of the patient’s
constitution. The result is that the doctor must “aim” for the mean in between
excessively strong and weak diets. (“For one must aim at a measure”) (9.3). It is
important to see that we have here something like the mean relative to the deed or
arithmetical mean – namely, diets should be neither overstrong nor overweak. They
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should offer nutritional value that is somewhere in the middle of defects and excesses
of strength.
But, the text goes on to introduce the equivalent of Aristotle’s mean relative to us.
For it suggests that the mean must be determined with reference to individual patients.
As the following passage suggests, an individual’s makeup should determine the correct
treatment for that patient:
This I think is what it is necessary for a doctor to know about nature (phusis) and
to make every effort to know, if he is going to do any of the things that he must:
what the human being is in relation (pros) to foods and drinks, and what it is in
relation to (pros) other practices, and what will be the effect of each thing on each
individual (aph’hekastou hekastô)(On Ancient Medicine, 20.3). 220
We must pay particular attention to the claim that the doctor must study ‘the effect of
each thing on each individual.’ As the passage argues, the doctor must know about the
nature or constitution of the human being (phusis). The suggestion seems to be that the
doctor should know the features of the human being in general (e.g. that humans have
two arms, two eyes, a heart that works roughly as so….). But in particular, the doctor
must know what this constitution is in relation to (pros) food and drinks – hence, the
important distinction between ‘what man is’ and ‘what man is in relation to foods and
drinks.’ However, as the remark about ‘the effect of each thing on each individual’
shows, the doctor must know how this food and drink will effect each individual. In
other words, treatment (i.e. food and drink) should be adjusted to individual cases.
This seems to be a recasting of Aristotle’s mean relative to us in medical terms.
Like Aristotle’s mean relative to us, the mean determined in light of ‘the effect of each
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thing on each individual’ is a mean determined with respect to particular person’s
cases. In the case of ethics, this point is phrased as a relation between the individual and
various features of action or praxis – namely: time, place, extent, manner, and so on. In
the case of medicine, the same basic point is phrased as a relation between food/ drink/
exercise and a particular person’s constitution or phusis. In both cases, we have the same
idea – that the mean should be determined with regard to a particular person’s case.
The analogue between Aristotle’s mean relative to us and On Ancient Medicine’s
mean can also be seen by considering On Ancient Medicine’s use of the term ‘phusis.’
For the term is used so that it means both the human being’s constitution, generally
specaking, and an individual’s constitution. Because it can mean the latter – namely, an
individual’s constitution – it helps us see how the text expresses the idea that treatment
needed tailoring to specific cases.
On the one hand, the term phusis is used in the medical corpus to capture the idea
of a recurring features or patterns that make the human being what he is.221 Hence, in
Epidemics, the author writes of the various activities typically associated with the phusis
of the human being: sneezing, blinking, breathing, yawning, etc. These are activities that
the body adopts ‘not from thought,’ but automatically and ‘without instruction,’ which
makes it a good doctor in that nature corrects itself:
The body’s nature (phusis) is the physician in disease. Nature finds the way for
herself, not from thought. For example, blinking, and the tongue offers its
assisstance, and all similar things. Well trained, readily and without instruction,
nature does what is needed. Tear, moisture of the nostrils, sneezing, ear wax,

221

Von Staden calls this “regularly recurring cluster of characteristics by which one can
always recognize a thing as what it is” (Von Staden 2007). Cf. Schiefsky 2005, 69-70.

183
production of saliva in the mouth, the intake of breath, exhalation, yawning,
coughing, hiccough, in a variety of ways” (6.5.1).222
Phusis can often be construed as ‘temperament’ or ‘constitution.’ Thus, the author of
Fractures writes that because “constitutions and ages differ greatly,” there is nothing
exact (atrekes) about the length of time it takes the forearm to heal. (Fract. 7).
In On Ancient Medicine, the term phusis is used to capture the idea of human
nature, in this sense of the regularly recurring characteristics that define what it is to be a
human. We see this idea in the idea that the human being consists of a blend or krâsis of
humors such as sweet, bitter, salty, acid, astringent, insipid, etc. (14.4), and that the
human being is no different from food, in this respect. Just as the healthiest food is wellblended, so too is the healthiest person he who has a well-blended composition of humors
(14.1-2). Namely, the healthiest human being seems to be he whose dunameis are wellblended. By the same token, disease is explained by failure to mix well. If one of the
humors becomes excessively concentrated, it seperates off (apokrinesthai), resulting in
illness. Finally, knowledge of human phusis consists in knowledge of the internal
structures (schemata) that make up human beings, in general. All of these matters –
which are essentially, the properties shared by all human beings – account for the sense in
which phusis refers to a general notion of patterns or regularly recurring characteristics.
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But phusis is also used to capture the idea of a specific individual’s nature.
We saw this in the author’s claim that ‘the nature of …people differ’ such that some are
seriously affected by drinking large quantities of unmixed wine, and others less so.
Similarly, we saw it in the idea that relatively unaffected by large quantities of cheese or
wine and those much affected. On the other hand, phusis is also in such a way that it
refers to an individual’s constitution. We can see this use in the On Ancient Medicine
passage discussed above. Reading phusis as the individual’s constitution is the only way
to get purchase on the author’s claim that ‘the nature of these people differ’ – namely,
those relatively unaffected by large quantities of cheese or wine and those much affected.
The author’s explanation is that these people have different amounts of the same humors
– i.e. ‘those in whom such a humor happens to be present in greater quantity.”
We have also seen this idea throughout the Hippocratic Corpus. In chapter four, I
described several categories of questions that a doctor should ask about his patients,
including: constitution (phusis), age, gender, and geographical location, and so on. All of
these categories concern particular features of patients that doctors must assess in order
to apply rules of regimen to them correctly. For example, as I explained in chapter five, a
doctor might have to establish that a young woman is from the cold, dry and arid regions
of the North in order to ascertain that she has a relatively hardy phusis, and thus will
withstand a relatively substantial diet and fail to thrive with a small one. In all cases,
hitting the mean will not be a mere matter of giving a patient a medium-strength diet.
Indeed, our hardy girl from the North shows as much. She should not drink five glasses
of wine a day, but she should not drink just one either. A person of a weaker constitution
would be better fit with a regimen of just one glass of wine a day – and perhaps watered
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down at that. The reason for differences in individual phuseis is that these people
have different amounts of the same humors – i.e. ‘those in whom such a humor happens
to be present in greater quantity” (20.4).

We have just considered the idea that On Ancient Medicine presents a notion of
the mean that is an analogue to Aristotle’s mean relative to us. We have seen that On
Ancient Medicine presents this idea with the claim that the mean should be selected with
relation to a person’s phusis, or his individual constitution.
Another way to explore the mean in On Ancient Medicine is to consider On
Ancient Medicine’s contrast between ‘what man is’ (ho ti estin anthrôpos) and ‘what man
is in relation to (pros) food and drink.’ At the heart of the contrast is the distinction
between two ways of studying medicine – namely, as the study of nature in the tradition
of the phusiologoi like Empedocles, or as the study of regimen. In declaring its
preference for the study of man in relation to food and drink, On Ancient Medicine
declares its allegience to medicine as the study of regimen. In seeing that On Ancient
Medicine advocates that medicine be the study of regimen, we can helpfully connect On
Ancient Medicine with other treatises on regimen. This, in turn, will help us see that On
Ancient Medicine’s commitment to tailoring treatment to specific patient cases should be
understood in light of the widespread commitment in such treatises to the study of
general principles that guide diet.
On the one hand, the inquiry into ‘what man is’ is an inquiry into the basic nature
of the human being – its constituent parts, its matter, and its origin. On the other hand,
the inquiry into ‘what man is in relation to food and drink’ is an inquiry into the nature of

186
man in relation to his environment – not only the food and drink he ingests, but the
place in which he lives, the air he breaths and the kind of habits he keeps. On Ancient
Medicine argues for a focus on the latter notion in medicine, in contradistinction to the
former - namely, ‘what man is in relation to food and drink’ as opposed to ‘what man is.’
For the study of ‘what man is in relation to food and drink’ brings the doctor closer to
effective and practicable treatments for patients, so the argument goes. But, as the text
suggests, the study of man in relation to food and drink is not merely the study of the
general features of that relationship, but the study of the specific features of that
relationship. That is, the doctor’s work is to study not only the relationship between man
and his environment, generally, but the relationship between a specific patients and food
and drink. In effect, the treatise calls for the doctor’s attention to the study of a patient’s
specific or individuating features, in addition to those features that he shares in common
with other human beings.
Let us consider the first arm of the contrast – namely, the study of ‘what man is.’
This is the study of origins, the constituent parts, the nature, and matter of the human
being in general:
Some doctors and sophists say that it is impossible for anyone to know medicine
who does not know what the human being is (ho ti estin anthrôpos). Anyone who
is going to treat patients correctly must, they say, learn this. Their account tends
towards philosophy, just like Empedocles or others who have written about nature
from the beginning (ex archês ho ti estin anthrôpos), what the human being is and
how it originally came to be (hopôs egeneto prôton) and from what things it is
compounded (hopôs sunepagê )(20.1).
The study of ‘what man is’ can be characterized by a general concern to develop accounts
of the origins of man (ex archês ho ti estin anthrôpos), how he came to be (hopôs egeneto
prôton) and what he is made of (hopôs sunepagê)(20.1). The inquiry into ‘what the man
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is’ is associated with Empedocles and others who wrote about nature (alloi hoi peri
phuseôs gegraphasin). This is the study of nature that was characteristic of a group of
scientists or philosophers termed the phusiologoi. Their interest was in the study of man
in terms of his origin and his material makeup. We can easily find examples of such
inquiries. For instance, when Plato writes of Socrates’early adventures in cosmology and
the ‘inquiry into nature’ in the Phaedo, he is hypothesizing about a stage in Socrates’ life
in which Socrates could be counted among the phusiologoi (97c-99b).
To understand fully the study of ‘what man is’ in On Ancient Medicine, we must
look at role of the phusiologoi in intellectual society. The passage above is part of a long
tradition of critique, according to which the study of nature was not relevant to the
understanding of the nature of living well. Cicero rehearses this critique when he writes
that “celestial phenomena [Socrates] regarded as beyond our comprehension, or at any
rate, however well we might understand them, as irrelevant to the good life” (Academica,
I.4,15). Isocrates’ Antidosis also levels a critique of the phusiologoi. While scientific
knowledge disposes students to learn, nothing about its content helps a student along
when it comes to praxis. This is because the study of such matters demands “special
subtlety and refinement.”1 These studies have no connection with other forms of learning
and particularly with the useful kind of rhetorical abilities that Isocrates claims to teach
(263-4). If anything, such studies isolate a student from the normal life of the polis – the
normal political life implicitly identified by Isocrates as the quintessential activity of the
Athenian people.
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The critique of the phusiologoi also enters the medical corpus. On Fractures
epitomizes the hostility towards impractical and excessively learned doctors. Not only
are such doctors ineffective, they even harm their patients.
The theorizing (sophismenoi) practitioners are just the ones who go wrong. In
fact, the treatment of a fractured arm is not difficult, and is almost any
practitioners job. But I have to write a lot about it because I know wise (sophos)
doctors who, out of a schematon… have got credit for wisdom by putting up
arms in positions which ought rather to have given them a name for ignorance.
And many other parts of the art are judged thus. They practice the outlandish, not
knowing if it is useful, and take the customary to be good… (On Fractures, 1)
First, these doctors believe that they are capable. Second, they base their analyses of
patients on theories. The author of On Fractures takes such theories to be misguided
since they favor false analogies and spectacle. Finally, the lay public are impressed by
such shows of apparent wisdom. The opening chapters of On Fractures develop several
criticisms of other doctors on the basis of their “wisdom” (the term is used
provocatively). The so-called ‘wise’ doctor, in the grip of a schêma, falsely reasons about
the method by which to cure a broken arm. As we discover later, the source of the
misguided reasoning is a false analogy to archery. The bad doctor reasons that – because
archers hold their arms in a certain position – one ought to bandage the arm so as to favor
the archer’s position. While the practice of drawing analogies gives the bad doctor the
appearance of wisdom, it does little to help the broken arm.
This is not to suggest that all the treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus are uniformly
aligned against the phusiologoi’s inquiry into nature. Treatises such as Fleshes, Regimen
and Sevens treat the human being as if it were made up of the constitutive elements of the
cosmos. For example, Fleshes uses three elements (air, earth and aether) to give an
account of the formation of the various parts of the human body. Regimen explains the
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nature of the body in terms of two elements: water and fire. It presents a view of man
as a microcosm of the cosmos, with the consequence that the anatomy and physiology
developed in the treatise show the way in which the body looks like the cosmos. The
belly, for example, is supposed to be enveloped by three “circuits,” on the model of the
three revolutions of moon, sun, and stars about the earth. There is a second group of
Hippocratic treatises which treat medicine as an autonomous discipline, rather than an
offshoot of cosmology. In this camp, we find the treatises Nature of Man and Ancient
Medicine. The Nature of Man criticizes the monists who held that human nature is
constituted by the elements fire, air, water, and earth. Ancient Medicine criticizes
physicians who explain diseases by means of postulates such as the hot, cold, moist and
dry.
Let us return to On Ancient Medicine and the specific complaint there about the
phusiologoi. A first complaint is a point about the usefulness of theories of the cold, hot,
wet and dry. In using such theories, a doctor will not cure his patients. He will drive
them to an early death. If a person follows a regimen based on this theory, “he will suffer
many terrible things: for he will experience pains, his body will be weak, his digestion
will be ruined, and he wil not be able to live for long” (13.1). This objection follows
from a second one – according to which the theory of disease and human constitution in
question is simply wrong. Doctors who operate according to the method ex hupotheseôs
have the wrong theory of properties. They believe that the only things which exist are:
hot, cold, wet and dry. These are the properties, in turn, which explain health and disease
in the human body. Since health consists in a balance of those properties, disease is the
imbalance of the same properties and it is treated by rectifying the balance.
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Now that we have considered the study of ‘what the man is’ and the critique
of this sort of study, let us consider the contrasting idea - namely ‘what man is in relation
to food and drink.’ The following passage, a part of which was quoted earlier, provides
the core of the view:
…This is what it is necessary for a doctor to know about nature and to make every
effort to know, if he is going to do any of the thing that he must: what the human
being is in relation to foods and drinks, and what it is in relation to other practices,
and what will be the effect of each thing on each individual – not simply that
‘cheese is harmful food’, for it causes trouble to one who has eaten too much of
it’, but rather what trouble, and why, and which of the things in the human being
it is inimical to. (20.3-4).
Medicine ought to provide an account of the effects of food, drinks, and exercise on
human beings and an account of the reasons or causes of those effects. That is, the doctor
should know “what the human being is in relation to foods and drinks” and “in relation to
other practices” (e.g. exercise, bathing, etc.).
In effect, this passage argues that the doctor’s body of knowledge should be
constituted by an account of regimen. Regimen, or dietetics (diêta) is the science of
managing the body’s humors in order to maintain and restore health. 223 The science
developed in fifth and fourth century Greece, having been imported – mythically, like
many other technai – from Egypt. Regimen is a holistic science; it deals with all aspects
of life: one’s sleeping, eating, exercise and sexual habits. It prescribes times of day
during which to eat and activities with which to occupy oneself between meals. It makes
instructions regarding best partners, education, and – in general – what one ought to
believe about the world. But fundamentally, regimen is a science dealing with food and
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drink. It explains how much of what sort of thing one ought to eat or drink in order to
keep his health.
Techniques of regimen changed in the late fifth and fourth centuries. Originally,
regimen was not a philosophical or theory-laden science. It had consisted exclusively in
the administration of food and drinks.224 However, in the late fifth century, the doctor
Herodicus of Selymbria communicated his medical findings to intellectuals and
philosophers (Rep. 405d-406c).225 Afterwards, there was a flurry of interest in spelling
out the details of regimen in a more theoretical and systematic form. Several treatises on
regimen date from this period of burgeoning theoretical inquiry: Regimen, Epidemics,
Regimen in Health, Regimen in Acute Diseases, Airs Waters Places and Nutriment.
3 Rules in the Hippocratic Corpus
We have seen that On Ancient Medicine is a treatise that argues for medicine as
the study of regimen. We should now consider the fact that it is also commonplace in
treatises on regimen to invoke general principles in the determination of the mean and in
determining how best to restore the patient to his mean state. In this section of the
chapter, we will see several kinds of principles that the doctor would have used to
determine the mean in relation to a specific patient.
Before considering these principles, a note about terminology is in order. By the
term ‘principle’ or ‘rule,’ I have in mind an idea that is not always translated in the Greek
text as such, but which is implicit in the giving of the sorts of rules that will be discussed
below. However, if the Greek does have a term for ‘rule,’ then it is ‘nomos’ or ‘logos.’
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Nomos is most familiar to us in its translation as ‘law.’ In the Hippocratic Corpus, it
is used – primarily in the singular – to capture the idea of a doctor’s protocol – as in ‘rule
of law’ (i.e. as opposed to ‘rules of procedure’).226 Logos is also used to express the idea
of a rule or a principle that the doctor ought to follow (e.g. Regimen in Acute Diseases,
7).
The Hippocratic doctor would have used a wide swath of principles in treating
patients, and we can see this well by taking the Hippocratic work Places in Man as an
example. One of the earliest or the earliest treatise in the Hippocratic Corpus,227 Places
in Man is wide ranging in themes, dealing with all aspects of the doctor’s art. In
particular, it deals with the physiology of the human being, the aetiology of diseases,
treatment of patients, general principles of medicine and gynaecology. Moreover, the
treatise was probably written for the instruction of neophyte doctors,228 so it presents a
clear picture of the basic knowledge that the doctor would have been expected to possess.
On all counts, then, the treatise will provide us with a good sense of the principle to
which the doctor would have appealed in treating patients. In what follows, I will
proceed as if asking: what must the doctor know in order to treat his patients?
First of all, the doctor would have had an account of the patient’s physiology.
Places in Man operates with a rudimentary and standard account of humors – an account
very much like the one found in the seminal Nature of Man, but far less detailed and
rigorous in exposition.229 According to humoral theory, the human being is composed of
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four basic qualities – hot, cold, wet and dry. However, in Nature of Man, this group
includes phlegm rather than water. In turn, phlegm has a wide range of roles in the body,
for it can be associated with both health and illness. As evidence of health, phlegm is
associated with the swelling of sexual organs. As evidence of illness, on the other hand,
phlegm takes the form of pus or ichor.230
Besides the humoral theory, a second aspect of patient physiology in Places in
Man is the theory of flux (rheuma). The flux is a movement of a moisture-like substance
that flows from various parts of the body, such as the head or the belly. While typically
manifested as phlegm, the moving agent can be blood or bile.231 The process of sweating
is a relatively simple example of a flux. When the heat of the body increases, the vessels
of the body expand, giving way to increased flow of blood through the vessels (9). This
flow is the flux. There are seven fluxes, all of which start from the head. (These can
conveniently be thought of as pathways starting from the head and leading to various
parts of the body through which the various forms of moisture could course.) The fluxes
terminate in places such as the nose, ears, eyes, belly and back.232
In addition to knowledge of physiology, the doctor would have also possessed an
understanding of the aetiology and nature of disease. In Places in Man, disease is caused
primarily by the imbalance of humors in the body. This imbalance, in turn, would have
caused a disruption to the fluxes. Disruption might have taken many forms: aggregation,
corruption or exceedingly fast flow.233 One such form of disruption was fixation, the
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state in which one of the moisture-like substances would have become lodged
somewhere in the body. Angina, for example, was the condition in which blood became
fixed in the vessels at the back of the neck (30). The disrupted fluxes might manifest
themselves in the form of various liquids and stuffs secreted or emitted from the body’s
various orifices – e.g. pus and vomit.
As for treating disease, the doctor might ascertain the nature of a patient’s illness
by making note of these kinds of signs. For example, an improper flux to the spinal
marrow can be recognized by the dryness of the head, nose and eyes. The patient’s
vision becomes weak. The patient himself becomes pale and has difficulty coughing up
mucus. The front of the patient’s body will be dry, while the back will be moist (10.3).
There are signs for improper flux to other parts of the body as well. For instance, a
patient with a flux to the eye will have phlegmatic and swollen eyes (13.1). If the flux
comes from the patient’s flesh and bones rather than his head, the skin on the head will
swell; sores will develop and erupt; and the patient will shed tears. However, he will not
feel pain or experience blurred vision. The liquid expelled through his eyes will be salty
(13.3) Again, flux to the chest can be detected by ascertaining whether the patient feels
pain at his side and near his collar bone. Flux to the chest is also accompanied by fever
and a greenish color on the tongue. The patient will cough up thick sputum (14.1). One
last example: excess of bile can be detected through the following signs: bright or livid
hues in the eyes and nails; sores and livid area around the sores; sweating on just one part
of the body; and green colored expectorant (16.1). These are the signs of pleurisy.
With these signs in mind, the doctor should decide how to treat his patient.
Therapies were directed at restoring the proper fluxes to the body, which often meant
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manipulating of the amount of wetness or dryness in the flux, since disease was
caused by excess or deficiency of moisture in the flux. Take, for example, the case of
flux just discussed. If the doctor sees the signs of pleurisy, Places in Man directs him to
treat the patient in the following manner. First, the doctor should let the fever progress
for seven days. During this time, he should prescribe vinegar water or vinegar-and-honey
water. The patient should be encouraged to drink as much of these as possible. (The aim
is to increase the amount of moisture in the body so as to dislodge or break up the matter
obstructing the flux.) The patient should take warming drugs and have a bath on the
fourth day of his illness. On the fifth and sixth days, the patient should be anointed with
olive oil. Finally, on the seventh day, the doctor should attend carefully to the state of the
fever. It should begin to slack starting on the seventh day. If the patient does not seem to
be recovering, he should be bathed in warm water so as to induce sweating – in turn, to
let off some of the heat his body has been accumulating (17.1).
For flux to the eye, Places in Man recommends the following therapy. First, the
patient should receive a drug. If the patient experiences only slight flux and irritation, the
drug should both dry the eye and make it moist. That is, it should dry the eye, but induce
watering (13.2). Along with the medication for the eye, a drug ought also to be
administered to the nose, and this should be done every day or every other day, its dosage
increasing little by little. The drug for the nose should have drying properties in case any
of the excess moisture in the direction of the eyes changes course and travels to the nose
(13.2).
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Therapy for illness could be accomplished either through diet or more extreme
measures such as surgery and cautery.234 For example, an enlarged spleen would have
been treated initially with drugs – the sort of drugs that evacuate water from the body –
and with foods that are moist or phlegmatic in nature (24.2). However, if these were to
fail, Places in Man recommends ‘gentle’ cautery, since the cautery will be a more
aggressive means of drawing water from the body: ‘cauterize around the cricle of the
navel, and no on the navel itself, and drain it every day’ (trans. Craik)(24.2). Similarly,
surgery was sometimes called for as a last resort. (In general, the Hippocratic treatises
are cautious about the need for surgery.) For example, Places in Man recommends
trephinning for skull injuries, but only in cases in which there is danger of pus
accumulating beneath the skull. This dangerous procedure involved boring a hole into
the head, which would have allowed the pus and other noxious substances to escape from
the wounded area. After the trephinning has been completed, the patient should be given
drying drugs and be bathed (32.1).
Most of these treatments follow the allopathic principle – namely, illnesses caused
by imbalance among the humors can be rectified by applying the opposite quality to the
offending humor (e.g. excessive moisture can be treated with a drying agent).235 The
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Kosak notes that the main therapeutic alternatives to allopathy in the field of regimen
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abstraction does so. According to Hankinson, for example, such principles evidence a
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allopathic principle is a reflection of a scientific model of the human being according
to which the human being exhibits a balance of different or opposing humors, such that
disease is a manifestation of imbalance between or among these humors. This sort of
picture of the human being is symptomatic of a more general tendency in Presocratic,
Platonic and Aristotelian science to see the natural world in terms of opposing forces.
However, it is important to note that Places in Man does not give its unmitigated
support to the allopathic principle. The treatise presents two sorts of cases designed to
challenge the merits of allopathy (42.1-3). The first case is that of illnesses that have at
least two causes. For example, fever can be caused by either excessive moisture or
excessive dryness in the body. Dryness was often associated with declining health or
advancing age (e.g. Aristotle, HA II.2). Hence, the author of Places in Man writes that
‘what is more dry is inclined to contract illnesses and suffer more…for an ailment in a
dry situation is fixed and does not let up” (I.1). Notice the consequences for the doctor
attempting to treat the fever. If he is uncertain of the cause of the fever, he will also be
uncertain of the proper treatment. If the fever is caused by dryness, it is cured through
moisture – e.g. baths and drinks. On the other hand, if the fever has been caused by
excessive phlegm, it ought to be cured by substances with drying properties.
Earaches also have two kinds of cause and, therefore, two kinds of treatment.
Earaches are caused by flux from the ear, characterized by an overabundance of either

desire to explain and control physical phenomena on the basis of an abstract causal theory
(Hankinson 2003, 54). “Both the structure of the pathological theory and the insistence
upon the intelligibility of disease and bodily function and dysfunction are products of the
same intellectual attitudes as those which nourished Presocratic speculation” (Hankinson
2003, 53) – namely a desire to explain physical phenomena on the basis of an abstract
causal theory.
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hotness or coldness. One method of treatment is to administer a drug with heating
properties (12.1). “For the patient who is gripped by pain, the treatment is to warm up a
drug with heating properties, dilute it with butter almond oil, insert it in the ear and apply
a cupping vessel behind….” (12.1). But if the heating properties do not work, the doctor
should switch treatments and attempt to cool the area (12.2). In all cases like that of the
fever or the earache, the practical reality is that the doctor should try administering one
sort of thing; if this does not work, the doctor ought to try the opposite. “Always change
the treatment from a method which does not effect a cure; and if a method makes things
worse, try the opposite. If the treatment tends to bring improvement, change nothing at
all in the treatment applied; do not desist from it and do not add anything further” (42.2;
cf. 12.2, 34.1).
A second case also raises problems for the allopathic principle – namely, the
allopathic treatment sometimes harms a patient. That is, the treatment that would
typically work for a patient actually harms the patient. Such patients have weak
constitutions. As a result, the treatment overpowers their constitution, harming rather
than helping. Indeed, as the author claims, ‘the very things which make the body strong
dominate the body and thereby effect the opposite (43.1; cf. 44.2-3; VM 6-9). For
example, a hot bath weakens the body if one’s health is not up to the bath. If it is
stronger, the bath is good for the body (43.2). We have seen this idea in On Ancient
Medicine as well. For there, too, the idea is that regimen is healthy for the patient
provided that it is neither too strong nor too weak, given the patient’s constitution.
Similarly, the operative principle in Places in Man is the idea that health follows from a
diet that is neither too strong nor too weak, depending on the particular body in question.
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Given these problem cases, the author concludes bombastically that the only
principle in medicine is that there is no “fixed principle” (42.4).
Medicine is a matter of fine balance. If a man understand this, he has a fixed
principle, and he understands the presence or absence of inherent qualities,
knowledge of which is balance in medicine: that is, that loosening agents may
become non-loosening and that other things are (similarly) contraries; and that the
most contrary things are not most contrary …. (Loc. 44.1)
The only fixed principle is the need for flexibility. For the doctor must know the strength
of the patient’s constitution relative to the strength of the regimen or treatment
administered. The relative strength of the two determines what kind of effect treatment
will have on the body. The consequence is that, in many cases, the doctor has to be
attentive to the effect of the treatment on the body – and switch to its opposite, if need be
(34.1). For the allopathic principle does not always result in the increasing health of a
patient. The patient’s individual consistution and response to a treatment is decisive. We
have seen this point made elsewhere. As On Ancient Medicine suggested, the doctor
must also know how food and drink will affect individual patients (20.4-6). Some people
are invigorated by cheese, find it nourishing and filling. Others find that it causes
digestive difficulty and weakness. Similarly, some people can drink three glasses of
unmixed wine without batting an eye; yet for others, the dose would be overwhelming.
Places in Man recommends the same attention to the individual in noting that, at base,
medicine has “no fixed principle.”
But does the lack of a “fixed principle” mean that the doctor employs no
principles or generalizations in determining the best way to balance the patient’s humors?
This does not seem to be the case. We can see this by considering an imaginative
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reconstruction of a treatment session with a hypothetical doctor trained through
Places in Man. Suppose that an ill patient visits this doctor. The doctor must first
ascertain the nature of the person’s illness. Initially, this involves reading the signs or the
symptoms of illness. We encountered several such descriptions of signs above. For
example, the signs of flux to the spinal marrow are: dryness of the head, nose and eyes;
weak vision; pallor, moist backside, dry frontside, and difficulty expectorating. The signs
of flux to the eye are: swollen eyes, erupting sores, shedding of tears and salty pus
through the eyes.
The diagnostic process may be complicated by the many relevant details about the
patient’s life. While Places in Man does not dwell on this point, closely related treatises
such as Regimen suggest that a doctor might have to inquire about many facets of a
patient’s life and situation in order to complete the diagnostic process. He must ask about
matters such as: the patient’s habitual eating patterns (one or two meals a day); the
patient’s exercise and bathing habits; and the geographical location of his home. Does
the patient live close to brackish water? Does he live in a valley or in an area that has
winds that characteristically bring certain illnesses during certain parts of the year? Of
course, the doctor must also ask about the progression of the illness so far: how long have
you had this? How did it start? How severe was the pain on that day? These details help
the doctor to establish the progression of the disease so far. As we saw above, the
Hippocratic also knew that diseases manifested certain patterns of development.
In the diagnostic stage of the doctor’s treatment, we see in the doctor’s
deliberation the interplay of general and particular considerations On the one hand, the
doctor knows the various signs of flux to the spinal marrow. But the signs that the patient
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manifests might be consistent with another illness as well. For example, flux to the
spinal marrow is accompanied by pallor. But pallor may also be a sign of the enervation
associated with pneumonia. Thus, the doctor has to go back and forth between what he
knows about the general patterns of disease, on the one hand, and about the particular
history of the patient. He will have to inquire about the patient’s recent history: do you
also have a pain in your chest? Are you also sometimes feverish? Does anyone in your
household have a similar ailment? By going between knowledge of the general
characteristics and patterns of particular diseases and the specific symptoms of the
patient, the doctor is ultimately able to arrive at a hypothesis about the nature of a
patient’s condition.236
Once the doctor has established a first-round diagnosis of the patient’s condition,
he turns to the treatment of the condition. Again, as we saw above, the doctor employs
principles to arrive at such a treatment. For example, as Places in Man instructs, pleurisy
should be treated according to a set schedule: the patient’s fever tolerated for seven days,
during which time the patient should be administered a battery of remedies including
vinegar water and honey-vinegar water, warming drugs, a bath, and anointment with
olive oil. Similarly, flux to the eye should be treated with drugs that have drying
properties, and these should be administered to both the eye and the nose, their dosage
increased little by little each day or every other day. Some diseases required more
aggressive treatments. An injury to the skull, for example, might require trephinning, and
this procedure, too, would have been completed according to a set schedule. Once the
trephinning is complete, the patient should receive drying drugs and a bath.
236
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There is need for sensitvity to a change in a patient’s fortunes. A doctor may
do everything right, and still the patient’s health declines. In such cases, the doctor must
be vigilant about the path of the patient’s recovery if he is to change a patient’s therapy or
reverse a therapy that is causing harm. Thus, the doctor continues to be involved in the
patient’s case long after the intial stage of diagnosis and treatment. It is probably for
reasons such as these that the author of Places in Man remarks that
…It is not possible to learn medicine quickly…. It is impossible for any fixed
expertise to come about in it…. [for] medicine now and at other times does not do
the same thing; and does opposite things to the same individual….(41.-2).
Does any of this speak to a lack of principles in determining the best way to
restore the humoral balance of a sick patient? If anything, we see quite the contrary.
From the stage of diagnosis to the stage of treatment, the doctor appeals to principles that
express medical knowledge about the various clues that diseases leave for diagnosticians
and to principles that express medical knowledge about the best way to treat those
ailments, once their nature has been determined. These principles included claims about
the signs of illness (e.g. pallor, fever, shedding of tears, and so on). They also included
claims about the way to treat illness – claims that were quite specific in some cases (e.g. a
drying drug should be administered to the eye in increasing doses, little by little, every
other day).
In my view, these principles are the helpmates to the doctor’s determination of the
mean for a patient. That is, they help the doctor determine the nature of the patient’s
failure to have a balanced set of humors. They also help the doctor to determine how best
to re-establish that balance among the humors. As we have seen many times already, the
Hippocratics were committed to the idea that such helpmates could be useful only to a
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degree. For, at some point, the doctor must use his judgment to determine just how
much of a drug was appropriate for a patient – given his or her constitution – and just
how much of change to diet that patient could sustain towards his or her health. Thus, the
Hippocratics acknowledge that general knowledge is very important in the treatment of
patients, but that they are also not sufficient for making a patient healthy. In addition, the
doctor must get to know the patient – who he or she is, in particular; what makes the
person different from all others, and what course of treatment might, therefore, best
restore this patient to health.
Conclusion
Aristotle argues that the virtuous mean in determined “relative to us” (pros hêmas).
Recall that the particularist argues that the standard (horos) in light of which an agent
selects the mean (NE VI.1, 1138b18-24) is not constituted by principles. Treatises on
regimen presents a counterexample to the particularist reading of Aristotle’s doctrine of
the mean. First of all, one such treatise on regimen – namely, On Ancient Medicine –
offers an account of the mean that closely resembles Aristotle’s virtuous mean. For it
argues that doctors should determine the mean relative to patient’s particular cases.
Second, treatises on regimen like On Ancient Medicine endorse a role for action-guiding
principles in the selection of the mean. The doctor must know about phusis in both the
general and particular sense in order to deliberate successfully about a patient’s
treatment. We got that idea by seeing that a correct application of the doctrine of the
mean involves adjustment of general rules of diet to particular patient’s constitutions. If
we were to transport the same lesson to Aristotle’s virtuous mean, we would say that the
mean is determined with reference to particular cases, but also in light of general action-
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guiding principles. Thus, on this score, too, the particularist reading of Aristotle is
problematic.
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